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Even so, a victim’s prior sexual conduct may be admissible as “constitutionally required by the defendant’s right to due process, his right to confront his accuser, or his right to offer evidence in his own defense.” ( 7 The state responds, however, to Deloye’s related claim that the district court’s exclusion of this evidence was a Brady violation.

We agree with Carbo that, here, the probative value of the evidence establishing a motive for B.E.’s purported actions was not substantially outweighed by the State’s interest in “guarding [the victim’s] privacy and in protecting her from harassment.”

Caselaw indicates that evidence otherwise inadmissible under rule 412 may be received if it “tends to establish a [victim’s] predisposition to fabricate a charge of rape.”

See State v. Caswell , (holding that a victim’s past sexual conduct is admissible when constitutionally required); Wenthe, d at 306 (explaining that sexual-history evidence is admissible when “constitutionally required by the defendant’s right to due process, his right to confront his accusers, or his right to

(holding that a victim’s past sexual conduct is admissible when constitutionally required); 6 Wenthe, d at 306 (explaining that sexual-history evidence is admissible when “constitutionally required by the defendant’s right to due process, hi

Caselaw supports Miller’s claims that “[a]ny evidence tending to establish a predisposition to fabricate a charge of rape should be admitted unless its potential for unfair prejudice outweighs its probative value.” (), review denied (Minn. Dec.

We have construed the rape-shield law as allowing sexual-history evidence, however, when “admission is constitutionally required by the defendant’s right to due process, his right to confront his accusers, or his right to offer evidence in his own defense.” ().

Evidence of a victim’s prior sexual conduct “may be admitted where it is constitutionally required by the defendant’s right to due process, his right to confront his accuser, or his right to offer evidence in his own defense.” d 747, 750 (Minn. App. 1991) ().

Cobb also argues that the rape shield rule should have “yield[ed]” to his constitutional right to present a complete defense, d 337 (Minn. 1986)

unless its potential for unfair prejudice outweighs its probative value.” (), review denied (Minn. Dec.

The effect of rule 404(c) on admission of evidence regarding a complainant’s

we construed the rule in such a way as to allow the admission of a victim’s past sexual conduct in all cases in which admission is constitutionally required by the defendant’s right to due process, his right to confront his accusers, or his right to offer evidence in his own defense.

* * * the supreme court held that evidence of a complainant’s previous sexual conduct should be admitted when evidence shows a predisposition to fabricate a charge of rape.

In this case, we do not find that possibility present.

3 prohibits the admission of evidence concerning a complainant’s previous sexual conduct except under limited circumstances, it has been established that, when evidence tends to establish a predisposition to fabricate a charge of rape, it “should be admitted unless the potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.” (citing United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268 , 271 n. 2 (8th Cir.1978)).

the supreme court refused to grant a new trial in a criminal case where the trial court had included the instruction on false testimony because the instruction did not single out the defendant.