Cited by

(refusing to consider argument concerning warrantless search because defendant challenged different search at omnibus hearing).

at 14; (refusing to consider argument concerning search of apartment because appellant did not raise that issue at 8 omnibus hearing or trial).

Waivers can be explicit or implied from other conduct; for example, defendants implicitly waive their Miranda rights by “answering questions without hesitation or volunteering information in the absence of questioning.” State v. Merrill , abrogated on other grounds by State v. Dahlin , ; see also Fox, d at 23 214 (concludi ng that the defendant implicitly waived his Miranda rights based on the totality of the circumstances).

14 omitted); (stating that the “reasonable cause” statutory requirement is synonymous with the “probable cause” constitutional requirement).

Sufficiency of the Evidence In a sufficiency -of-the-evidence challenge, this court is “limited to ascertaining whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of th e offense charged.” State v. Merrill

In reviewing a sufficiency -of-the-evidence claim, this court must determine whether, “given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.”

We do not retry the facts, because the fact - finder assesses the credibility of witnesses and weighs their testimony

See Palmer , d at 739 (quoting Moore , d at 361 ); State v. Merrill , , 112 (Minn. 1978) (holding that defendant's admission that he retrieved a knife from the kitchen before stabbing his victim to death supported jury's finding of premeditation).

We cannot disturb a conviction if, “given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.”

“In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case, ‘[appellate courts] are limited to ascertaining whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.’” ().

at 475, 86 S. Ct. at 5 1628; see also Scott, d at 417; (“Waiver is defined as an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”) (quotation omitted).

See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010) (“Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”); (“To determine whether a defendant’s conduct implies an effective waiver, a court must look at the circumstances of the particular case.”).

ause the evidence was insufficient to prove that he drove while under the influence of alcohol.1 “In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we are limited to ascertaining whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.”

Furthermore, we have recognized that "the police must also be al *73 lowed to encourage suspects to talk where the suspect has not clearly refused.”

] whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.”

But, “police must also be allowed to encourage suspects to talk,” and we have upheld empathetic tactics that prod suspects “to speak with [police] and cooperate,” see also Farnsworth, d at 373 (concluding that a statement was voluntary although police placated the defendant by telling him they were just t