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This court, in Inland Construction, stated that under Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192 , the failure of the council to articulate “any legally sufficient basis for its determination made a prima facie showing of arbitrariness inevitable.” 292 Minn, at 392, d at 569.

Cf. Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192

See Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 196 , Barton Contracting Co.

For example, the special use standard in C. R. Investments, is typical: “If the Village Council shall determine the proposed use will not be detrimental to the health, safety, morals, on [sic] general welfare of the community * * * the Village Council may grant a special use permit.” As we pointed out in Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 196 , an arbitrary denial of a special use permit may be found when “the requested use is compatible with the basic use authorized within the particular

Hay v. Township of Grow, 296 Minn. 1 , Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192

These procedural standards were established in Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192 , where we held that when a local governing board makes a decision without contemporaneously stating reasons for its actions, its decision will be prima facie arbitrary.

In Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192 , we adopted the rule that where a special use which conforms with the zoning ordinance is requested, a city council’s denial of a special-use permit to a single landowner is proved prima facie arbitrary and unreasonable if it is shown that the council failed to support its action by written find

The basic principle, as stated in our leading case, Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 196 , is that the application may not be denied “arbitrarily” but that “the administering body, be it the council itself or a planning commission to which power to act is delegated, has broad discretionary power to deny an application for a special use permit * * * Subsequent cases such as I

versing the county board’s decision to revoke the permits, the district court relied heavily on previous decisions of this court in concluding that the board’s revocation of the permits was “arbitrary as a matter of law, due to the failure of the County to state any reasons and facts showing a need to revoke.” The district court relied chiefly on this court’s decision in Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192

This was a significant omission for, as we said in Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 198 , a prima facie case of arbitrariness exists if the county board’s decision is not accompanied by findings to show that its action “was reached upon a consideration of the facts and was based upon reason rather than the mere individual whim of the * * * members.” We have held, however

In Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 196 , we discussed the role of special-use permits in providing municipalities “with broad latitude to meet the changing problems of land-use control.” We held in Zylka, however, that the denial of a special-use permit is arbitrary when “the evidence presented at the hearing before the mun

See, Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192

Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192 , Twin City Red Barn, Inc. v. City of St.

Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192 , Hay v. Township of Grow, 296 Minn. 1

In Zulka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192 , we had occasion to consider the nature of special-use permits.

In Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 196 , this court stated: “* * * [A]n arbitrary denial may be found by a reviewing court when the evidence presented at the hearing before the municipal governing body and the reviewing court establishes that the requested use is compatible with the basic use authorized within the particula

Thus, under Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192 , a prima facie case of arbitrariness was established.

In Hay v. Township of Grow, 296 Minn. 1, 5 , we said: “It is now settled that where a zoning ordinance specifies standards to apply in determining whether to grant a special-use permit and the applicant fully complies with the specified standards, a denial of the permit is arbitrary as a matter of law.” See, also, Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192 , Twin City Red Barn, Inc. v. City of St.

Inland Const. Co. v. City of Bloomington, 292 Minn. 374 , Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192

In Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 199 , we alluded to “the danger of permitting the council to deny a special-use permit without contemporaneous findings or reasons and then permit its members after several months of thought to present reasons perhaps totally unrelated to the actual reasons for denying the permit.” Where t

Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192 , Inland Const. Co. v. City of Bloomington, 292 Minn. 374

See, Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192

al use permits] are designed to meet the problem which arises where certain uses, although generally compatible with the basic use classification of a particular zone, should not be permitted to be located as a matter of right in every area included within the zone because of hazards inherent in the use itself or special problems which its proposed location may present.” Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 195

bitrary denial of a permit may be found when the evidence presented at the hearing before the municipal governing body and the reviewing court establishes that “the requested use is compatible with the basic use authorized within the particular zone and does not endanger the public health or safety or the general welfare of the area affected or the community as a whole.” Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 196