Cited by

P rejudice is “[t]he primary consideration in determining whether to grant a new trial.” .

Torchwood Props., (stating that prejudice is “[t]he primary consideration in determining whether to grant a new trial”).

Torchwood Props., (stating that prejudice is “[t]he primary consideration in determining whether to grant a new trial”).

See, (tolling for fraudulent concealment); Abel v. Abbott Nw.

The decision to grant a new trial for party misconduct “rests almost wholly in the discretion of the [district] court and its [decision] will not be reversed on appeal except for a clear abuse of discretion.”

(citing Minn. Stat. §§ 541.05, .07 (2022)).

24, 1991), but both cases are inapt.

Co., (“A party is not permitted to remain silent, gamble on the outcome, and, having lost, then for the first time claim misconduct in opposing counsel’s argument.”).

1983) (concluding that when the duties arose out of contracts, it was error to submit the theory of “negligent breach” of contract to the jury); Wild v. Rarig , (“A malicious or bad -faith motive in breaching a contract d oes not convert a contract action into a tort action .”); McNeill & Assocs.

d 775, 785 (Minn. 1975); see also Poston v. Colestock , (“Appellate courts rarely disturb a dist rict court’s response to improper remarks in closing arguments.”), review denied (Minn. Jan.

However, under the independent-duty rule, “when a plaintiff seeks to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract [s]he is limited to damages flowing only from such breach except in exceptional cases where the defendant’s breach of contract constitutes or is accompanied by an in dependent tort.” Wild v. Rarig

See Oltmans v. Orthopaedic & Fracture Clinic, P.A., (holding that instructing jury to disregard improper testimony cured any error); -86 (Minn. 1975) (stating that “[i] f the [district] court instructed the jury to disregard the improper remarks or arguments, a new trial will rarely be granted by [an appellate court].”).

Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 43 3

Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc. , Hydra-Mac, d at 918-19; Wild v. Rarig , 302 Minn. 419, 450-51

However, under the independent-duty rule, “when a plaintiff seeks to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract he is limited to damages flowing only from such breach except in exceptional cases where the defendant’s breach of contract constitutes or is accompanied by an independent tort.” Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 440

See Sanchez, d at 558–60 (citing Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 449–50, –95 (1975)).

Prejudice is “[t]he primary consideration in determining whether to grant a new trial.” Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 433

Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 433

There is not a clear definition of what constitutes “fraudulent concealment.” See Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 450, d 775, 795 (1975) “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” fn.10 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted) (addressing equitable tolling of postconviction statutes).

“The primary consideration in determining whether to grant a new trial is prejudice.” Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 433

See Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 433

See Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 433, –86 (1975) (affirming the denial of a new-trial motion).

“[W]hen a plaintiff seeks to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract he is limited to damages flowing only from such breach except in exceptional cases where the defendant’s breach of contract constitutes or is accompanied by an independent tort.” Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 440, d 775, 789 (Minn. 1975).

I. A party may not recover tort damages for a breach of contract, “except in exceptional cases where the defendant’s breach of contract constitutes or is accompanied by an independent tort.” Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 440, (citations omitted); (stating that “[b]ecause of the differences between tort and contract actions, ‘[w]hen a contract provides the only source of duties between the parties, Minnesota law does not permit t

) (); (“[W]hen a contract provides the only source of duties between the parties, Minnesota law does not permit the breach of those duties to support a cause of action in negligence.” (quotation omitted) (citing Lesmeister, d at 102)); Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 440, (“[W]hen a plaintiff seeks to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract he is limited to damages flowing only from such breach except in exceptional cases where the defendant’s breach of contract constitutes or is accompa

Generally, “fraudulent concealment of the existence of a cause of action will toll the statute of limitations, postponing the commencement of the running of the statute until discovery or reasonable opportunity for discovery of the fact by the exercise of ordinary diligence.” Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 450

at 634 ; see also Wild v. Rang, 302 Minn. 419, 450