Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703.

77 citing documents.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
When a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of mental illness, expert psychiatric testimony is admissible during the mental illness phase of trial to establish that the defendant “was laboring under such a defect of reason that he lacked the capacity to form the intent that was otherwise manifested.” see also Minn. R. Crim.
Robert Patrick Butters v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Robert Patrick Butters v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2016
“The law recognizes no degree of sanity”—“on one side are the legally sane, on the other side are the legally insane.”
State of Minnesota v. Javon Lamar Johnson Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Javon Lamar Johnson Minn. Ct. App. 2015
(“In making its factual determination, the jury was entitled to make reasonable inferences from the evidence, including inferences based on their experiences or common sense.” (quotation omitted)); (stating that jurors “rely[] on their sensory perceptions, experiences in life, and their common sense” when considering evidence).
State v. Anderson 789 N.W.2d 227 Minn. 2010
State v. Anderson 789 N.W.2d 227 Minn. 2010
Existing law presumes that during any trial, “defendant^ standing trial, are responsible for their acts, i.e., that they have the capacity to intend what they do.”
State v. Brown 758 N.W.2d 594 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
State v. Brown 758 N.W.2d 594 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
State v. Bird 734 N.W.2d 664 Minn. 2007
State v. Bird 734 N.W.2d 664 Minn. 2007
When a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of mental illness, expert psychiatric testimony is admissible during the mental illness phase of the defendant’s trial to establish that he “was laboring under such a defect of reason that he lacked the capacity to form the intent that was otherwise manifested.” see also Minn.R.Crim.
State v. Ambaye 616 N.W.2d 256 Minn. 2000
State v. Ambaye 616 N.W.2d 256 Minn. 2000
("There is a distinction, which society understands and accepts, between a verdict of `not guilty' and a verdict of `not guilty by reason of insanity.'").
State v. Voorhees 596 N.W.2d 241 Minn. 1999
State v. Voorhees 596 N.W.2d 241 Minn. 1999
In Re Linehan 594 N.W.2d 867 Minn. 1999
State v. Collins 580 N.W.2d 36 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
State v. Collins 580 N.W.2d 36 Minn. Ct. App. 1998
State v. Griese 565 N.W.2d 419 Minn. 1997
State v. Griese 565 N.W.2d 419 Minn. 1997
-06 (Minn.1982), is that expert psychiatric testimony on whether a defendant was capable of forming the requisite mens rea for the crime charged is admissible only in the second phase of a bifurcated trial when the defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity.
State v. Mills 562 N.W.2d 276 Minn. 1997
State v. Mills 562 N.W.2d 276 Minn. 1997
State v. Schreiber 558 N.W.2d 474 Minn. 1997
State v. Mott 931 P.2d 1046 Ariz. 1997
State v. Schreiber 558 N.W.2d 474 Minn. 1997
2d 453 (1991) (precluding psychiatric testimony relating to premeditation and intent did not deny defendant due process); (same); -16 (Minn.1982) (finding that defendant’s right to present evidence of mental capacity only arises during the mental illness phase, and not the guilt phase); (finding that evidence of mental capacity is irrelevant to determine intent during state’s case because state carries burden to establish intent and such evidence only becomes relevant during defendant’s ease whe
Matter of Linehan 518 N.W.2d 609 Minn. 1994
State v. Brink 500 N.W.2d 799 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
State v. Brink 500 N.W.2d 799 Minn. Ct. App. 1993
State v. Lee 491 N.W.2d 895 Minn. 1992
State v. Lee 491 N.W.2d 895 Minn. 1992
State v. Provost 490 N.W.2d 93 Minn. 1992
State v. Provost 490 N.W.2d 93 Minn. 1992
Defense counsel notified the state of his intent to call an expert psychiatric witness during the first or “guilt” phase of the trial, did not prohibit testimony on defendant’s mental condition and how this condition may have affected defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime.
Silberstein v. Cordie 474 N.W.2d 850 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
Silberstein v. Cordie 474 N.W.2d 850 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
to conclude the exception applies.
State v. Barsness 473 N.W.2d 325 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
State v. Barsness 473 N.W.2d 325 Minn. Ct. App. 1991
the supreme court, rejecting the doctrine of diminished responsibility, held that psychiatric evidence on the defendant’s mental capacity is inadmissible on the issue of intent.
State v. Brom 463 N.W.2d 758 Minn. 1990
State v. Brom 463 N.W.2d 758 Minn. 1990
we held expert psychiatric testimony inadmissible with respect to the elements of premeditation and intent.
Wieland v. State 457 N.W.2d 712 Minn. 1990
Wieland v. State 457 N.W.2d 712 Minn. 1990
State v. Gore 451 N.W.2d 313 Minn. 1990
State v. Gore 451 N.W.2d 313 Minn. 1990
State v. Barsness 446 N.W.2d 666 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
State v. Barsness 446 N.W.2d 666 Minn. Ct. App. 1989
(rejecting the doctrine of diminished responsibility).
State v. Hennum 428 N.W.2d 859 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
State v. Hennum 428 N.W.2d 859 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
(distinguishing intent as a fact issue from the question of the mental capacity of a defendant to commit a crime).
State v. Jurgens 424 N.W.2d 546 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
State v. Jurgens 424 N.W.2d 546 Minn. Ct. App. 1988
The doctrine of diminished responsibility, however
State v. Bergstrom 413 N.W.2d 206 Minn. Ct. App. 1987
State v. Bergstrom 413 N.W.2d 206 Minn. Ct. App. 1987