Cited by

–36 (Minn. 1982), which held that the appellant could not be convicted of attempted second-degree manslaughter involving culpable negligence because it “makes no sense to say” appellant specifically intended to kill the victim by being negligent.

d 730, 734 (Minn. 1982).

Porte emphasizes that witness tampering is a crime of specific intent—“an intent to cause a particular result.” d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted); (“[A]n attempt to commit any crime requires a specific intent to commit that particular offense.” (quotation omitted)); (“[T]he word ‘intentionally’ makes witness tampering a specific[-]intent offense.” (quotation omitted)) , rev. denied (Min

On appeal, Coleman argued that the district court co mmitted plain error when it instructed the jurors that Coleman need only have acted “with the knowledge that someone may be killed.” According to Coleman, th e above-quoted phrase incorrectly defined recklessness, which he claime d was the required mental stat e for third-degree depraved 6 mind murder.1 –34 (Minn. 1982), Coleman explained that “a person acts ‘recklessly’ when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that

It is intentional conduct which the actor ma y not intend to be harmful but which an ordinary and reasonably prudent man would recognize as involving a strong probability of injury to others.” State v. Zupetz

It is “intentional conduct which an actor may not intend to be harmful, but which an ordinary and reasonably prudent [person] would recognize as involving a strong probability of inju ry to others.”

An attempt to commit a crime “requires that the actor have an intent to perform acts and attain a result which if accomplished would constitute the crime.” State v. Zupetz , .

Under the objective test, a person acts with gross negligence through a “gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would ob serve in the actor’s situation.” State v. Zupetz , d 730, 733 (Minn. 1982).

1 (2010) (“Whoever, with intent to commit a crime, does an act which is a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for, the commission of the crime is guilty of an attempt to commit that crime” (emphasis added)); (providing that an attempt requires that the actor have the specific intent to perform acts and attain a result which, if accomplished, would constitute the crime alleged).

15, 1997); (observing that it seems illogical for crimes like attempt to commit manslaughter to exist because “there is no specific intent to commit the reckless or negligent act”).

Relying on State v. Zupetz, in which we defined “recklessly” in the context of reckless homicide, -34 (Minn.1982), we said, “A person acts ‘recklessly’ when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the element of an offense exists or will result from his conduct * * *.

In State v. Zupetz we explained that “[a] person acts ‘recklessly’ when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the element of an offense exists.” (emphasis added).

Interpreting the intent prong of “attempt,” this court has stated that “ ‘an attempt to commit any crime requires a specific intent to commit that particular offense.’ ” (quoting Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Law at 573-74 (2d ed.1969)).

review denied (Minn. Apr.

This court has held that “[sjpecific intent that would give rise to an attempt to commit a certain crime is the intent to commit that particular crime.” (emphasis omitted).

(holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of attempting to commit an offense for which the mens rea element requires mere recklessness or negligence rather than specific intent).

“Specific intent that would give rise to an attempt to commit a certain crime is the intent to commit that particular crime.”

9(4) (defining intent); -35 (Minn.1982).

This court discussed the meaning of “reckless” noting that “[a] person acts ‘recklessly1 when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the element of an offense exists or will result from his conduct * * *.

To the extent that, as [State v.] Zupetz [ ] holds, one cannot attempt to commit negligent or reckless acts, so one cannot premeditate and intend to be culpably negligent in causing the death of another.

This court has described the culpable negligence in the definition of second degree manslaughter as “recklessness,” “intentional conduct which the actor may not intend to be harmful but which an ordinary and reasonably prudent man would recognize as involving a strong probability of injury to others.” (quoting State v. Beilke, 267 Minn. 526, 534 , ).

In disagreeing with this, a case in which we held that second-degree manslaughter is not a specific-intent crime, and that therefore one may not be convicted of attempting to commit second-degree manslaughter.