Cited by
Opinions in Minnesota that cite Dunshee v. Douglas, 255 N.W.2d 42.
- Higgins v. Lufi 353 N.W.2d 150 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
- Hyduke v. Grant 351 N.W.2d 675 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
- Higgins v. Lufi 353 N.W.2d 150 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
- Hyduke v. Grant 351 N.W.2d 675 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
- Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc. 326 N.W.2d 149 Minn. 1982
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Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc.
326 N.W.2d 149
Minn. 1982
We have often held that “the admissibility of expert testimony rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and * * [we will not reverse its decision] on appeal unless there is a showing of clear abuse of discretion.”
- Anderson Ex Rel. Anderson v. City of Minneapolis 296 N.W.2d 383 Minn. 1980
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Anderson Ex Rel. Anderson v. City of Minneapolis
296 N.W.2d 383
Minn. 1980
See e. g., Gruenhagen v. Larson, 310 Minn. 454, 457-8 , , 569 (1976).
- Walton v. Jones 286 N.W.2d 710 Minn. 1979
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Walton v. Jones
286 N.W.2d 710
Minn. 1979
Hestad v. Pennsylvania Life Ins.
- State v. Dewey 272 N.W.2d 355 Minn. 1978
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State v. Dewey
272 N.W.2d 355
Minn. 1978
Recently, we at least implied that the same basic rule should govern all kinds of expert accident reconstruction testimony, and that that rule is the one which has been followed with respect to expert testimony concerning speed.
- Busch v. Busch Construction, Inc. 262 N.W.2d 377 Minn. 1977
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Busch v. Busch Construction, Inc.
262 N.W.2d 377
Minn. 1977
LeMieux v. Bishop, 296 Minn. 372, 378 , Dunshee v. Douglas, Minn.