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Public record · Human review · No verdicts asserted

Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Evans, 311 N.W.2d 481.

209 citing documents.

  • State v. Rohda 358 N.W.2d 39 Minn. 1984
  • State v. Pickett 358 N.W.2d 38 Minn. 1984
    1 The court concluded that there were grounds for a durational departure with respect to each offense and that *39 therefore the trial court, could have imposed a total sentence of 430 months (43 X 2 X 5).
  • State v. Heidelberger 353 N.W.2d 582 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
  • State v. Heidelberger 353 N.W.2d 582 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
  • State v. Ahern 349 N.W.2d 838 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
  • State v. Ahern 349 N.W.2d 838 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
  • State v. Higginbotham 348 N.W.2d 327 Minn. 1984
  • State v. Higginbotham 348 N.W.2d 327 Minn. 1984
  • State v. McGee 347 N.W.2d 802 Minn. 1984
  • State v. McGee 347 N.W.2d 802 Minn. 1984
    On remand, the trial court, if it choses, may depart both dispositionally and dura-tionally and, impose a sentence of up to 54 months executed (double the newly computed correct presumptive sentence duration of 27 months).
  • State v. Elkins 346 N.W.2d 116 Minn. 1984
  • State v. Elkins 346 N.W.2d 116 Minn. 1984
    and by the statutory maximum sentence duration.
  • State v. Gissendanner 343 N.W.2d 668 Minn. 1984
  • State v. Gissendanner 343 N.W.2d 668 Minn. 1984
    Defendant makes two contentions with respect to his sentence: one, that the record does not support any dura-tional departure or departure with respect to consecutive service, and two, that the use of both a double-durational departure and a
  • State v. Wittig 343 N.W.2d 711 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
  • State v. Wittig 343 N.W.2d 711 Minn. Ct. App. 1984
  • State v. Wellman 341 N.W.2d 561 Minn. 1983
  • State v. Wellman 341 N.W.2d 561 Minn. 1983
    However, a is that generally the maximum sentence that a defendant should be given in a case in which departure is justified is two times the presumptive sentence duration and that it would be a violation of that principle to also use the aggravating circumstances in such a case to justify an .additional departure
  • State v. Lalli 338 N.W.2d 419 Minn. 1983
  • State v. Lalli 338 N.W.2d 419 Minn. 1983
    generally bars use of one set of aggravating circumstances as justification for both a durational departure and a departure with respect to consecutive service in the same case, but clearly does not bar use of both a dispositional and a dura-, tional departure in the same case or a dispo-sitional departur
  • State v. Kirsch 338 N.W.2d 45 Minn. 1983
  • State v. Kirsch 338 N.W.2d 45 Minn. 1983
    Defendant’s other contention is that the imposition of three consecutive sentences constituted a which generally limits durational departures to double the presumptive sentence duration, the court at most could have sentenced defendant to either two consecutive terms (24 months) or to one term of double duration (24 months).
  • State v. Givens 332 N.W.2d 187 Minn. 1983
  • State v. Givens 332 N.W.2d 187 Minn. 1983
  • State v. Vazquez 330 N.W.2d 110 Minn. 1983
  • State v. Vazquez 330 N.W.2d 110 Minn. 1983
    Additionally, the standards dealing with departure and scope of departure — — servé the same purpose.
  • State v. Norton 328 N.W.2d 142 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Norton 328 N.W.2d 142 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Johnson 327 N.W.2d 580 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Johnson 327 N.W.2d 580 Minn. 1982
    the 20-year sentence clearly was proper since 20 years is less than two times the presumptive sentence.
  • State v. Blue 327 N.W.2d 7 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Blue 327 N.W.2d 7 Minn. 1982
    A departure is justified here
  • State v. Vogelpohl 326 N.W.2d 635 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Van Gorden 326 N.W.2d 633 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Van Gorden 326 N.W.2d 633 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Vogelpohl 326 N.W.2d 635 Minn. 1982
    No issue is raised as to the scope of departure
  • Novak v. State 325 N.W.2d 132 Minn. 1982
  • Novak v. State 325 N.W.2d 132 Minn. 1982
    However, the maximum durational departure in this case would have been twice the presumptive sentence duration.
  • Davis v. State 324 N.W.2d 802 Minn. 1982
  • Davis v. State 324 N.W.2d 802 Minn. 1982
    (filed after the sentence in this case was imposed).
  • State v. Herberg 324 N.W.2d 346 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Herberg 324 N.W.2d 346 Minn. 1982
    We therefore conclude that the trial court was justified not only in departing from the presumptive sentence, but also in imposing a
  • State v. Profit 323 N.W.2d 34 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Profit 323 N.W.2d 34 Minn. 1982
    Therefore, the trial court was justified in imposing a sentence of 140 months for the sex offense and a sentence of 108 months for the robbery, or a total of 248 months in prison.
  • State v. Partlow 321 N.W.2d 886 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Partlow 321 N.W.2d 886 Minn. 1982
    However, the prosecutor did not assert, nor did the medical reports or testimony state
  • State v. Martinez 319 N.W.2d 699 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Martinez 319 N.W.2d 699 Minn. 1982
    2 <■ we held that in cases in which upward durational departure is justified the length of the sentence imposed generally may not exceed twice the length of the presumptive sentence.
  • State v. Rohrer 317 N.W.2d 700 Minn. 1982
  • State v. Rohrer 317 N.W.2d 700 Minn. 1982
    However, because of the absolute vulnerability of the victim and the particular cruelty of petitioner in committing the offense, and possibly could have imposed a