State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-2029

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Levon Elias Jackson,
Appellant.

Filed November 19, 2018
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-17-1146

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Veronica May Surges, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of malicious punishment of a child, arguing that
the evidence is insufficient to establish that he used unreasonable force when disciplining
the child. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 22, 2016, appellant Levon Elias Jackson received a call that D.T., the
son of his fiancée, G.G., was misbehaving in school. D.T. was six years old at the time.
Jackson spoke with D.T. and encouraged him to apologize to his teachers and classmates
and “turn [his] day around.” Jackson and G.G. then discussed how to address D.T.’s
behavior. They decided that the appropriate punishment would be for Jackson to spank
D.T.
When D.T. returned home from school, Jackson and G.G. talked with D.T. about
why he was going to be punished. They explained that D.T.’s behavior was unacceptable
and needed to change. Jackson then spanked D.T. using D.T.’s belt. He struck him
approximately six times. Jackson, G.G., and D.T. then ate dinner together, bathed D.T .,
and did his homework.
The following day, D.T. spent the night with his grandmother, D.G. When D.G.
helped D.T. put on his pajamas, she noticed extensive bruising on the side of his leg. D.G.
called G.G. to ask about the bruises. Jackson took the phone and explained that he spanked
D.T. The next morning, D.T.’s father picked him up and saw the bruises. He immediately

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took D.T. to the police department. The police took photographs of the bruises and
interviewed Jackson, G.G., and D.T. Jackson admitted to spanking D.T.
The state charged Jackson with one count of malicious punishment of a child. The
district court held a jury trial , and Jackson was found guilty. The district court sentenced
Jackson to 90 days in jail, stayed, and placed Jacks on on probation for one year. This
appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Jackson argues there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction because the
state did not prove that he caused D.T.’s bruises. When considering a sufficiency -of-the-
evidence argument, we ascertain whether the facts in the record and the legitimate
inferences that can be drawn from those facts would permit a jury to reasonably conclude
that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 111
(Minn. 1978). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jur y’s verdict, and
assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the
contrary. State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989).
When a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, we use a two-step process.
State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). First, we identify the circumstances
proved, assuming that the jury resolved any factual disputes in a manner that is consistent
with the jury’s verdict. Id. at 598 -99. Second, this court independently e xamines the
reasonableness of the inferences the jury could draw from those circumstances. Id. at 599.
All circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010).

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Jackson argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction because
the state did not prove that he was the one who caused D.T.’s bruises. He does not
challenge the determinations that he spanked D.T. and that the bruising evidences the use
of unreasonable force. Rather, he argues that there is a rational hypothesis that G.G. also
spanked D.T. and caused the bruises. At trial, the prosecutor asked D.T. if G.G. did
anything while he was being spanked. D.T. answered that she was in the room and “they
were kind of like trying to take turns or something like that. I don’t remember —I don’t
really remember.”
Jackson asserts that based on the above testimony, there is a rational inference that
G.G. caused D. T.’s bruises. But D.T.’s equivocal statement that G.G. and Jackson may
have taken turns is the only statement that suggests that G.G. may have participated in the
spanking. D.T. indicated that he “[didn’t] really remember” what his mother did while he
was being spanked. Jackson testified that he spanked D.T. but did not suggest that G.G.
did. D.G. testified that when she called G.G. to ask about the bruises, Jackson took the
phone and “said he was the one that spanked [D.T.].” And when asked how he got the
bruises, D.T. responded “when he was like whooping me on my butt then it kind of got on
the side of my leg.” During his custodial interview, Jackson told police that “the belt
slipped and hit the side of [D.T.’s] leg” while he was spanking D.T. Thus , the evidence
reflects that Jackson struck D.T. on the locations that D.T. suffered bruising. There is no
evidence that G.G. did. Accordingly, the circumstances proved are inconsistent with the
hypothesis that G.G. caused the bruising.

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Finally, Jackson notes that corporal punishment is legal in Minnesota. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(6) (2016) (noting a parent or guardian may use “reasonable force”
to correct a child’s behavior). Jackson argues that he used reasonable force because the
district court judge stated that both he and the jurors believed that Jackson acted with good
intentions. But the state was not required to prove that Jackson intended to cause the
bruises. See State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309-10 (Minn. 2012) (concluding that assault-
harm is a general -intent crime because it requires only that the defendant intended to do
the physical act and not that the defendant intended to cause a particular result). Rather,
the statute provides that an individual is guilty of malicious punishment of a child if he “by
an intentional act or a series of intentional acts with respect to a child, evidences
unreasonable force.” Minn. Stat. § 609.377, subd. 1 (2016). Jackson admitted that he
intentionally spanked D.T. using D.T.’s belt. And the bruises occurred in the areas where
Jackson spanked D.T. On this record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain
Jackson’s conviction.
Affirmed.