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A special proceeding is “such a proceeding as may be commenced independently of a pending action by petition or motion, upon notice, in order to obtain special relief.” ().

Generally, a special proceeding is “such a proceeding as may be commenced independently of a pending action by petition or motion, upon notice, in order to obtain special relief.” ().

See Skelly Oil Co. v. Comm’r of Tax’n, (explaining that opinions must be read in light of “the specific controversy then before [the] court”); (holding that appellate decisions are not authority on issues that were “never raised or called to the attention of the court”).

And assumptions underlying an opinion that are not the subject of a court’s analysis are not precedential on the point that is assumed.” (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Comm’r of Taxation, )).

Opinions must be read in light of “the specific controversy then before [the] court,” Skelly Oil Co. v. Comm’r of Tax’n, and appellate decisions are not authority on issues that were “never raised or called to the attention of the court,”

See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Comm’r of Tax’n, (pre-Franson decision holding that opinions must be read in light of “the specific controversy then before [the] court”); (pre-Franson decision holding that appellate decisions are not authority on issues that were “never raised or called to the attention of the court”); n.3 (Minn. App. 2022) (post-Franson decision reaffirming the principle against inferring precedent from c

[that] adjudicate[s] a substantial right with decisive finality separate and apart from any final judgment entered or to be entered in such action upon the merits.” -41 (Minn. 1950); see also GlaxoSmithKline, d at 756.

A special proceeding is “such a proceeding as may be commenced independently of a pending action by petition or motion, upon notice, in order to obtain special relief.”

A special proceeding is “such a proceeding as may be commenced independently of a pending action by petition or motion, upon notice, in order to obtain special relief.”

-61 (Minn. App. 2013) ().

A special proceeding is a “generic term for any civil remedy in a court of justice which is not of itself an ordinary action.”

See Skelly Oil Co. v. Commissioner of Tax’n, (stating that opinions must be read in light of “the specific controversy then before this court”); (stating that opinions are not precedential on issues “never raised or called to the attention of the court”).

Where a court has heard an issue without objection to appealability, the decision is “no authority upon the issue of appealability and [is] to be explained by the fact that the issue of appealability was never raised or called to the attention of the court.”

See Skelly Oil Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation , 269 Minn. 351 , , 645 (1964) (stating that opinions must be read in light of "the specific controversy then before this court"); Chapman v. Dorsey , 230 Minn. 279 , , 443 (1950) (stating that opinions are not precedential on issues "never raised or called to the attention of the court").

And assumptions underlying an opinion that are not the subject of a court’s analysis are not precedential on the point that is assumed” (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Comm’r of Taxation, ); see Peterson v. Holiday Recreational Indus., Inc., n.1 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. Feb.

See Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 288, (stating that an opinion deciding an appeal based on the assumption that appellate 1 The district court’s analysis, as well as the parties’ arguments, show that their discussions are limited to the context of intestate succession.

See Skelly Oil Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 269 Minn. 351, 371 , (stating that opinions must be read in light of “the specific controversy then before this court”); Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 288 , (stating that opinions are not precedential on issues “never raised or called to the attention of the court”).'

See also Skelly Oil Co. v. Comm’r of Taxation, 269 Minn. 351, 371, (stating that “the language used in an opinion must be read in the light of the issues presented” (quotation omitted)); Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 288, (stating that supreme court decisions implicating an issue that was not raised and addressed are not precedential authority regarding that issue).

See Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 288

See Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 288 , (stating that issues that were never “raised or called to the attention of the court” do not represent binding law); (“[A]ssumptions underlying an opinion that are not the subject of a court’s analysis are not precedential on the point

See Shelly Oil Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 269 Minn. 351, 371 , (stating that opinions must be read in light of “the specific controversy then before court”); Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 288 , (stating that opinions are not prece-dential on issues “never raised or called to the attention of the court”).

Chapman v. Dorsey, 280 Minn. 279, 287

See Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 288 , (stating that an opinion deciding an appeal based on the assumption that appellate jurisdiction existed is not precedential regarding the existence of appellate jurisdiction where the existence of appellate jurisdiction was not addressed by the court).

See Skelly Oil Co. v. Comm’r of Taxation, 269 Minn. 351, 371 , (stating that opinion language must be read in light of issue presented); Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 288 , (deciding appeal based on the assumption that appellate jurisdiction existed, without actually addressing whether it did, is not precedential regarding existence of appellate jurisdiction).

d at 642 (stating that a special proceeding is a “generic term for a remedy that is not part of the underlying action and that is brought by motion or petition, upon notice, for action by the court independent of the merits of the underlying action”); Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 283 , -41 (1950) (stating that a special proceeding is a “generic term for any civil remedy in a court of justice which is not of itself an ordinary action”).

See Willeck v. Willeck, 286 Minn. 553 , 554 n. 1, , 559-60 n. 1 (1970); Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 283-84 , -41 (1950).

See Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 288 , (an appeal that decides a case on merits but does not address appellate jurisdiction is not prec-edential authority on jurisdictional issue).

See Davidner v. Davidner, 304 Minn. 491, 493 , (appellate court’s duty to determine jurisdiction sua sponte); cf. Chapman v. Dorsey 230 Minn. 279, 288 , (appeals decided on the merits that do not address issue of appellate jurisdiction are not precedential authority on jurisdiction).