Cited by

See, e.g. , Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minn. , (Minn. Stat. § 554.02 (2016)); State v. Garcia , (Minn. Stat. § 260B.130, subd.

9 2012); see State v. Garcia , ( stating that the Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions “have been analyzed under the same principles and begin with the mandate t hat all similarly situated individuals shall be treated alike” (quotation omitted)).

(explaining fundamental-rights analysis under substantive-due-process claims); see also State v. Garcia , , 298 (Minn. 2004) (explaining fundamental-rights analysis under equal-protection claims).

Instead, [appellate courts] have required a reasonable connection between the actual, and not just the theoretical, effect of the challenged classification and the statutory goals .” (quotation omitted).

d 294, 301 (Minn. 2004).

-99 (Minn. 2004) (describing the federal rational-basis test as "more deferential”).

In short, “similarly situated individuals shall be treated alike, but only invidious discrimination is deemed constitutionally offensive.” (quotation omitted).

Minnesota courts analyze both clauses “under the same principles,” and mandate that all “similarly situated individuals shall be treated alike, but only invidious discrimination is deemed constitutionally offensive.” (quotation omitted).

In short, “similarly situated individuals shall be treated alike, but only invidious discrimination is deemed constitutionally offensive.” (quotation omitted).

We review an equal protection challenge to a statute “under a rational basis standard unless the challenge involves a suspect classification or a funda *626 mental right.”

“A defendant bears the burden of establishing that he/she is entitled to jail credit.”

The “defendant bears the burden of establishing that [he] is entitled to jail credit.”

“A defendant bears the burden of establishing that he/she is entitled to [custody] credit.”

The “defendant bears the burden of establishing that [he] is entitled to jail credit.”

(rejecting a comparison between juveniles and adults for equal-protection purposes because “[t]he relevant comparison is between juveniles designated as EJJs who violate probation and have an adult sentence executed, and juveniles certified as adults who are initially placed on probation and then

“A defendant bears the burden of establishing that he/she is entitled to jail credit.”

ough time to figure things out for [appellant], if EJJ designation is appropriate or if he should be revoked and returned to the adult courts.” The Minnesota Supreme Court has noted that, “An initial juvenile disposition reinforced by the possibility of adult sanctions gives juveniles a certainty of punishment combined with an opportunity to be successful in the juvenile system.” (quotation omitted).

“The key distinction between the federal and Minnesota tests is that under the Minnesota test ‘we have been unwilling to hypothesize a rational basis to justify a classification, as the more deferential federal standard requires.’” (quoting Russell, d at 889 ).

“The key distinction between the federal and Minnesota tests is that under the Minnesota test Ve have been unwilling to hypothesize a rational basis to justify a classification, as the more deferential federal standard requires.’ ” (quoting Russell, d at 889 ) (emphasis added).

5 While we have not always followed federal law in interpreting our state Equal Protection Clause, we have relied on federal law to determine if two groups are similarly situated, (explaining that the Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions “have been analyzed under the same principles and begin with the mandate that all similarly situated individuals shall be treated alike” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The “key distinction” between the two tests is that “under the Minnesota test ‘we have been unwilling to hypothesize a rational basis to justify a classification, as the more deferential federal standard requires.’” (quoting Russell, d at 889 ).

“The key distinction between the federal and Minnesota tests is that under the Minnesota test ‘we have been unwilling to hypothesize a rational basis to justify a classification, as the more deferential federal standard requires.’ ” (quoting Russell, d at 889).

(jail credit for time served in custody for an Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile); (funding of public education); (statutory distinction between quantities of crack cocaine and powder cocaine).