Cited by

at 271 (citing Langdon v. State , 349 (Minn. 1982)) .

(concluding that a defendant who assaulted and committed first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a victim, then, fearing he would be observed, drove the victim a short distance and again assaulted and committed first-degree criminal sexual conduct with her, was engaged in a single behavioral in

See, e .g., Dillon, d at 597-98; -64 (Minn. 1982).

Vossen argues that this was error, contending that “it is not possible to separate the time-and-space component of the analysis from the criminal objective analysis, particularly given the ‘avoidance of apprehension doctrine.’” to support his argument.

These cases, State v. Boley , and Blockberger v. United States , 284 U.S. 299 (1932),2 all relate to whether a district court may enter multiple convictions based on conduct arising from a singular behavioral incident.

See State v. Herberg , 6 (finding that two sexual assaults against the same victim, occurring at different times and locations on the same day, were both related to defendant’s single objective to satisfy his sexual desires); Langdon v. State , (finding that defendant’s single crimina

1984), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a defendant’s two acts of sexual intercourse that occurred at different places in one evening arose out of a single behavioral incident because there had been “just one basic incident of wrongdoin g that took place at two different locations in one evening.” We do not agree that either Bixby or the case it relied upon, controls the outcome here based on the unique facts and circumstances of this case.

but not vacating the convictions for both offenses); -12 (Minn. 1998) (pursuant to section 609.035, vacating one of the two imposed sentences for criminal damage to property and exhibiting a pattern of harassing conduct because these offenses arose out of a single behavioral incident, but not vacating the convictions for these offenses); -49 (Minn. 1982) (pursuant to section 609.035, vacating three of the four imposed sentences because “there was an underlying unity to the various acts of assaul

Enderle cites to the case of State v. Herberg , as support for his claim.

a sentencing court cannot impose multiple sentences (even concurrent sentences) for multiple offenses committed against th e same victim in a single behavioral incident.” State v. Herberg

rivacy, and the victim suffered serious psychological damage); Van Gorden, d at 634–35 (affirming a greater-than-double durational departure for first-degree criminal sexual conduct when the victim was vulnerable and subjected to multiple forms of penetration; the victim suffered a serious, permanent injury; and the offense occurred in the victim’s zone of privacy); (affirming a greater-than-double durational departure for first-degree criminal sexual conduct when the victim was subjected to mul

This means a district court “cannot 13 impose multiple sentences (even c oncurrent sentences) for multi ple offenses committed against the same victim in a single behavioral incident.” State v. Herberg , d 346, 348 (Minn. 1982).

See Bixby v. State , State v. Herberg

See, e.g., Spears, d at 727 (noting that defendant’s abduction and sexual assault of victim was motivated by his “perverse sexual needs”); State v. Herberg , (determining that criminal sexual conduct and kidn apping offenses were motivated by defendant’s desire to “satisfy his perverse sexual needs”); Suhon, d at 24 (stating that defendant’s motivation in sexually abusing his adopted daughter was based on his “perverse sexual desires”).

( (reasoning that a defendant’s “overall criminal objective” was “to steal as much money as he could that afternoon” by burglarizing several laundry rooms in the same apartment complex); 349 (Minn. 1982) (reasoning that a defendant’s “underlying motivation remained the same” in committing multiple violent offenses against the same victim over the course of an afternoon).

2016), (relying on defendant’s motivation “to satisfy his perverse sexual needs” to find single behavioral incident where multiple sexual acts occurred in a single afternoon) , and State v. Spears , (following Herberg’s sexual-needs rationale when “[a]ll three offens

8) (holding that several crimes were not part of a single behavioral incident where, although all the crimes 5 occurred during the same evening, the contact period extended two and one-half hours, and, although all the crimes occurred in or by the victim’s automobile, the automobile itself was moved from place to place); (holding that two incidents of first-degree criminal sexual conduct committed against the same victim, separated by both time and place, arose out of a single behavioral inciden

5 See, (reasoning that defendant’s “overall criminal objective” was “to steal as much money as he could that afternoon” by burglarizing several laundry rooms in the same apartment complex); 349 (Minn. 1982) (reasoning that defendant’s “underlying motivation remained the same” in committing four violent offenses against the same victim over the course of an afternoon).

393 (Minn.1984) (holding that two separate acts of criminal sexual conduct involving the same victim committed in two locations over the course of one evening were part of the same behavioral incident); (same); see also State v. Musta, 284 Minn. 359, 364 , (explaining that if the defendant had been charged with only robbery, “evidence of his efforts to escape apprehension including the exchange of gunfire [with police] which constituted the assault” and which occurred sever

(concluding that defendant’s one “underlying motivation” for two acts of penetration was “to satisfy his perverse sexual needs,” although “[d]efendant moved the victim to a different place before 4 Although Larson raises his sentencing argument for the first time on appeal, the statutory protect

see also Glaraton, d at 834 (concluding *598 that severe aggravating circumstances were present in a case factually similar to Herberg).

See, e.g., Norregaard, d at 450

Id.; (explaining the rule).

(affirming district court’s sentence departure for attempted murder where defendant broke knife off in victim’s spine and attacked victim while she was huddled over her child); (affirming district court’s sentence departure for first-degree criminal-sexual conduct where defendant terrified victim, forced victim to submit to various types of penetration, and subjected victim to gross and vile physical abuse, which included cutting her vagina, forcing her to stick pin into one

at 296 ; (concluding two acts of criminal sexual conduct against the same victim in separate counties comprised a single behavioral incident because defendant drove the victim to a different location only to avoid detection and planned to continue his attack).

1 (1996) (providing that a person whose conduct constitutes more than one offense may be punished for only one of the offenses); (prohibiting even concurrent sentences for single behavioral incident).

to support his argument that moving L.L.

and State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430 , support admission of the pornographic items.

State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430, 433 , -68 (1973).

State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430, 433 , (approving, in attempted murder trial, admission of books on “urban guerilla warfare” seized from defendant); (noting link between contents of violent pornographic books offered as state’s exhibits and circumstances of charged crimes in a case settled before trial by a plea bargain).

ultiple penetrations, permanently injured, threatened with death, and suffered psychological damage); Norton, d at 146 (victim threatened with death and psychologically damaged, victim’s zone of privacy invaded); -35 (Minn.1982) (victim subjected to multiple penetrations, permanently injured, and victim’s zone of privacy invaded); (victim subjected to various types of penetration, threatened with death, and gratuitously and permanently injured).