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ng that the decision to impose three consecutive life sentences for first degree murder was within the discretion of the district court under Minn. Stat. § 609.15 and subject to appellate review only to ensure consecutive sentences were “commensurate with culpability and not an 13 exaggeration of defendant’s criminality” ()); (reversing the imposition of concurrent life sentences on the grounds that it understated the criminality of a defendant who fatally shot three persons).

ate Thompson’s 3 In State v. Warren, we held that “[w]hen reviewing a defendant's challenge to the imposition of consecutive sentences for multiple convictions of first degree murder involving more than one victim, we consider whether consecutive sentences are ‘commensurate with culpability and not an exaggeration of defendant's criminality.’” d at 451 ().

See State v. Hughes , , 313 (Minn. 2008) ("We have recognized in several cases that procurement of a weapon constitutes evidence of premeditation."); Bangert v. State , , 544 (Minn. 1979) (concluding that the jury's finding of premeditation was reasonable where defendant retrieved a rifle, walked to the bedroom, raised the rifle, aimed the rifle, and fired the rifle three times).

sentencing challenges, such as, for example, when a defendant was unlawfully sentenced for multiple offenses arising out of a single behavioral incident in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.04 (2006), or when the district court unlawfully stays a sentence in the face of a statute that mandates an executed sentence, or when the district court unlawfully sentences the defendant based on an incorrect criminal history score, d 141, 147 (Minn. 2007), or when the defendant’s sentence constit

784-37 (Minn.2011) (describing prior possession of the murder weapon, careful aim at the victim, and a pause between shots as evidence of premeditation); (concluding that the jury’s finding of premeditation was “clearly justified” when the defendant procured a rifle, walked down the hallway, took careful aim, and pulled the trigger three times).

547 (Minn.1979) (remanding for resentencing where an initial sentence involved an error of law and it was not clear that the sentence, as corrected by the postconviction court, effectuated the intention of the sentencing judge).

n, (holding that trial court abused its discretion in imposing concurrent sentences, as opposed to consecutive sentences, upon defendant who shot and killed three victims at close range); (holding that three consecutive life sentences were commensurate of defendant’s murdering of four family members); (affirming two consecutive life sentences for a double homicide).

See, (stating that premeditation includes procuring a firearm from another part of the house and walking down a hallway to kill the victim); (stat *314 ing that the defendant’s “actions in going into the kitchen, obtaining the knife, returning to the bedroom

See, -47 (Minn.1979) (multiple murders merited multiple sentences); (an aggravated assault and a sex crime merited multiple sentences); -06 (Minn.1977) (three sentences merited for defendant who fired 20 bullets at three victims); see

er to death — and is “inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Chomnarith, d at 664 ; -30 (Minn.1995) (holding that the defendant acted with premeditation when he forcibly entered the victims’ house, took knives from the victims’ kitchen, walked down the hall, and used the knives to stab the victims); (holding evidence of premeditation sufficient where the defendant procured a rifle from the victims’ house, walked down the hallway to the bedroom, took aim, and fired three

When reviewing the imposition of consecutive life sentences, we consider whether consecutive sentences “result in punishment grossly out of proportion to the defendant’s culpability.”

Minn. Sentencing Guidelines II.F.2 (providing that “[m]ulti-ple current felony convictions for crimes against persons may be sentenced consecutively to each other”); (“In appropriate cases, [consecutive] sentences serve the valid legislative purpose of protecting the public.”); see, (affirming multiple consecutive sentences in a ease involving multiple vic tims; life sentence for first-degree murder, a cons

(quoting LaFave & Scott, supra); see, e.g., United States v. Blue Thunder, 604 F.2d 550, 553-54 (8th Cir.1979) (defendant brought butcher knife used as murder weapon to the murder scene); (defendant carried gun from one area of the house, down a hallway, and into the bedroom of sleeping victims); , (Minn.1978) (defendant carried knife from kitchen to wounded victim’s bedroom).

the court reasoned that an error of law in sentencing may be corrected even though it results in a harsher sentence.

See, (stating consecutive life sentences for two separate murders were proper under the circumstances because sentence was "commensurate with culpability and not an exaggeration of defendant's criminality"); Minn. Sent.

Where offenses with multiple victims arise from the same behavioral incident, we uphold the imposition of one sentence per victim if this would not result in “punishment grossly out of proportion to the defendant’s culpability.” 7

1(a) states that “[a]n actual or prospective civil action involving the alleged crime shall not be used by the court as a basis to deny a victim’s right to obtain court-ordered restitution under this section.” we held that a district court could permissibly impose a harsher sentence on remand than it had originally imposed at trial because the original sentence stemmed from an error of law and “[i]t [was] not at all clear that fairness and public policy entitle a defendant to the benefit of a mi

“[Pjostconviction relief is proper not only where constitutional issues are raised but also upon a showing of violation of state law.” -45 (Minn.1979).