Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Schulte v. CH PETERSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 153 N.W.2d 130.

66 citing documents.

Gluba Ex Rel. Gluba v. Bitzan & Ohren Masonry 735 N.W.2d 713 Minn. 2007
Gluba Ex Rel. Gluba v. Bitzan & Ohren Masonry 735 N.W.2d 713 Minn. 2007
Co., 278 Minn. 79, 83 , -34 (1967) and other cases.
Falls v. Coca Cola Enterprises, Inc. 726 N.W.2d 96 Minn. 2007
Falls v. Coca Cola Enterprises, Inc. 726 N.W.2d 96 Minn. 2007
Co., 278 Minn. 79, 83 , -34 (1967) (stating the rule that “a person is totally disabled if his physical condition, in combination with his age, training, and experience, and the type of work available in his community, causes him to be unable to secure anything more than sporadic employment resulting in an insubstant
Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc. 664 N.W.2d 324 Minn. 2003
Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc. 664 N.W.2d 324 Minn. 2003
Behrens v. City of Fairmont 533 N.W.2d 854 Minn. 1995
Behrens v. City of Fairmont 533 N.W.2d 854 Minn. 1995
le to an injured worker who is “totally disabled if his physical condition, in combination with his age, training, and experience, and the type of work available in his community, causes him to be unable to secure anything more than sporadic employment resulting in an insubstantial income.” Cavanaugh v. Frederick Willys, Inc., (quoting Schulte v. C.H. Peterson Const. Co., 278 Minn. 79, 83 , -34 (1967)).
Harrison v. Cleaning Concepts, Inc. 526 N.W.2d 46 Minn. 1994
Harrison v. Cleaning Concepts, Inc. 526 N.W.2d 46 Minn. 1994
A “person is totally disabled if his physical condition, in combination with his age, training, and experience and the type of work available in his community, causes him to secure anything more than sporadic employment resulting in an insubstantial income.” Cavanaugh v. Frederick Willys, Inc., (quoting Schulte v. C.H. Peterson Const. Co., 278 Minn. 79, 83 , -34 (1967)).
Doble v. Jesco, Inc. 514 N.W.2d 572 Minn. 1994
Doble v. Jesco, Inc. 514 N.W.2d 572 Minn. 1994
E.g., Mitchell v. White Castle Systems, Inc., Schulte v. C.H. Peterson Construction Co., 278 Minn. 79
Marsolek v. George A. Hormel & Co. 438 N.W.2d 922 Minn. 1989
Marsolek v. George A. Hormel & Co. 438 N.W.2d 922 Minn. 1989
Co., 278 Minn. 79, 83 , -34 (1967) (temporary total).
Krauss v. ITT Continental Baking Co. 436 N.W.2d 769 Minn. 1989
Krauss v. ITT Continental Baking Co. 436 N.W.2d 769 Minn. 1989
Cf. Schulte v. C.H. Peterson Const. Co., 278 Minn. 79 , (remand for resolution of issue prematurely presented).
Redgate v. Sroga's Standard Service 421 N.W.2d 729 Minn. 1988
Redgate v. Sroga's Standard Service 421 N.W.2d 729 Minn. 1988
This is the same definition of total disability as appeared under the old law and has been explained in Schulte v. C.H. Peterson Construction Co., 278 Minn. 79, 83 , -34 (1967), as meaning: [A] person is totally disabled if his physical condition, in combination with his age, training, and experience, and the type of work available in his community, causes him to be unable to secure anything more than sporadic employment resulting in an insubstantial incom
Freeman v. Armour Food Co. 380 N.W.2d 816 Minn. 1986
Freeman v. Armour Food Co. 380 N.W.2d 816 Minn. 1986
See Schulte v. C.H. Peterson Construction Co., 278 Minn. 79, 83 , ("The concept of temporary total disability is primarily dependent upon the employee’s ability to find and hold a job, not [her] physical condition”).
Chacos v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 368 N.W.2d 343 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Chacos v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 368 N.W.2d 343 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
at 864 (quoting Schulte v. C.H. Peterson Construction Co., 278 Minn. 79, 83 , ).
Cavanaugh v. Frederick Willys, Inc. 361 N.W.2d 49 Minn. 1985
Cavanaugh v. Frederick Willys, Inc. 361 N.W.2d 49 Minn. 1985
We have long held that “a person is totally disabled if his physical condition, in combination with his age, training, and experience, and the type of work available in his community, causes him to be unable to secure anything more than sporadic employment resulting in an insubstantial income.” Schulte v. C.H. Peterson Const. Co., 278 Minn. 79, 83 , -34 (1967).
Rogde v. United Van Bus Delivery 330 N.W.2d 715 Minn. 1983
Fredenburg v. Control Data Corp. 311 N.W.2d 860 Minn. 1981
Fredenburg v. Control Data Corp. 311 N.W.2d 860 Minn. 1981
Co., 278 Minn. 79, 83 , -34 (1967).
Mee v. Metropolitan Transit Commission 304 N.W.2d 15 Minn. 1981
Mee v. Metropolitan Transit Commission 304 N.W.2d 15 Minn. 1981
Schulte v. C. H. Peterson Const. Co., 278 Minn. 79
Findorff v. Pinkerton's, Inc. 295 N.W.2d 373 Minn. 1980
Findorff v. Pinkerton's, Inc. 295 N.W.2d 373 Minn. 1980
In Schulte v. C. H. Peterson Construction Co., 278 Minn. 79 , this court explicated the definition *376 of “total disability” within the context of the Workers’ Compensation Act: 1 [A] person is totally disabled if his physical condition, in combination with his age, training, and experience, and the type of work available in his community, causes him to
Henry v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. 286 N.W.2d 720 Minn. 1979
Henry v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. 286 N.W.2d 720 Minn. 1979
Co., 278 Minn. 79 , or on a finding that the employee intended to retire on a specific date regardless of his or her disability.
Spangrud v. Precision Grinding Co. 281 N.W.2d 362 Minn. 1979
Spangrud v. Precision Grinding Co. 281 N.W.2d 362 Minn. 1979
See, e. g., Schulte v. C. H. Peterson Const. Co., 278 Minn. 79 , Reese v. Preston Marketing Ass’n., 274 Minn. 150 , Petter v. K. W. McKee, Inc., 270 Minn. 362
Kuehn v. State, Department of Tenth Judicial District 271 N.W.2d 308 Minn. 1978
Kuehn v. State, Department of Tenth Judicial District 271 N.W.2d 308 Minn. 1978
See, Schulte v. C. H. Peterson Const. Co., 278 Minn. 79
Smith v. Civic Center Chrysler 270 N.W.2d 276 Minn. 1978
Smith v. Civic Center Chrysler 270 N.W.2d 276 Minn. 1978
Schulte v. C. H. Peterson Const. Co., 278 Minn. 79
Paulson v. Ceco Corp. 265 N.W.2d 647 Minn. 1978
Paulson v. Ceco Corp. 265 N.W.2d 647 Minn. 1978
Schulte v. C. H. Peterson Construction Co., 278 Minn. 79
Pieske v. City of Minneapolis 259 N.W.2d 602 Minn. 1977
Pieske v. City of Minneapolis 259 N.W.2d 602 Minn. 1977
This argument is untenable in light of our definition of temporary total disability in Schulte v. C. H. Peterson Construction Co., 278 Minn. 79, 83 , : “ * * * [A] person is totally disabled if his physical condition, in combination with his age, training and experience, and the type of work available in his community, causes him to be unable to secure anything more than sporadic employment resulting in an insubstantial income.
Briggs v. K. W. McKee, Inc. 259 N.W.2d 266 Minn. 1977
Ahoe v. Quality Park Products 258 N.W.2d 885 Minn. 1977
Ahoe v. Quality Park Products 258 N.W.2d 885 Minn. 1977
This contention ignores the fact that the concept of temporary total disability “is primarily dependent upon the employee’s ability to find and hold a job, not his physical condition.” Schulte v. C. H. Peterson Construction Co., 278 Minn. 79, 83
Hines v. Kobiela 241 N.W.2d 814 Minn. 1976
Hines v. Kobiela 241 N.W.2d 814 Minn. 1976
See, Schulte v. C. H. Peterson Const. Co. 278 Minn. 79
Flavin v. Totino's Finer Food 238 N.W.2d 433 Minn. 1976
Flavin v. Totino's Finer Food 238 N.W.2d 433 Minn. 1976
McCrae v. Brandt Aero Service, 283 Minn. 483 , Schulte v. C. H. Peterson Const. Co. 278 Minn. 79