Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Leecy, 294 N.W.2d 280.

46 citing documents.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2024
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2022
(stating that the state was not required to give notice of its intent to use immediate -episode evidence); Hollins, d at 132 (stating that int rinsic evidence may be admitted “without regard to Minn. R. Evid.
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
It also explained that t he earlier threats and “kidnapping” were relevant “to show the lengths to which Nunn was willing to go to retrieve his money and marijuana and to punish the individual s he believed to be responsible for their disappearance.” Id.; (concluding that the district court properly admitted testimony concerning a threat defendant made earlier in the evening in question).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
(holding that testimony regarding earlier threats was immediate -episode evidence because the threats escalated into an assault).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
See State v. Leecy , , 283 (Minn. 1980) (explaining that c ommunications made when others are present are not confidential and therefore are not privileged).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
see also State v. Kendell , (“Immediate episode evidence is a separate category from evidence of other bad acts 7 crime evidence should not necessa rily preclude the state from m aking out its whole case against the accused based on evidence that may be otherwi
Fahad Abdihaim Diriye v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Fahad Abdihaim Diriye v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2016
(citing Nunn, d at 907–08; (holding that evidence of drugs found in the defendant's purse two days after drug store robbery was admissible as immediate-episode evidence where the drugs were the same type of drugs stolen from the drug store); (explaining that testimony about earlier threats is immediate-episode evidence because the earlier threats escalated into the charged assault); and State v. Martin, 293 Minn. 116, 128, –27 (1972) (concluding that the district court properly admitted testimon
State v. Zais 790 N.W.2d 853 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
State v. Zais 790 N.W.2d 853 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
*861 See Gianakos, d at 417 (acknowledging that “[the supreme] court has at least implicitly recognized the legitimacy of the marriage as a factor” when determining applicability of marital privilege); (“[T]here is modern authority that a marriage well on its way to final dissolution will not support a claim of the privilege.”).
State v. Riddley 776 N.W.2d 419 Minn. 2009
Explained State v. Riddley 776 N.W.2d 419 Minn. 2009
State v. Palubicki 700 N.W.2d 476 Minn. 2005
State v. Palubicki 700 N.W.2d 476 Minn. 2005
(concluding that communications made in presence of others were not confidential communications for marital privilege purposes).
State v. Gianakos 644 N.W.2d 409 Minn. 2002
State v. Gianakos 644 N.W.2d 409 Minn. 2002
29 , 112 L.Ed.2d 7 (1990); (observing that the marital privilege statute had not been superseded by court rule).
State v. Lee 494 N.W.2d 475 Minn. 1993
State v. Lee 480 N.W.2d 668 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
State v. Lee 480 N.W.2d 668 Minn. Ct. App. 1992
State v. Schwab 409 N.W.2d 876 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
State v. Paradee 403 N.W.2d 640 Minn. 1987
State v. Paradee 403 N.W.2d 640 Minn. 1987
Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich.L.Rev.
State v. Wahl 394 N.W.2d 536 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
State v. Wahl 394 N.W.2d 536 Minn. Ct. App. 1986
State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 497 , Minn.R.Crim.P.
State v. Gerring 378 N.W.2d 94 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
State v. Gerring 378 N.W.2d 94 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
State v. Tucker 368 N.W.2d 404 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
State v. Tucker 368 N.W.2d 404 Minn. Ct. App. 1985
State v. Kutchara 350 N.W.2d 924 Minn. 1984
State v. Kutchara 350 N.W.2d 924 Minn. 1984
Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich.L.
State v. Ward 349 N.W.2d 294 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
State v. Ward 349 N.W.2d 294 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
See, (prior first degree murder conviction, prosecution for second-degree murder); (both aggravated robbery); (both sexual offenses); (both ag *297 gravated assault); (both sexual offenses).
State v. Upton 306 N.W.2d 117 Minn. 1981
State v. Upton 306 N.W.2d 117 Minn. 1981
State v. Bellcourt 305 N.W.2d 340 Minn. 1981
State v. Bellcourt 305 N.W.2d 340 Minn. 1981
State v. Kruse 302 N.W.2d 29 Minn. 1981
State v. Kruse 302 N.W.2d 29 Minn. 1981
609 since it was a conviction directly involving “dishonesty or false statement.” The trial court, using the balancing approach approved in our cases — see, — at the very least had discretion to allow use of the other convictions, for theft, to impeach defendant’s credibility.
State v. St. John 299 N.W.2d 737 Minn. 1980
State v. St. John 299 N.W.2d 737 Minn. 1980
State v. Mendoza 297 N.W.2d 286 Minn. 1980
State v. Mendoza 297 N.W.2d 286 Minn. 1980
State v. Burrows 295 N.W.2d 100 Minn. 1980
State v. Bettin 295 N.W.2d 542 Minn. 1980
State v. Burrows 295 N.W.2d 100 Minn. 1980
State v. Bettin 295 N.W.2d 542 Minn. 1980
filed May 16, 1980 (holding that admission of 8-year-old aggravated assault conviction to impeach a defendant charged with aggravated assault was error, although harmless).