Cited by

The definition of swindle is broad because “[n]o single definition can cover the range of possibilities for the offense,” given that “[t]he statute was intended to reach cheats and swindlers of all kinds and descriptions.” -205 (Minn. 1968) (quotation omitted) (affirming appellant’s theft-by-swindle conviction for obtaining money from two 17-year-old victims by persuading them to withdraw cash from a bank account, play cards, and later hide cash in a trash can).

In other words, the statute “punishes any fraudulent scheme, trick, or device whereby the wrongdoer deprives the victim of his money or property by deceit or betrayal of confidence.”

The supreme court later “observed that the gist of the offense [set forth in the former swindling statute] is the cheating and de frauding of another by deliberate artifice.” State v. Ruffin , ( and State v. Yurkiewicz , 292 N.W.

(explaining the “range of possibilities” for offenses that constitute a swindle).

(finding the defendant did not meet his burden that the instruction had a significa nt effect on the jury because of the totality of evidence against him); Darris, d at 2 40 (finding the error not prejudicial); State v. Thompson , (upholding conviction because defendant was not entitled to a new tri al based on the error); State v. Rosen , (affirming conviction despite error in light of the evidence in the record).

State v. Ruffin , d 202, 205 (Minn. 1968).

“[T]he [theft-by-swindle] statute punishes any fraudulent scheme, trick, or device whereby the wrongdoer deprives the victim of [its] money or property by deceit or betrayal of confidence.”

See Gomez, d at 880; -41 (Minn. 2002); State v. Rosen, 280 Minn. 550, 550-51

4 Whether the evidence presented by the state supported probable cause depends on the definition of “swindle.” The state cites State v. Ruffin, 280 Minn. 126 , and two unreported cases in support of its contention that swindle is to be interpreted broadly to *598 encompass respondents’ failure to report their delinquent accounts.

See Thompson, d at 153 ; State v. Rosen, 280 Minn. 550, 550-51 , (per curiam); see also State v. Sandve, 279 Minn. 229, 233-34 , -34 (1968).

State v. Ruffin, 280 Minn. 126, 130

State v. Rosen, 280 Minn. 550

State v. Rosen, 280 Minn. 550

See State v. Rosen, 280 Minn. 550

This court recognized in State v. Ruffin, 280 Minn. 126 , that “swindle” defies precise definition in that no single definition can cover the range of possibilities for the offense.

State v. Ro-sen, 280 Minn. 550 , see Minn.Stat.

954 , 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981), “[t]he essence of a swindle is the defrauding of another of his property by deliberate artifice.” That is, “the statute punishes any fraudulent scheme, trick, or device whereby the wrongdoer deprives the victim of his money or property by deceit or betrayal of confidence.” State v. Ruffin, 280 Minn. 126, 130

In State v. Ruffin, 280 Minn. 126, 130 , we stated that the theft statute “punishes any fraudulent scheme, trick, or device whereby the wrongdoer deprives the victim of his money or property by deceit or betrayal of confidence.” We hold that the evidence in this case, while not overwhelming, was sufficient to establish that petitioner intended t

954 , 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981), “[t] essence of a swindle is the defrauding of another of his property by deliberate artifice.” That is, “the statute punishes any fraudulent scheme, trick, or device whereby the wrongdoer deprives the victim of his money or property by deceit or betrayal of confidence.” State v. Ruffin, 280 Minn. 126, 130

State v. Ruffin, 280 Minn. -126, 129-30, State v. Wells, 265 Minn. 212, 214

In State v. Ruffin, 280 Minn. 126 , this court upheld the statute.