Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343.

55 citing documents.

Josh Campion, et al., Appellants, Minn. Ct. App. 2026
(stating that this principle “is dependent upon the plaintiff’s manifestation of consent, express or implied, to relieve the defendant of a duty”).
Henson v. Uptown Drink, LLC 922 N.W.2d 185 Minn. 2019
Soderberg v. Anderson 922 N.W.2d 200 Minn. 2019
Henson v. Uptown Drink, LLC 922 N.W.2d 185 Minn. 2019
See, e.g. , Armstrong v. Mailand , , 351 (Minn. 1979).
Soderberg v. Anderson 922 N.W.2d 200 Minn. 2019
" Bjerke v. Johnson , , 669 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Olson v. Hansen , 299 Minn. 39 , , 127 (1974) ); see Armstrong v. Mailand , , 351 (Minn. 1979) (noting that the application of primary assumption of risk "is dependent upon the plaintiff's manifestation of consent, express or implied, to relieve the defendant of a duty").
Charlotte Nelson, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Donya L. Dawson v. Afton Alps Recreation Area Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Donya L. Dawson v. Afton Alps Recreation Area Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Daly v. McFarland 812 N.W.2d 113 Minn. 2012
Bjerke v. Johnson 727 N.W.2d 183 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
Bjerke v. Johnson 727 N.W.2d 183 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
that he consents to relieve the defendant of his duty.”
Espinoza v. Schulenburg 129 P.3d 937 Ariz. 2006
Schneider Ex Rel. Schneider v. Erickson 654 N.W.2d 144 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
Schneider Ex Rel. Schneider v. Erickson 654 N.W.2d 144 Minn. Ct. App. 2002
Arrowhead Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. LTV Steel Mining Co. 568 N.W.2d 875 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Arrowhead Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. LTV Steel Mining Co. 568 N.W.2d 875 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
-52 (Minn.1979) (concluding that plaintiff may assume risk by manifesting consent to relieve defendant from actions based on strict products liability or strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity); T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 123 N.J.
Sutherland v. Barton 560 N.W.2d 116 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Sutherland v. Barton 560 N.W.2d 116 Minn. Ct. App. 1997
Doe v. Brainerd International Raceway, Inc. 514 N.W.2d 811 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
Baber v. Dill 510 N.W.2d 228 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
Baber v. Dill 510 N.W.2d 228 Minn. Ct. App. 1994
Maras v. City of Brainerd 502 N.W.2d 69 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
Maras v. City of Brainerd 502 N.W.2d 69 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
Andren v. White-Rodgers Co. 465 N.W.2d 102 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
Andren v. White-Rodgers Co. 465 N.W.2d 102 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
Conversely, secondary assumption of the risk “is a type of contributory negligence where the plaintiff voluntarily encounters a known and appreciated hazard created by the defendant without relieving the defendant of his duty of care with respect to such hazard.”
Otto v. City of St. Paul 460 N.W.2d 359 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
Otto v. City of St. Paul 460 N.W.2d 359 Minn. Ct. App. 1990
We do not consider the status of Otto here to be ”consist[ant] with the policy set forth in Peterson v. Balach, [ 294 Minn. 161 , ] of eliminating classifications of land entrants.”
Goodwin v. Legionville School Safety Patrol Training Center, Inc. 422 N.W.2d 46 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
Goodwin v. Legionville School Safety Patrol Training Center, Inc. 422 N.W.2d 46 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
Lang v. Glusica 393 N.W.2d 181 Minn. 1986
Lang v. Glusica 393 N.W.2d 181 Minn. 1986
we made it clear that a landowner owed firefighters a duty of reasonable care and that while a fireman assumes all risks reasonably apparent to him, he does not assume the risk of hidden or unanticipated risks.
Lang v. Glusica 387 N.W.2d 895 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
Lang v. Glusica 387 N.W.2d 895 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
The basis of the fireman’s rule is the doctrine of primary assumption of risk — that “one who has knowingly and voluntarily confronted a hazard cannot recover for injuries sustained thereby.’.’ (quoting Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199, 204 , 142 Cal.Rptr.
Wagner v. Thomas J. Obert Enterprises 384 N.W.2d 477 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
Wagner v. Thomas J. Obert Enterprises 384 N.W.2d 477 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
-49 (Minn.1979) (recognizing primary assumption of risk as a viable doctrine).
Swagger v. City of Crystal 379 N.W.2d 183 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Swagger v. City of Crystal 379 N.W.2d 183 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Johnson v. Miller 371 N.W.2d 94 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Johnson v. Miller 371 N.W.2d 94 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
(Firemen were barred from recovery where they were aware of the *96 risk of a liquified petroleum tank explosion in the fire they fought).
Thompson v. Hill 366 N.W.2d 628 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Thompson v. Hill 366 N.W.2d 628 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
“Primary assumption of the risk * * * indicates that the defendant did not even owe the plaintiff any duty of care.”
Woodland Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Palmi 366 N.W.2d 125 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
Woodland Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Palmi 366 N.W.2d 125 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
The fireman’s rule whether expressed as an aspect of the landowner’s duty of care, or as primary assumption of *127 the risk, has been considered an aspect of negligence law, and not the law of intentional tort.
Kaiser v. Northern States Power Co. 353 N.W.2d 899 Minn. 1984
Kaiser v. Northern States Power Co. 353 N.W.2d 899 Minn. 1984
Hannah v. Chmielewski, Inc. 323 N.W.2d 781 Minn. 1982
Hannah v. Chmielewski, Inc. 323 N.W.2d 781 Minn. 1982
The doctrine of primary assumption of risk, which forms the basis of the fireman’s rule, is not a defense but is a “legal theory which relieves a defendant of a duty which he may otherwise owe to the plaintiff with respect to particular risks.” (citations omitted).
Rieger v. Zackoski 321 N.W.2d 16 Minn. 1982
Explained Rieger v. Zackoski 321 N.W.2d 16 Minn. 1982
Recently, we explained the difference between primary and secondary assumption of risk: “Primary assumption of risk, express or implied, relates to the initial issue of whether a defendant was negligent at all — that is, whether the defendant had any duty to protect the plaintiff from a risk of harm.
Griffiths v. Lovelette Transfer Co., Inc. 313 N.W.2d 602 Minn. 1981