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Stated differently, the intent required for assault-harm is “‘only an intent to do the prohibited physical act of committing a battery.’” Fleck, d at 310 ().

Minnesota law provides that, “[i]f the crime charged has a specific intent as an element and if intoxication is offered by the defendant as an explanation for his actions, then the court must give an instruction on intoxication.” see also Minn. Stat. § 609.075, subd.

that [it] could not have been strategic”; and second, finding prejudice relies “on speculation about what evidence might have been available to defense counsel and admissible.” “If the crime charged has a specific intent as an element and if intoxication is offered by the defendant as an explanation for his actions, then the court must give an instruction on intoxication.”

-67 (Minn. 1981) ( stating that criminal-sexual-conduct offenses require proof of general intent and voluntary intoxication is not a defense to general-intent crimes).

See State v. Lindahl , d 763, 766-67 (Minn. 1981) (noting that only general intent is required for criminal -sexual- conduct offenses and that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to general-intent crimes); (“[G]eneral intent only requires an intention to make the bodily movement whic

“If the crime charged has a specific intent as an element and if intoxication is offered by the defendant as an explanation for his actions, then the court must give an instruction on intoxication.” State v. Lindahl

-67 (Minn. 1981); see also State v. Fleck , (“[G]eneral intent only requir es an intention to make the bodily movement which constitutes the act which the crime requires.” (quotation omitted)).

Two years later, she identified Davis from a photo lineup because she “recognized some facial features.” (noting eyewitness “positively identified defendant” after spending five to six hours with him, providing “a good opportunity to observe him”).

In Fleck, the supreme court similarly recognized that “‘an assault involving infliction of injury of some sort requires no abstract intent to do something further, only an intent to do the prohibited physical act of committing a battery.’” Fleck, d at 310 (d 763, 767 (Minn. 1981)).

First, -67 (Minn. 1981) (holding that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to general-intent sex crimes).

See Hart, d at 786 (noting absence of intent element in first-degree criminal sexual conduct statute created a general-intent crime); (noting that “rape” has generally but not unanimously been viewed as a general-intent crime).

The state argues that this is a for support.

In support of its arguments, -04 (Minn.App.1991), two cases stating that assault is a general-intent crime.

A crime is a specific-intent crime when it requires the state to prove that the defendant’s act was motivated by a “specific intent or purpose.” (stating that specific intent requires a person to have a purpose or conscious desire to cause a criminal result).

ual appears multiple times or whose image is emphasized); United States v. Hines, 387 F.3d 690, 693-94 (8th Cir.2004) (noting that one-person photo lineup was unduly suggestive and analyzing identification under the totality of the circumstances); Ostrem, d at 921 (“Single photo line-up identification procedures have been widely condemned as unnecessarily suggestive.”); (finding suggestive a photo lineup containing two pictures of defendant); State v. Witt, 310 Minn. 211, 212-13 , -15 (1976) (fi

(quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107 , 97 S.Ct.

“If the crime charged has a specific intent as an element and if intoxication is offered by the defendant as an explanation for his actions, then the court must give an instruction on intoxication.”

: We are not prepared to establish any requirement that the state call the Spreigl witnesses to testify at the hearing to determine the admissibility of the Spreigl evidence.

1(c), (d), (e) (1992); -67 (Minn.1981).

(first degree criminal sexual conduct involving bodily harm to the victim is a general intent crime); see also State v. O’Brien, (substantive elements of first degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn.Stat.

The trial court must give an instruction on intoxication if the crime charged has a specific intent element and “if intoxication is offered by the defendant as an explanation of his actions.”