Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279.

122 citing documents.

  • Harvey v. Dots, Inc. 561 N.W.2d 192 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
    See Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 288 , (prior cases are not authority on the issue of appealability if that issue was not presented to the court).
  • Pulju v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty 535 N.W.2d 608 Minn. 1995
  • Pulju v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty 535 N.W.2d 608 Minn. 1995
    We are unable to identify any purpose served by this characterization and conclude that it is contrary to the cumulative discussions of the nature of “special proceedings” contained in Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279 , and Willeck v. Willeck, 286 Minn. 553
  • Mely v. State Farm Insurance Co. 530 N.W.2d 216 Minn. Ct. App. 1995
  • Mely v. State Farm Insurance Co. 530 N.W.2d 216 Minn. Ct. App. 1995
    See Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 283 , (special proceeding is commenced independently by petition or motion to obtain special relief).
  • Duluth Ready-Mix Concrete, Inc. v. City of Duluth 520 N.W.2d 775 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
  • Duluth Ready-Mix Concrete, Inc. v. City of Duluth 520 N.W.2d 775 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
    See Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 283
  • In Re the Establishment of County Ditch No. 11 (Bevens Creek) 511 N.W.2d 54 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
  • In Re the Establishment of County Ditch No. 11 (Bevens Creek) 511 N.W.2d 54 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
    1100, 1100 (1910) (ditch proceedings are special proceedings); see also Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 283 , (special proceedings include civil remedies that are not ordinary civil actions).
  • Steeves v. Campbell 508 N.W.2d 817 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
  • Steeves v. Campbell 508 N.W.2d 817 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
    See Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 283 , (special proceeding is such a proceeding as may be commenced independently of a pending action by petition or motion, upon notice, to obtain special relief).
  • County of Stearns v. Schaaf 472 N.W.2d 191 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
  • County of Stearns v. Schaaf 472 N.W.2d 191 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
    A special proceeding is “such a proceeding as may be commenced independently of a pending action by petition or motion, upon notice, in order to obtain special relief.” Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 283
  • Gayle's Marina Corp. v. Minnehaha Creek Watershed District 451 N.W.2d 907 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
  • Gayle's Marina Corp. v. Minnehaha Creek Watershed District 451 N.W.2d 907 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
    While the mere existence of opinions which do not comment on jurisdiction is not persuasive upon the issue of appealability, Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 288 , we clarify today that such permitting decisions are appealable as a matter of right.
  • Park & Recreation Board of Minneapolis v. Carl Bolander & Sons Property 436 N.W.2d 481 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
  • Park & Recreation Board of Minneapolis v. Carl Bolander & Sons Property 436 N.W.2d 481 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
    See Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 288 , (mere existence of occasional opinions on merits, without comment on basis for jurisdiction, does not render non-appealable order appealable).
  • In Re State & Regents Building Asbestos Cases 435 N.W.2d 521 Minn. 1989
  • Voss v. Duerscherl 408 N.W.2d 161 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
  • Voss v. Duerscherl 408 N.W.2d 161 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
    103.03(g) provides for review of “a final order, decision or judgment affecting a substantial right made in an administrative or other special proceeding.” The supreme court has defined a “special proceeding” as a “generic term for any civil remedy in a court of justice which is not of itself an ordinary action.” Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 283
  • Knutson v. Commissioner of Public Safety 406 N.W.2d 560 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
  • Knutson v. Commissioner of Public Safety 406 N.W.2d 560 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
    Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 283 , -41 (1950) (emphasis deleted) (citations omitted).
  • Rock v. Hennepin Broadcasting Associates, Inc. 359 N.W.2d 735 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
  • Rock v. Hennepin Broadcasting Associates, Inc. 359 N.W.2d 735 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
    Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 283 , -41 (1950) (emphasis added) (an order denying a motion for join-der of parties is not a special proceeding); see also Beatty v. Winona Housing and Redevelopment Authority, 277 Minn. 76, 79-80 , (declaratory judgment actions are not special proceedings).
  • Brown v. Muetzel 358 N.W.2d 725 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
  • Brown v. Muetzel 358 N.W.2d 725 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
    Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 283 , -41 (1950) (emphasis added) (determining that order denying motion for joinder of parties is not a special proceeding); see also Beatty v. Winona Housing & Redevelopment Authority, 277 Minn. 76, 79 , (declaratory judgment actions are not special proceedings).
  • Johnson Motor Co., Inc. v. Cue 352 N.W.2d 114 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
  • Johnson Motor Co., Inc. v. Cue 352 N.W.2d 114 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
    Rule 103.03(e) allows a party to appeal “from an order which, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken.” Rule 103.03(g) allows an appeal from a “final order * * * affecting a substantial right made in [a] * * * special proceeding * * ” A garnishment action has been held to be a “special proceeding,” Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279
  • Village Apartments v. State 320 N.W.2d 729 Minn. 1982
  • In Re Objections and Defenses, Etc. 320 N.W.2d 729 Minn. 1982
  • Village Apartments v. State 320 N.W.2d 729 Minn. 1982
    We have also refused to allow an appeal from an order denying a motion for joinder of additional parties for the reason that such an order “is decisive of no fundamental issue.” Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 284
  • In Re Objections and Defenses, Etc. 320 N.W.2d 729 Minn. 1982
    Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 284
  • Olson v. Burt 239 N.W.2d 212 Minn. 1976
  • Olson v. Burt 239 N.W.2d 212 Minn. 1976
    Cf. Luethi v. Stanko, 240 Minn. 380 , Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279
  • Grothe Ex Rel. Grothe v. Shaffer 232 N.W.2d 227 Minn. 1975
  • Grothe Ex Rel. Grothe v. Shaffer 232 N.W.2d 227 Minn. 1975
    Burke v. Hunt, 397 U. S. 1010 , 90 S. Ct. 1239 , 25 L. ed. 2d 423 (1970); Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279
  • Milner ex rel. Milner v. Haller 206 N.W.2d 924 Minn. 1973
  • Milner ex rel. Milner v. Haller 206 N.W.2d 924 Minn. 1973
    Cf. Cohen v. Globe Business Sales, Inc. 282 Minn. 540 , Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279
  • Willeck v. Willeck 176 N.W.2d 558 Minn. 1970
  • Willeck v. Willeck 176 N.W.2d 558 Minn. 1970
    Beatty v. Winona Housing & Redevelopment Authority, 277 Minn. 76 , 151 N. W. (2d) 584 ; Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279 , 41 N. W. (2d) 438 ; Anderson v. Langula, 180 Minn. 250 , .
  • Hunt v. Nevada State Bank 172 N.W.2d 292 Minn. 1969
  • Hunt v. Nevada State Bank 172 N.W.2d 292 Minn. 1969
    See, Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279 , 41 N. W. (2d) 438 ,16 A. L. R. (2d) 1015, and Luethi v. Stanko, 240 Minn. 380 , 61 N. W. (2d) 522 .
  • Farnam v. Linden Hills Congregational Church 149 N.W.2d 689 Minn. 1967
  • Farnam v. Linden Hills Congregational Church 149 N.W.2d 689 Minn. 1967
    9, says, in part, that “[t]he supreme court shall hear and dispose of the matter in accordance with the laws and court rules governing appeals in civil actions.” In Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279 , 41 N. W. (2d) 438 , 16 A.L.R.
  • Merz v. Oftedal 144 N.W.2d 58 Minn. 1966
  • Merz v. Oftedal 144 N.W.2d 58 Minn. 1966
    We have attempted to define broadly the meaning of a “special proceeding” 1 in Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 283 , 41 N. W. (2d) 438, 440 , 16 A. L. R. (2d) 1015, where we said: “* * * The statutory phrase ‘a special proceeding’ is a generic term for any civil remedy in a court of justice which is not of itself an ordinary action and which, if incidental to an ordinary action, independently of the progress and course of pro
  • State v. J. P. Sinna & Sons, Inc. 136 N.W.2d 666 Minn. 1965
  • State v. J. P. Sinna & Sons, Inc. 136 N.W.2d 666 Minn. 1965
    However, since Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279 , 41 N. W. (2d) 438 , 16 A. L. R. (2d) 1015, this rule can no longer be held applicable to an ex parte order which is nonappealable for reasons other than its ex parte nature.
  • Winnifred Hillerns v. Minnesotan Hotel and Others 135 N.W.2d 63 Minn. 1965
  • Winnifred Hillerns v. Minnesotan Hotel and Others 135 N.W.2d 63 Minn. 1965
    It states: “When the return of the proceedings before the commission has been filed with the clerk of the supreme court, the supreme court shall hear and dispose of the matter in accordance with the laws and court rules governing appeals in civil actions.” Examining the rules governing appeals in civil cases, we find that since Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279 , 41 N. W. (2d) 438 , it *104 has been the rule in this state that an order either granting or denying the joinder of additional parties