Court of Appeals Thissen, J. Concurring, Anderson, J., Gildea, C.J. Fletcher Properties, Inc., et al.,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A18-1271

Court of Appeals Thissen, J.
Concurring, Anderson, J., Gildea, C.J.
Fletcher Properties, Inc., et al.,

Appellants,
vs. Filed July 29, 2020
Office of Appellate Courts
City of Minneapolis,

Respondent.

________________________

Tamara O’Neill Moreland, Inga K. Schuchar d, Larkin Hoffman Da ly & Lindgren Ltd.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellants.

Erik Nilsson, Interim Minneapolis City At torney, Kristin R. Sarff, Tracey N. Fussy,
Assistant City Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

Aaron D. Van Oort, Thomas Pryor, Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota; and

Todd B. Liljenquist, Minnesota Multi Housing Association, Bloomington, Minnesota, for
amicus curiae Minnesota Multi Housing Association.

Seth Leventhal, Leventhal PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

John J. McDermott, National Apartment Association, Arli ngton, Virginia, for amicus
curiae National Apartment Association.

John Cann, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Housing Justice Center.

Eric Dunn, Richmond, Virginia; and

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Renee Williams, San Francisco, California, National Housi ng Law Project, for amicus
curiae National Housing Law Project.

Philip Tegeler, Washington, D. C., for amicus curiae Pove rty & Race Research Action
Council.

Lawrence R. McDonough, Theresa M. Bevilacqua, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota; and

Samuel Spaid, HOME Line, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae HOME Line.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S

1. Those portions of title 7, chapter 139, of the Minneapolis Code of Ordinances
that prohibit an owner from refusing to rent residential property to an individual because of
any requirement of a public assistance program do not violate the Minnesota Constitution’s
guarantee of substantive due process.
2. Those portions of title 7, chapter 139, of the Minneapolis Code of Ordinances
that prohibit an owner from refusing to rent residential property to an individual because of
any requirement of a public assistance program do not violate the Minnesota Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
THISSEN, Justice.
In this case, we consider a constitutional challenge to an ordinance adopted by
respondent City of Minneapolis that prohibits certain property owners, property managers,
and others (collectively, landl ords) from refusing to rent pr operty to prospe ctive tenants

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when that refusal is motiva ted by a desire to avoid the burden of complying with the
requirements of Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937. Appellants are property
owners (Owners) who own and rent residential properties in Minneapolis. They assert that
the ordinance violates the Du e Process Clause and the Equa l Protection Clause of the
Minnesota Constitution. Because we conclude that the ordinance survives due process and
equal protection rational basis scrutiny, we affirm.
FACTS
Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 provides for housing assistance
to low-income people in the United States. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2016). The
United States Department of Housing and Urban Developm ent (HUD) funds Section 8
programs and local housing aut horities administer the progr ams in their regions. In
Minneapolis, the Minneapolis Public Hous ing Authority (the Housing Authority)
administers Section 8.
Housing choice vouchers are one form of assistance provided under Section 8. See
id., § 1437f(o). Families using housing choice vouchers have a portion of their rent payments
subsidized by the government. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a) (2018). Families using housing
choice vouchers “select and rent units that meet progr am housing quality standards.”
24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(2). If the Housing Authority approves a family’s unit and tenancy, the
Housing Authority “contracts with the [property] owner to make rent subsidy payments on
behalf of the family.” Id. The Housing Authority uses the funds provided by the federal
government to pay the rent subsidy.

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Under federal law, partic ipation in Section 8 is vol untary for both landlords and
tenants. See, e.g., Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir.
1998); Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1280 (7th Cir. 1995). Landlords
who opt to participate in th e program are required to ente r into a Housing Assistance
Payments Contract with HUD. See generally 24 C.F.R. § 982.451 (2018). Under the
Housing Assistance Payments Contract, landlords are subject to certain rules and restrictions
that apply only when landlords lease to voucher holders. These include minimum length of
initial lease terms and housing quality standards. See id. § 982.401.
For years, voucher holders ha ve consistently reported difficulty finding landlords who
accept Section 8 housing choice vouchers. In June 2015, th e Minneapolis City Council
published a notice of intent to introduce an amendment “prohibiting discrimination based on
receipt of public assistance, including tenant-based Section 8 assistance, regardless of any
requirements of such publ ic assistance progra m.” Over the next two years, the City
conducted private meetings, pub lic hearings, surveys, and focus groups with landlords,
tenants, tenant advocates, and representatives of housing industry organizations. The City
also conducted research and ga thered reports and data to further its understanding of the
Section 8 housing choice voucher program, affordable housing, and the Minneapolis housing
market, among other topics.
In March 2017, the City amended the sect ion of its civil ri ghts title addressing
discrimination in real estate. Before the amendment, the section prohibited landlords from
refusing to rent to prospective tenants “because of race, color, cr eed, religion, ancestry,
national origin, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, marital status, status with

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regard to public assist ance or familial status.” Minnea polis, Minn., Code of Ordinances
(MCO), tit. 7, § 139.40(e) (2016). The amendment added a new prohibition providing that
a landlord may not refuse to rent to a prospective tenant “because of . . . any requirement of
a public assistance program.”1 MCO, tit. 7, § 139.40(e) (2017).
The ordinance was again amended in De cember 2017. The ordinance now states:
(e) Discrimination in property rights . It is an unlawful
discriminatory practice for an owner, lessee, sublessee, managing agent, real
estate broker, real estate salesperson or other person having the right to sell,
rent or lease any property, or any agent or employee of any of these, when . . .
status with regard to a public assistance progr am, or any requi rement of a
public assistance program is a motivating factor:
(1) To refuse to sell, rent or lease, or to refuse to offer for sale, rental
or lease; or to refuse to negotiate for the sale, rent al, or lease of any real
property; or to represent that real property is not available for inspection, sale,
rental, or lease when in fact it is so available; or to otherwise make unavailable
any property or any facilities of real property.

MCO, tit. 7, § 139.40(e) (2020).
2 Under the ordinance, the Section 8 housing choice voucher
program is a public assistance program. Id., § 139.20 (2020) (defining “[p]ublic assistance
program” to include any “tenant-based federal, state or local subsidies, including, but not
limited to, rental assistance, rent supplements, and housing choice vouchers”).

1 Nine months after adding the “any requ irement of a public assistance program”
language, the City restructured chapter 139 and again amended the language of section
139.40(e) to provide that it is unlawful for a landlord to refuse to rent to a prospective
tenant if race, color, creed and other statuses , or any requirement of a public assistance
program, is a “motivating factor.”

2 Landlords may continue to refuse to rent to prospec tive tenants if renting would
violate applicable laws and regulations like maximum occ upancy restrictions and may
continue to screen prospective tenants based on nondiscriminatory criteria such as credit or
rental history. MCO, tit. 7, § 139.30(c)(1)–(3) (2020).

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The 2017 amendments also added an affirm ative defense for landlords providing that
refusing to rent due to a requi rement of a public assistance program is not unlawful if the
“requirement would impose an undue hardship.” Id., § 139.40(e)(1). “Undue hardship” is
defined as “a situation requiring significant difficulty or expense when considered in light of
a number of factors to be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Id., § 139.20. The factors
include, but are not limited to:
(1) The nature and net cost of complying with any requirement of a
public assistance program, taking in to consideration existing property
management processes;
(2) The overall financial resources of the landlord, taking into
consideration the overall size of the business with respect to the number of its
employees, and the number, type, and location of its housing stock; and
(3) The impact of complying with any requirement of a public
assistance program upon the business and dwelling.

Id.
The ordinance also provides that four ca tegories of landlords are exempt from the
prohibition on refusing to rent because of the requirements of the housing choice voucher
program without needing to prove undue hardship. The ordinance states:
The provisions of secti on 139.40(e) relating to te nant-based federal,
state or local subsidies, including, but not limited to , rental assistance, rent
supplements, and hous ing choice vouche rs, or any require ment of such a
program, shall not apply to:
(1) Renting or leasing a r oom in an owner occupied
single-family dwelling.
(2) Renting or leas ing a single-family dwelling, a single
dwelling unit, or a single dwelling unit of a condominium, townhouse,
or housing cooperative, by the owner of the dwelling or dwelling unit,
for no more than thirty-six (36) months, when such dwelling or
dwelling unit is an owner occupied homestead at the start of the thirty-
six (36) month period.

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(3) Renting or leasing a dwel ling with two dwelling units
when a person who owns or has an ownership interest in the dwelling
is residing in the other dwelling unit.
(4) Renting or leas ing a single-family dwelling, a single
dwelling unit, or a single dwelling unit of a condominium, townhouse,
or housing cooperative, by the owner of the dwelling or dwelling unit,
while the owner is on active military duty and when such dwelling or
dwelling unit is an owner occupied homestead at the start of the active
military duty.

Id., § 139.30(b) (2020).3
The Owners’ complaint allege d that the amended ordinance (1) is preempted by state
law; (2) violates the Due Pr ocess Clause of the Minnesot a Constitution, Minn. Const.
art. I, § 7; (3) is an unconstitutional partial regulatory taking; (4) unlawfully interferes with
freedom of contract; and (5) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Minnesota
Constitution, Minn. Const. art. I, § 2. The Owners also requested temporary and permanent
injunctive relief. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the Owners, concluding that the ordinance
violated the due process and equal protection clauses. The district court did not address the
Owners’ other claims.4 The court of appeals reversed on both claims and remanded to the
district court for it to consid er the Owners’ other claims. Fletcher Props., Inc. v. City of

3 On appeal, the Owners’ equal protecti on challenge focuses on only two types of
exemptions: those for owner-occupied duplex es and those previously homesteaded as
single-family dwellings or units being rented by the owner for no more than 36 months.
Id., § 139.30(b)(2)–(3).

4 In their briefs, the Owners assert that the ordinance exceeds the scope of the City’s
police powers. To the extent the Owners’ ar gument is that a city’s exercise of police
powers must be consistent with due process, we address those arguments below. To the
extent the Owners’ argument is that the ordinance may constitute an uncompensated taking,
we do not reach that issue.

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Minneapolis, 931 N.W.2d 410, 429–30 (Minn. App. 2019). The Owners sought review and
we granted their petition.
ANALYSIS
This case comes to us on appeal from a grant of summary judgment. We review a
grant of summary judgment de novo. Kratzer v. Welsh Cos., LLC , 771 N.W.2d 14, 18
(Minn. 2009). We view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the party against whom
judgment was granted” —here, the City. See Fabio v. Bellomo , 504 N.W.2d 758, 761
(Minn. 1993). We will affirm the judgment “if no genuine issues of material fact exist and
if the court below properly applied the law.” Kratzer, 771 N.W.2d at 18.
The constitutionality of a statute is a ques tion of law which we review de novo.
State v. Larsen , 650 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Minn. 2002 ). Because statutes are presumed
constitutional, we “exercise our power to de clare a statute unconst itutional with extreme
caution and only when ab solutely necessary.” Boutin v. Lafleur , 591 N.W.2d 711, 714
(Minn. 1999).
I.
A.
We start with the Owners’ due process challenge to the ordinance. The Due Process
Clause of the Minnesota Constitution provides that “no person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law.” Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. Due process
challenges to laws call on us to reconcile several competing constitutional values.
First, we must reconcile our fundamental constitutional commitment that generally
people should be allowed to go about their business without government interference with

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the broadly recognized understanding that, at times, the government must intervene to
protect the interests of others and the common good. In most cases, government action is
constitutional when the objective of the law is permissible, the means chosen to achieve
that objective are reasonable, and the legislative body did not act arbitrarily or capriciously
in enacting the law. See Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 717–18 (citing Contos v. Herbst , 278
N.W.2d 732, 741 (Minn. 1979)).5
A law is permissible when it is within the power of the governmental decision maker
to enact and serves a public purpose. Miller Brewing Co. v. State , 284 N.W.2d 353, 356
(Minn. 1979) (stating that the “purpose of the statute must be on e that the state can
legitimately attempt to achieve”); Contos 278 N.W.2d at 741 (stati ng that the law must
“serve to promote a public purpose”).6
The means chosen to achieve the purpose are reasonable if the legislative body could
rationally believe that the mechanism it chose would help achieve the legislative goal or
mitigate the harm the legislation seeks to address. See Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 718 (rejecting
the argument that the State has no interest in registering nonpredatory offenders because

5 When fundamental rights are at stake, the legislative body must surmount a higher
hurdle before government interference with life, liberty, or property is justified. We apply
strict scrutiny to legislative actions in those cases. See SooHoo v. Johnson , 731 N.W.2d
815, 821 (Minn. 2007). Here, the parties agree that no fundamental rights are at stake and
the less demanding rational basis standard applies.

6 Miller Brewing Company concerns an equal protection challenge. Although the
rational basis tests for equal protection and due process claims differ in some respects, and
we have used different formulations to describe them, the inquiries overlap in many ways.
In particular, the inquiry into the legitimacy of the objective or purpose of the statute is the
same. See State v. Holloway, 916 N.W.2d 338, 346, 348–49 (Minn. 2018).

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maintaining a list that includes nonpredatory and predatory offenders is rationally related
to the State interest of solving crimes). We will not invalidate a law just because the chosen
mechanism “does not assure complete amelioration of the evil it addresses.” Mack v. City
of Minneapolis, 333 N.W.2d 744, 751 (Mi nn. 1983). And the legi slative body need not
choose the best or most exact mechanism to achieve the purpose; it must merely choose a
reasonable method. See Red Owl Stores, Inc. v. Comm’r of Agric. , 310 N.W.2d 99, 103
(Minn. 1981).
A law is not arbitrary or capricious wh en it emerged from a r easoned, deliberative
process, rather than as a result of legislative chance, whim, or impulse. See Minn. State
Bd. of Health v. City of Brainerd , 241 N.W.2d 624, 629–30 (M inn. 1976) (holding that a
law requiring water fluoridation was not arbitrary and violative of due process because the
Legislature relied on scientific opinion that fl uoridation is safe and effective at reducing
dental caries); see also State v. Rey, 905 N.W.2d 490, 495–96 (Minn. 2018) (holding that
an identity theft statute that allowed some victims to recover restitution in excess of actual
losses is not arbitrary because it recognizes the difficulty of discovering and quantifying
identify theft losses). When assessing arbitrariness, we have also considered whether the
law provides a sufficiently definite standard so that obligations and enforcement authority
are clear. See Red Owl Stores, Inc., 210 N.W.2d at 103–04.
Second, due process challenges raise questi ons about the extent to which courts
should disturb decisions of a legislative body. We generally defer to legislative judgments
on the wisdom and utility of a law out of concern for democratic legitimacy and
institutional capacity. Legislators—as the elected representatives of the people—and

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legislative bodies are generally institutionall y better positioned than courts to sort out
conflicting interests and evidence surrounding complex public policy issues. See id. at 104
(stating that “it is not our role to decide whether [a law] is sound policy or whether it
appropriately balances” competing interests). As the United States Supreme Court put it:
This restriction upon the judicial function, in passing on the constitutionality
of statutes, is not artificial or irrational. A state legislature, in the enactment
of laws, has the widest possible latitude within the limits of the Constitution.
In the nature of the case it cannot record a complete catalogue of the
considerations which move its members to enact laws. In the absence of such
a record courts cannot assu me that its action is capricious, or that, with its
informed acquaintance with local conditions to which the legislation is to be
applied, it was not aware of facts which afford reasonable basis for its action.
Only by faithful adherence to this guidi ng principle of judicial review of
legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful
independence and its ability to function.

Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co. , 301 U.S. 495, 510 (1937 ). Under the due process
clause then, “it is not this court’s function, at least in the absence of overwhelming evidence
to the contrary, to second-guess the . . . accuracy of a legislative determination of fact. Nor
is it within our province to determine the wisdom of or necessity for a legislative
enactment.” Minn. State Bd. of Health, 241 N.W.2d at 629.
Accordingly, on a rational basis review, the burden of proving that a statute is
invalid rests with the party challenging its constitutionality. Essling v. Markman ,
335 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 1983). We will not strike down a law as irrational when “it
is evident from all the considerations presented to [the Legislature], and those of which we
may take judicial notice, that the question is at least debatable” and the government
decision maker could reasonably have conceived those facts and considerations to be true.
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. , 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1 981) (citation omitted)

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(internal quotation marks omitted); see Contos, 278 N.W.2d at 742 (holding that a law
forfeiting severed mineral interests if the owner failed to register the interests with the state
was not a violation of subs tantive due process because the Legislature “could have
concluded” that the prior mechanism for en couraging registration was not adequately
effective).
B.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the questi on of whether the Minneapolis
ordinance violates the Owners’ substantive due process rights. We conclude that it does not.
1.
The City articulated th ree purposes for the ordina nce: (1) increasing housing
opportunities for voucher holders , (2) addressing the discrimi natory effects of housing
denials, and (3) prohibiting prejudice-based discrimination. Each of these is a permissible
object of legislation. The Owners neither question that the City can seek to achieve these
ends nor contend that these objectives lack a public purpose. We agree that the objectives
of the ordinance are permissible.
2.
The Owners assert that the ordinance is not a reasonable means to achieve the City’s
purposes. First, they contend that the ordinance will not increase housing opportunities
because the ordinance will not overcome the actual barriers that voucher holders face in
finding housing in Minneapolis. These barriers include a tight rental market and low vacancy
rates, especially for voucher holders; lawful screening criteria that are left untouched by the
ordinance; and rent increases driven by the added costs imposed by the ordinance itself. For

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constitutional purposes, these arguments are unavailing because the ordinance addresses one
impediment to voucher holders finding housing in Minneapolis : the undisputed fact that
some landlords reject voucher holders because the landlords want to avoid the perceived
burdens of participating in the housing choice voucher program. By making it unlawful for
landlords to refuse to participate based on the requirements of the program, more landlords
will participate, thus expanding housing opportunities for voucher holders.
Further, based on the eviden ce in the record, the City’s conclusion that the ordinance
will increase housing opportunities for voucher holders is “at least debatable.” See Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 464. Unde r our deferential rational basis test, we cannot
conclude that the City acted unreasonably by seeking to create more housing opportunities
for voucher holders by prohibiting landlords from refusing to rent to voucher holders to avoid
the burdens associated with the housing choice voucher program.
The Owners similarly contend that the ordinance will not reduce the concentration of
housing opportunities for vouc her holders in certain poor , racially segregated
neighborhoods. They argue that the concentration of Secti on 8 housing is driven by the
supply of housing and not the refusal of la ndlords to participate in the Section 8 housing
choice voucher program. The Owners also point out th at housing mobility for voucher
holders is limited by the lack of job opportunities and so cial services in areas of the city
where fewer voucher holders live.
Although the Owners offer a reasoned argument that the City could have chosen more
effective mechanisms to re duce the concentration of hous ing opportunities in some
neighborhoods, they do not satisfy their burden under our deferential rational basis test. The

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City had before it evidence that low participation by landlords in the Section 8 housing choice
voucher program contributed to the concentration of vouche r holders in poorer, more
segregated neighborhoods. The City could rationally decide that making it unlawful to refuse
to participate in the housing choice voucher program due to the requirements of the program
would increase the number of landlords who participate in the voucher program in all parts
of the city and, consequently, open up housing opportunities in neighborhoods with lower
concentrations of voucher holders.
The Owners finally assert that the or dinance will not re duce prejudice-based
discrimination against Section 8 housing choice voucher holders.7 The Owners note that the
ordinance independently makes it unlawful for la ndlords to refuse to rent to prospective
tenants because they plan to use housing choice vouchers to help cover payment of the rent.
Accordingly, the Owners argue, the additional prohibition on landlords refusing to rent to
voucher holders because they do not want to comply with program requirements is
unnecessary and redundant. The Owners also point out that many landlords do, in fact, rent
some of their properties to voucher holders and other re nters who rely on different
government subsidies. They vigorously contend that their objection to the housing choice
voucher program is motivated solely by the perceived additional burdens and costs that are
associated with the Housing Assistance Payments Contract and not by any prejudice against
voucher holders. We have no reason to doubt this of the Owners and many other landlords

7 The parties disagree about whether one of the purposes of the ordinance is to reduce
or eliminate discrimination against voucher holders. Because we conclude that the
ordinance passes constitutional muster even if that is a purpose (or the purpose) of the
ordinance, that dispute is not germane to our resolution of the case.

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in Minneapolis. But such prejudice is one reason among several that some subset of
landlords in Minneapolis does not rent to voucher holders. And as w ith the other two
purposes, refusing to allow landlords to opt out of the housing choice voucher program due
to the burden of complying with its requirements is one rational step toward reducing refusals
to rent based on prejudice against voucher holders.
That the ordinance may impose burdens on some property owners who are not
motivated by prejudice against voucher holders does not render the ordinance
unconstitutional under the due process rational basis test. Outside of laws directed against
protected classes or politically unpopular groups, overinclusive rules—rules that sweep in
and burden more people than absolutely required to achieve the legislative purpose—have
consistently been upheld against due pro cess challenges because they are rationally
connected to the le gislative purpose. See N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer , 440 U.S. 568,
591–92 (1979) (upholding a rule that individuals in methadone treatment programs cannot
work for the transit authority, even though some individuals may be competent and safe
employees, because the rule was a legislative policy choice); Mourning v. Family Publ’ns
Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 377–78 ( 1973) (upholding a “prophyl actic” rule that required
certain disclosures to consumers if a loan was to be repaid in four or more installments,
even if the lender did not impose a finance charge, under a Truth in Lending Act provision
that required certain disclosures for contracts imposing finance charges).
[T]he question . . . is not whether a st atutory provision precisely filters out
those, and only those, who are in the factua l position which generated the
[legislative] concern reflect ed in the statute. Such a rule would ban all
prophylactic provisions . . . . Nor is the question whether the provision filters
out a substantial part of the class wh ich caused [legisla tive] concern, or

16
whether it filters out more members of the class than nonmembers. The
question is whether [the legislative body], its concern having been reasonably
aroused by the possibility of an abuse which it legitimately desired to avoid,
could rationally have concluded both that a particular limitation or
qualification would protect against its occurrence, and that the expense and
other difficulties of individual dete rminations justified the inherent
imprecision of a prophylactic rule.

Weinberger v. Salfi , 422 U.S. 749, 777 (1 975). Once again, the Minnesota Constitution
does not require a legislative body “to devi se precise solutions to every problem.” Rey,
905 N.W.2d at 495.
Here, the City’s decision to prohibit landlord s from refusing to rent to housing
choice voucher holders because the landlords do not want to comply with the program
requirements is a rational way to reduce refusals to rent based on prejudice against voucher
holders. And the reasonableness of the provi sion is enhanced by the undue hardship
exemption that allows landlords to avoid the requirements of the ordinance and the housing
choice voucher program altogether when those requirements impose unreasonable burdens.
3.
The Owners also argue that the ordinanc e violates the Due Process Clause because
it creates a constitutionally impermissible irre buttable presumption th at a landlord who
refuses to rent to a prospective tenant because of the burdens associated with the Section 8
housing choice voucher program was motivated by prejudice against voucher holders. We
disagree.
8

8 We are not unsympathetic to the Owners’ concern that they may be broadly labelled
as persons who “discriminated,” despite the fact that, as individuals, each may have acted
wholly without discriminatory animus as that term is commonly understood. The
no-refusal-because-of-Section-8-requirements provision is some what of an ill fit with

17
First, the Owners’ irrebuttable-presumpti on argument is a nonstarter because proof
of prejudicial intent simply is not required under the provision prohibiting landlords from
refusing to rent to avoid comp liance with housing choice voucher program requirements.
Accordingly, there is no need or reason to presume prejudicial intent.
Like innumerable statutes and ordinances , the provision establishes a substantive
rule of law that prohibits conduct regardless of the actor’s intent. The unlawful conduct
prohibited by the ordinance is the refusal of a landlord to rent or lease a property because
the landlord wants to avoid complying with the requirements of the housing choice voucher
program—plain and simple. No thing in the specific prohib ition at issue here makes an
intent to discriminate against a voucher holder an element of the violation.
Contrary to the Owners’ arguments, us ing the word “discr imination” in the
ordinance does not inherently include a notion of invidious intent. The City chose to
expressly define “discrimination” in the ordinance. “When a word is defined in a statute,
we are guided by the definition pr ovided by the Legislature.” Wayzata Nissan, LLC v.
Nissan N. Am., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 279, 286 (Minn. 2016). The ordinance provides:
Discriminate or discrimination : Includes any act, at tempted act, policy or
practice, which results in unequal treatment, separation or segregation of or
which otherwise adversely affects any person who is a member of a class or
combination of classes protected by this title.

MCO, tit. 7, § 139.20. On its face, the definition does not require proof of intent.

section 139.40 and perhaps wo uld have been more proper ly enacted in the housing
regulation title of the Minneapo lis Code of Ordinances. But this does not render the
provision unconstitutional. See Red Owl Stores, Inc., 310 N.W.2d at 103.

18
Further, section 139.40 affirmatively declares certain acts—some of which require
proof of intent and some of which do not—to be “unfair discriminatory acts.” Accordingly,
if a person engages in one of those acts, the person’s conduct is by definition an “unfair
discriminatory act.” A property owner’s refu sal to rent property to a potential tenant
because the owner wants to avoid complying with the requirements of the housing choice
voucher program is such an act, regardless of whether the property owner was acting out
of prejudice toward a voucher holder. See MCO, tit. 7, § 139.40(e)(1).
Finally, the responsibility of the Minne apolis Commission on Civil Rights to
determine whether a landlord’s refusal to rent is motivated by a desire to avoid complying
with Section 8 program requirements, see MCO, tit. 7, § 141.50 (2020), does not compel
the conclusion that there can be no violation of section 139.40(e)(1) in the absence of proof
of discriminatory intent. The Director of the Minneapolis Department of Civil Rights has
authority to investigate and enforce many m unicipal economic regulations that lack any
discriminatory intent, including the City’s prevailing wage law, MCO, tit. 2, § 24.220
(2020), and the City’s minimum wage and sick leave policies, MCO, tit. 2, §§ 40.10–.650
(2020). A finding of “discrim ination” by the Commission on Civil Rights simply means
that a person engaged in “unfair discrimina tory acts” or “unlawful discriminatory
practices” as defined in section 139.40. See MCO, tit. 7, § 141.50(r). As set forth above,
those determinations neither connote nor require proof that the person acted with
discriminatory intent.
The Owners also point to the Minnesot a Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat.
§§ 363A.01–.44 (2018), to support their view that proof of prejudicial intent is required in

19
every “discrimination” case in Minnesota.9 They cite two court of appeals cases to argue
that, under the MHRA provisions related to refusal to rent, a prospective tenant must prove
that the landlord’s refu sal to rent was because of the pr ospective tenant’s status in the
Section 8 voucher program.10 In other words, the Owners argue that the precedents they
cite stand for the proposition that Minneso ta law requires a prospective tenant to
demonstrate that the landlord intended to disc riminate based on the prospective tenant’s

9 Before the district court, the Owners argued that the ordinance was preempted by
state statute and case law. The district court did not address the issue, and the question of
preemption—whether the existe nce of the MHRA precludes the City from adopting the
provision at issue in this case—is not before us.

10 The two cases cited by the Owners are Edwards v. Hopkins Plaza Ltd. P’ship, 783
N.W.2d 171 (Minn. App. 2010), and Babcock v. BBY Chestnut Ltd. P’ship, No. CX-03-90,
2003 WL 21743771 (Min n. App. July 29, 2003). Due process considerations were not
raised. In each case, the tenant was a Secti on 8 participant but, fo r business reasons, the
landlord did not participate in the Section 8 program. The tenants argued that the landlords
violated the provision of the MHRA that de fined as an unfair discriminatory practice
refusal to rent or lease property “because of . . . status with regard to public assistance.”
Edwards, 783 N.W.2d at 175-76; (quoting Minn. St at. § 363A.09, subd. 1(1) (2018));
Babcock, 2003 WL 21743771 at *1 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 363.02, subd. 2(1)(b) (2002)
(current version at Mi nn. Stat. § 363A.09, subd. 1(1) (2018))). Noting th at nothing in
Minnesota state law required a landlord to par ticipate in the Section 8 program or accept
Section 8 vouchers, the court of appeals rejected the tenants’ argument because the tenants
offered no proof that the landl ords’ reason for refusing to rent to the tenants was animus
toward participants in Section 8. Edwards, 783 N.W.2d at 177; Babcock, 2003 WL
21743771 at *1–2. “[R]efusal to participate in a volunt ary program for a legitimate
business reason does not constitute discrimination under the MHRA. ” Edwards, 783
N.W.2d at 177 (emphasis added).
The Owners also rely on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
to support their argument that in tent to discriminate is manda tory in every law that seeks
to prohibit or decrease discrimination. This reliance is misplaced for the same reason that
the Owners’ reliance on the MHRA is misplaced. The burden shifting test set forth in
McDonnell Douglas is a method of applying the statutory requirements of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. It is not a constitutional case. And, of course, this is not a Title
VII case.

20
status. The flaw in the Owners’ argument is that the conclusion reached by the court of
appeals in those case was a matter of statutory interpretation of the MHRA. See Minn.
Stat. § 363A.09, subd. 1(1) (defining refusal to rent or lease property “because of . . . status
with regard to public assistance” as an unfair discriminatory practice).
The City’s ordinance is fundamentally different fro m Minn. Stat. § 363A.09,
subd. 1(1). The City’s ordinance has a provision similar to the Minnesota Human Rights
Act provision on which the Owner s rely. MCO, tit. 7, § 139.40( e)(1) (“It is an unlawful
discriminatory practice for an owner [to refuse to sell or lease a property when] status with
regard to a public assistance program . . . is a motivating factor.”). But the ordinance also
expands the list of prohibited reasons for refu sing to rent property beyond those already
listed in the MHRA and includ es the additional provision at issue here, which prohibits
landlords from refusing to rent because of the burdens asso ciated with complying with
Section 8 requirements. Moreover, the City expressly chose to change the language of the
ordinance from prohibiting a landlord from refusing to rent “because of . . . any requirement
of a public assistance program” to prohibiting a landlord from refusing to rent when “any
requirement of a public assistance program is a motivating factor.” MCO, tit. 7,
§ 139.40(e) (amending MCO, tit. 7, § 139.40(e) (2016)). Interpretations of the statutory
language in section 363A.09, subdivision 1(1), are simply inapposite.
Indeed, in one of the cases cited by the Owners, the court of appeals distinguished
the MHRA from a Massachusetts statute, which, similar to the City’s ordinance, made it
unlawful to refuse to rent to an individual r eceiving Section 8 benef its “ ‘because of any
requirement of . . . [a] housing subsidy program.’ ” Edwards v. Hopkins Plaza Ltd. P’ship,

21
783 N.W.2d 171, 178 (Minn. App. 2010) (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, § 4(10)
(West 2006)). The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a landlord could be found liable
under the Massachusetts statute without a showing that the landlord was motivated by
discriminatory animus. DeLiddo v. Oxford St. Realty, Inc., 876 N.E.2d 421, 428–29 (Mass.
2007).
In essence, the Owners’ clai m is that due process princi ples prohibit a legislative
body from passing a law that has the goal of stopping prejudicial discrimination unless the
law includes proof that the actor had an intent to discriminate as an element of the violation.
For purposes of rational basis review, ho wever, the argument improperly conflates a
purpose of a law with the mechanism the legislative body chooses to achieve that purpose.
There is more than one rational way to reduce or eliminate discrimination against voucher
holders. A legislative body rationally coul d attempt to accomplis h that objective by
requiring proof that the refusal to rent was “because of” the prospective tenant’s status as
a voucher holder. But a legislative body could also rationally attempt to reduce or eliminate
discrimination against voucher holders by removing the burden of the program
requirements as a lawful excuse for not participating in the housing choice voucher
program.
In short, because the language of the Minneapolis ordinance does not require proof
that a landlord acted out of prejudice against voucher holders, the Owners’ argument that
the ordinance creates a cons titutionally impermissible c onclusive presumption of
discriminatory intent fails.

22
Despite the Owners’ contentions, our decision in Twin Cities Candy & Tobacco Co.
v. A. Weisman Co., 149 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1967), does not compel a different result. In
Weisman, we held unconstitutional a state cr iminal statute prohibiting wholesale
distributors from selling cigarettes at less than actual invoice cost. Id. at 703. The statute
allowed a distributor to be convicted for a sale below cost regardless of whether the
distributor acted with the intent or effect of injuring a competitor or destroying or lessening
competition. Id. at 701. Relying on our understanding that substantive due process
required proof of predatory pu rpose as an element of any law making sales below cost
unlawful, id. at 703–04, we held that the stat ute was unconstituti onal because “[n]o
opportunity [was] afford ed [to the distributor] to show that [a] transaction is either
innocently consummated or has no injurious effect on comp etitors or the public.” Id. at
702. We ruled that a conclusive legisla tive presumption regarding a factual element
necessary to convict a person of the crime of selling cigarettes below cost was unjustified
and invalid. Id.
The statute at issue in Weisman differs in several re spects from the City’s
prohibition on refusing to rent due to the requirements of the housing choice voucher
program. First, for the reas ons stated earlier, the ordinance does not presume prejudicial
intent. Unlike the statute in Weisman, intent is simply not an element.
Second, in Weisman, we relied primarily on state and federal case law concerning
price fixing and price discrimination. See 149 N.W.2d at 703–04 (discussing Fairmont
Creamery Co. v. Minnesota , 274 U.S. 1 (1927), and Nebbia v. New York , 291 U.S. 502
(1934); then citing State by Clark v. Wolkoff, 85 N.W.2d 401 (Minn. 1957), State by Clark

23
v. Applebaums Food Mkts., Inc., 106 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1960)). The Fairmont Creamery
Court struck down a law prohibiting price discrimination in the purchase of creamery
products. 274 U.S. at 11. The Court held th at the statute interfered with the freedom of
contract protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. It stated that because “the statute
applie[d] irrespective of motive, [it was] an obvious attempt to destroy [the company’s]
liberty to enter into normal contracts, long regarded, not onl y as essential to the freedom
of trade and commerce but also as beneficial to the public.” Id. at 8.
The Fairmont Creamery Court’s focus on freedom of contract—and the date of the
decision—make clear that the decision was part of the approach to the due process clause
that characterized the Court’s Lochner-era11 cases. The constitutional requirement that
price-fixing statutes inherently include proof of injurious inte nt as an element was rooted
in an effort to protect individuals’ freedom to contract, particularly with regard to setting
prices for goods. Courts have long since disavowed this Lochner-era approach and moved
away from a focus on freedom of contract. See Griswold v. Connecticut , 381 U.S. 479,
481–82 (1965) (“Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New York should
be our guide. But we decline th at invitation . . . . We do not sit as a super-legislature to
determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business
affairs, or social conditi ons.” (citations omitted)); Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 523 (“[N]either
property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen

11 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

24
may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm.” (footnotes omitted)).
Relying on those older notions of substantive due process, the Weisman court
applied a more stringent level of scrutiny than rational basis. The court, echoing strict
scrutiny analysis, stated: “A basic assumption in considering this question is the premise
that vendors have a right to deal with thei r property as they wish and that freedom to
contract is a liberty which may not be circumscribed except for compelling reasons.” Id.
at 702 (emphasis added). When an ordinance deprives a person of fundamental rights, the
United States Constitution requi res that we apply such a heightened standard. See Salfi,
422 U.S. at 771–72 (distingu ishing “conclusive evidentia ry presumpti on” cases like
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972), on the ground that the rights at issue in those cases were fundamental
liberties); cf. Fed. Distillers, Inc. v. State, 229 N.W.2d 144, 159 n.19 (Minn. 1975) (“The
proper reach or scope of the constitutional st andard denouncing the use of irrebuttable
presumption is far from settled since we find no cases invalidating its use in the area of
economic regulations except for [ Weisman].”). But here, the parties agree that the
provision in this case is subject to rational basis review which does not require a compelling
reason for the government action but rather a legitimate government interest
Finally, in th e years since Weisman, the Supreme Court has moved away from a
distinct “irrebuttable presumption” analysis of due process challenges and refocuses on the
basic rational basis inquiry of reasonable fit between statutory mean s and purpose. In
Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Supreme Court upheld a California statute that conclusively

25
presumed a woman’s husband was the father of a child born during the marriage and did
not allow another man to introduce paternity evidence to refute the presumption. 491 U.S.
110, 132 (1989). The Michael H. Court ruled that, although framed as a presumption, the
California law was actually a substantive rule of law—that it is irrelevant for paternity
purposes whether a child born into an existing marriage was begotten by someone other
than the husband— supported by rational legislative purposes. Id. at 120–21. Accordingly,
the Michael H. Court held that the proper focus was the traditional rational basis inquiry:
“the adequacy of the ‘fit’ between the classi fication and the policy that the classification
serves.” Id. at 121. It concluded that, because an unmarried biological father does not
have a fundamental liberty interest in obtai ning parental rights under state law, the
conclusive presumption that th e husband is the father “is a question of legislative policy
and not constitutional law.” Id. at 129–30; see also Salfi, 422 U.S. at 771–72; Shreve v.
Dept. of Econ. Sec. , 283 N.W.2d 506, 509 (Minn. 1979) (upholding a law that created a
conclusive presumption that full-time student s were unavailable for work and therefore
ineligible for unemployment benefits); cf. Juster Bros., Inc. v. Christgau , 7 N.W.2d 501,
509–11 (Minn. 1943) (Pirsig, J., dissenting).
Consequently, in cases that do not imp licate fundamental rights, legislative
enactments will be upheld against due proce ss challenges when the means chosen to
achieve a permissible legislative objective are reasonable, regardless of whether the law is
framed as a substantive rule of law or as a conclusive presumption.

26
4.
Finally, we conclude that the ordinance is not an arbitrary and capricious exercise
of the City’s power. Quite the contrary. After considering the ordinance amendment for
almost 2 years, the City adop ted a definite and understanda ble standard of conduct for
landlords. The City gathered substantial ev idence before passing the ordinance. It
consulted with stakeholders including landlo rds, voucher holders, business associations,
and housing nonprofit groups. The City he ld two public hearin gs on the ordinance,
received feedback from focus groups, and was presented with numerous reports regarding
the housing crisis within Minneapolis and the broader metropolitan area. The evidence
presented to the City supported its conclusi on that prohibiting land lords from refusing to
rent to voucher holders because of the burden of complying with the requirements of the
housing choice voucher progra m would help remedy the ch allenges faced by voucher
holders in obtaining housing in Minneapo lis, reduce the concentration in poor and
segregated neighborhoods of housing ava ilable to voucher holders, and prevent
prejudice-based discrimination. The arbitrary and capricious challenge fails.
We therefore conclude that the Minneap olis ordinance does not violate the
Minnesota Constitution’s guarantee of substantive due process.
II.
We now turn to the Owners’ equal protec tion challenge. As we have acknowledged
on several occasions over the past few deca des, our precedent on equal protection under
the Minnesota Constitution has not been a model of clarity. So today we state our rule: a
law subject to rational basis review does not violate the equal protection principle of the

27
Minnesota Constitution when it is a rational means of achieving a legislative body’s
legitimate policy goal. Because we are deferential to the judgment of the lawmaking body,
in the absence of overwhelmi ng evidence to the contrary, we will not second-guess the
accuracy of a legislative determination of facts. Thus, the principle we apply in analyzing
laws subject to rational basis review under the Minnesota Constitution is the same principle
applied to such laws under th e Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
But under our precedent, this rule is subject to an im portant exception: under the
equal protection guarantee of the Minnesota Constitution, we hold lawmakers to a higher
standard of evidence when a statutory classi fication demonstrably and adversely affects
one race differently than other races, even if the lawmakers’ purpose in enacting the law
was not to affect any race differently. See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn.
1991). In those circumstances, we require actual (and not just conceivable or theoretical)
proof that a statutory classification serves the legislative purpose.12

12 The varying levels of scrutiny applie d in equal protection cases differ along two
dimensions: the significance of the government interest at issue and the tightness of the
connection between the means chosen and the government interest. Our cases have
characterized the Russell rule of law as part of our precedent addressing rational basis
review of legislative enactments. As in our rational basis cases, Russell requires only that
the government articulate a legitimate intere st—the same inquiry that applies under the
rational basis test of the Fourteenth Ame ndment to the United States Constitution.
However, our Russell rule differs from the federal sta ndard along the se cond dimension
because it requires a tighter fit between the government interest and the means employed
to achieve it in the form of actual evidence (as opposed to hypothetical or conceivable
proof) that the challenged classification will accomplish the government interest. See 477
N.W.2d at 888 n.2 (distinguish ing federal equal protection la w where stricter scrutiny is
applied only where the legislature enacted a pa rticular statute because of, not merely in
spite of, its anticipated discriminatory effect); cf. Mitchell v. Steffen, 504 N.W.2d 198, 210

28
A.
Legislative bodies regularly, and for ma ny different reasons, pa ss laws that treat
people differently. There is nothing inherently wrong with that. Indeed, it is in the nature
of the work of balancing different policy considerations in a complex and diverse polity.
The equal protection guarantee in the Minnesota Co nstitution places limits on the
circumstances under and extent to which the Legislature can treat similarly situated people
differently.13 In certain circumstances, when a statutory classification impacts fundamental
rights or creates a suspect class, the scope of action of the legislative body is significantly
constrained and its decision is subject to le ss deference and heightened scrutiny by the
courts. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 133 (Minn. 2014) (stating that
when fundamental rights are at issue, a stat utory classification is not entitled to the usual
presumption of validity and the government must show that the classification is “narrowly
tailored to serve a compelli ng government interest”); see also State ex rel. Forslund v.
Bronson, 305 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1981) (a pplying intermediate scrutiny to
gender-based classifications).

(Minn. 1993) (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting) (interpreting Russell as part of a different class
of cases where a higher level of scrutiny than minimal rational basis scrutiny applies).

13 The federal equal protection clause as a pplicable to the states is found in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Minnesota equal protection
guarantee is found in the Rights and Privilege s Clause in Article 1, Section 2 of the
Minnesota Constitution. See Miller Brewing Co. , 284 N.W.2d at 354. We have also
applied the principle under the uniformity clause found in Article 10, Section 1, id., and
the Special Legislation clauses now found in Article 12 of the Minnesota Constitution, see
Loew v. Hagerle Bros., 33 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 1948).

29
When fundamental rights or suspect classes are not at issue, the legislative body
generally may enact laws that treat similarly situated people differently as long as the
different treatment of classes of people is a rational means of achieving—there is “some
fit” with—the legislative body’s policy goal. Back v. State , 902 N.W.2d 23, 29 (Minn.
2017). As appropriate under principles of separation of powers and the distinct institutional
roles played by elected legislative representatives and judges, courts are deferential to those
legislative decisions. See id.; see also Gluba ex rel. Glub a v. Bitzan & Ohren Masonry ,
735 N.W.2d 713, 723 (Minn. 2007) (assessing whether the Legislature “could reasonably
have believed in any facts” to support th e connection between the classification and
purpose of the law); Moes v. City of Saint Paul, 402 N.W.2d 520, 525 (Minn. 1987) (“[I]t
is not this court’s function, at least in the absence of overwhelming evidence to the
contrary, to second-guess the scientific accuracy of a legislative determination of fact.”
(quoting Minn. St. Bd. Of Health , 241 N.W.2d at 629)). Moreover, in this latter
circumstance, the legislative body’s action is presumed to be constitutional and the burden
rests with the person challengi ng the law to prove that the legislative body’s reason for
treating one class differently from another class was not legitimate. Back, 902 N.W.2d at
29. This is the essence of what we call rational basis review under equal protection
principles.
Over the years, we have used many differe nt formulations to describe rational basis
review. We have applied the federal two-pa rt formulation that examines whether the
challenged legislation has a legitimate pur pose and whether it wa s “reasonable for
lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose.”

30
See Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal, 453 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn. 1990). We have also used
a three-part formulation of rational basis re view, which requires that (1) the distinction
between the classes be “genuine and substantial, thereby providing a natural and reasonable
basis to justify legislation adapted to pecu liar conditions and needs”; (2) there be “an
evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the prescribed
remedy”; and (3) “the purpose of the statute be one that the state can legitimately attempt
to achieve.” Miller Brewing Co. , 284 N.W.2d at 356 (citing Schwartz v. Talmo , 205
N.W.2d 318, 323 (1973), superseded by statute as stated in Meils ex rel. Meils v. Nw. Bell
Tel. Co., 355 N.W.2d 710, 714 (Minn. 1984); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Comm’r of
Taxation, 12 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1943)). We have applied yet another formulation of the
very same constitutional equal protection principle in some workers’ compensation cases.
See Gluba, 735 N.W.2d at 721 (stating that the standard is whether the classification applies
uniformly to all those simila rly situated, is “necessitate d by genuine and substantial
distinctions between the two groups,” and effectuates the purpose of the law) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
These differing formulations are best u nderstood as lenses that courts use to
examine different types of equal protection problems that may arise in a given case, rather
than a strict checklist that mu st be run down in every case.
14 In the end, they “merely

14 Talmo, which is the source of and precursor to the Miller Brewing test, is instructive.
We adopted the Talmo three-part test from earlier cases, including Loew v. Hagerle Bros.,
33 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 1948). See Talmo, 205 N.W.2d at 322 n.2. In Loew, we applied
equal protection principles to a claim brought under the Special Legislation clause of the
Minnesota Constitution. 33 N.W.2d at 601. To assemble the three-part test, Loew pulled
together different “principles” and “fundamental rule[s]” th at we had applied in even

31
represent different ways of stating the same analysis.” In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d
767, 770 n.2 (Minn. 1986); see also AFSCME Councils 6, 14, 65 & 96 v. Sundquist , 338
N.W.2d 560, 569–70, 570 n.12 (Minn. 1983) (“Although we have expressed this standard
in various ways, the preeminent expression of rationality analysis under the equal
protection clause is the requirement that legislative classifications make distinctions which
are rationally related to legitimate legislative goals or interests.”); Talmo, 205 N.W.2d at
322 (using the phrase “guiding principles” wh en listing factors to consider in equal
protection challenges). The test s and formulations exist to pr ompt litigants and courts to
ask the right questions and, depending on the specific distinction or classification made in
the law, those questions may be different. As we noted in Loew v. Hagerle Bros., “[a]ny
formulation of the applicable principles canno t be expected to reflect all facets in their
application to an infinite variety of circumstances.”15 33 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. 1948).
What is most important is identifying clearl y the specific equal protection concern raised
by the party challenging the law.

earlier cases to help courts as sess whether legislative classifications passed constitutional
muster in a variety of contexts. See Hamlin v. Ladd , 14 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn. 1944).
The lesson is that the Loew/Talmo/Miller Brewing test is properly conceptualized as a
compendium of principles of analysis—some or all of which may apply in a particular case
depending on the type of equal protection challenge raised—rather than as a set of elements
to establish a constitutional violation.

15 When reading a large numb er of our equal protection decisions, it becomes evident
that our analysis of the elemen ts of the three-part test is often duplicative; the reason that
the distinction made in a law between the cla sses is genuine and subs tantial is the very
same reason that an evident connection exists between the distinctive needs peculiar to the
class and the prescribed remedy.

32
Thus, to clarify, we hold that, unless a la w that treats groups of people differently
impacts fundamental rights or creates a su spect class, it does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Minnesota Constitutio n when it is a rational means of achieving
the legislative body’s legitimate policy goal.
In applying the standard, we have stated th at the first step is to identify whether the
law creates distinct classes within a broader group of similarly situated persons or whether
those treated differently by the law are sufficiently dissimilar from others such that the law
does not create different classes within a group of similarly situated persons. See State v.
Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 521 (Minn. 2011). To make this dete rmination, we ask whether
“ ‘the claimant is treated differently from other [persons] to whom the claimant is similarly
situated in all relevant respects.’ ” State v. Holloway, 916 N.W.2d 338, 347 (Minn. 2018)
(quoting State v. Johnson, 813 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Minn. 2012 )) (emphasis added). When the
claimant is not treated differently than all others to whom the claimant is similarly situated,
there is no equal protection violation. Cox, 798 N.W.2d at 521–22.
This first step is not a contextless comp arison of the classes within the broader
group. To meaningfully assess whether a claimant is similarly situated to all others in all
relevant respects, we examine the positions of the claimant and all others in light of the
broad purpose and operation of th e statute. Whether a claimant is “similarly situated” to
other persons cannot be decided based solely on the very classification challenged as
violating equal protection. Stated another way, a cla ssification does not pass equal
protection muster simply because the Legislature created two classes. To do so would beg
the question and render the equal protection principle meaningless.

33
Our decision in Holloway is illustrative. We analyzed a Minnesota statute that make
it a crime to sexually penetrate or have sexual contact with a person between the ages of
13 and 16. The equal protection challenge fo cused on a legislative decision to impose a
lower sentence on defendants who were 10 or fewer years older than the victim and a longer
sentence on defendants who were more th an 10 years older than the victim. Holloway,
916 N.W.2d at 343. In assessing whether the two classes of perpetrators were similarly
situated, we did not focus on the challenged classification—the age differential. Id. at 347.
Rather, we decided that the two classes were similarly situated because, at a higher level
of generality, they were both s ubject to criminal liability for sexual contact with a minor.
Id. at 347–48. Accordingly, we concluded that persons in each of the two classes (those
more than 10 years older than the victim and those 10 or fewer years older than the victim)
were similarly situated. Id. at 348; cf. Cox, 798 N.W.2d at 523, 525 n.9 (holding, in a case
challenging the differential in sentences betw een a person convicted for violation of the
dishonored check statute and a person convicted under the theft-by-check statute, that the
two persons were not similarly situated because the Legislature imposed different mens rea
requirements for the two crimes, and noting that we defer to the Legislature’s power to set
criminal sentences).
In Schatz v. Interfaith Care Center, we held under the Workers’ Compensation Act
that Minnesota providers who treat injured workers are not in the same class as out-of-state
providers who treat injured workers. 811 N.W.2d 643, 656–57 (Minn. 2012). We reached
that conclusion because the Workers’ Compensation Act “has a mechanism for
employers . . . to challenge the reasonableness of the charges of medical providers subject

34
to the Act [i.e., Minnesota providers]; but those employers may be unable to challenge the
reasonableness of the charges of medical providers not subject to the Act [i.e., out-of-state
providers].” Id. at 657.
After we identify the appropriate group of similarly situated persons, we determine
the two critical nodes of equal protection anal ysis: the precise nature of the challenged
distinction between members of the group and th e legislative purpose for that distinction.
Finally, we apply the rational basis test, asking if the distinction is a rational way to achieve
the legislative purpose.
To be clear, however, this analysis does not mean that we are compelled to interpret
or apply the equal protection guarantee in the Minnesota C onstitution identically to the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Justice Wahl’s observation in her concurrence in Estate of Turner remains apt:
I would question whether we should harness interpretation of our state
constitutional guarantees of equal protec tion to federal standards and shift
the meaning of Minnesota’s constituti on every time federal law changes.
Such a result would undermine the inte grity and independence of our state
constitution and degrade the special role of this court, as the highest court of
a sovereign state, to respond to the needs of Minnesota citizens.

391 N.W.2d at 773 (Wahl, J., concurring specially) (footnote omitted). But we emphasize
that the uniqueness of Minnesota’s equal protection guarantee does not turn on the specific
formulation used to describe the standard. Rather, in certain circumstances, the Minnesota
Constitution’s equal protection guarantee demands more rigorous analysis from lawmakers
when they are determining whet her a classification will, in fa ct, achieve a statutory goal.
In other words, in a narrow range of cases, we apply a more searching level of scrutiny and

35
less deference to legislative enactments challenged under the Minnesota Constitution’s
Equal Protection Clause than would be applied under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
In particular, we hold lawmakers to a hei ghtened standard of proof as to the fit
between the means chosen by the Legislature a nd the government interest to be achieved
when a statutory classification demonstrably and adversely affects one race differently than
other races, even if the lawmakers’ purpose in enacting the law was not to affect any race
differently. In State v. Russell , we considered a law providing for longer sentences for
possession of crack cocaine than for possession of the same amount of powder cocaine.
477 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Minn. 1991). We struck down the law on equal protection grounds.
Id. at 891. The Legislature ad opted the distinction betwee n crack cocaine and powder
cocaine in an effort to stop street-level dealers of cocaine. Id. at 889. Evidence presented
to a legislative committee suggested that a person who possessed three grams of crack
cocaine was likely a dealer while a person who possessed powder cocaine was unlikely a
dealer unless he possessed 10 grams or more. Id.
The record in Russell, however, also demonstrated that “the law ha[d] a
discriminatory impact on black persons.” Id. at 887. The district court found that “crack
cocaine is used predominantly by blacks and that cocaine powder is used predominantly
by whites,” and thus, “a far greater percentage of blacks than whites are sentenced for
possession of three or more grams of crack co caine . . . with more severe consequences
than their white counterparts who possess three or more gr ams of cocaine powder.” Id.
(footnote omitted).

36
We recognized that under the Supreme Co urt’s interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, this racially discriminatory ef fect of the law was insufficient to invoke a
higher level of scrutiny in the absence of proof that the Legislature enacted the sentencing
distinction because the law would have such a racially discriminatory effect. Id. at 888 n.2
(citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987)). Nonetheless, while acknowledging
that “we are ordinarily loathe to intrude or even inquire into the le gislative process,” we
said that “the correlation between race and the use of cocaine base or powder and the gross
disparity in resulting punishment cries out for closer scrutiny of the challenged laws.” Id.
We stated: “It is particularly appropriate that we apply our stricter standard of rational basis
review in a case such as th is where the challenged classi fication appears to impose a
substantially disproportionate burden on the ve ry class of persons whose history inspired
the principles of equal protection.” Id. at 889.
Accordingly, because of the disparate effect of the la w on African Americans, we
more closely scrutinized whether the dis tinction between crack cocaine and powder
cocaine accurately reflected whether the pe rson possessing a determ ined amount was a
street-level dealer. Id.; see State v. Frazier, 649 N.W.2d 828, 842 (Minn. 2002) (Page, J.,
dissenting) (interpreting Russell to hold that “[u]nder Minnesota law . . . a defendant who
challenges the constitutionality of a statute on the basis that it has a disparate impact on the
members of a minority racial group is entitled to review of the statute under the Minnesota
rational basis test if the defendant shows that the statute falls more harshly on one group
than another”). In other words, we considered whether the evidence proved a sufficiently

37
strong connection between the purpose of the law—regulating the possession of drugs by
street-level dealers—and the means chosen by the Legislature.
Rather than allowing lawmakers to rest on the theoretical assumption that a person
who possessed three grams of crack cocaine was a dealer and someone who possessed three
grams of powder cocaine was not a dealer, we demanded that the legislation be supported
by actual proof that that was the case. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 890. We found such proof
lacking because the Legislature relied on “a necdotal testimony” of a Hennepin County
attorney which was contradicted by a report by the Minnesota Department of Safety Office
of Drug Policy that rejected the “street de aler” distinction in possession amounts. Id. at
889–90; see also id. at 891 (“Without more [actual] evid ence, it is as easily assumed that
individuals jailed with possession of three grams of crack are mere personal users who are
arbitrarily penalized as dealers.”).
Since Russell, we have not employed its higher scrutiny of means-end connection—
requiring actual proof as opposed to theoretical or hypothesized proof—to strike down any
law under the Equal Protection Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. In Frazier, we faced
a similar challenge to a longer sentence imposed for a controlled substance crime
committed for the benefit of a gang than would be imposed for someone who violated the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute. 649 N.W.2d at 832. We did not
have occasion to more closel y examine the connection betw een the means of imposing a
longer sentence for gang crimes and the ends to be achieved by the distinction because we
determined that the evidence that the benefit-of-a-gang enhancement has a disparate impact
on minorities was insufficient. Id. at 836–37. Contra id. at 842 (Page, J., dissenting). And

38
we have continued to apply a deferential rational basis standard to “statutory classifications
affecting the regulation of econ omic activity and the distribu tion of economic benefits.”
Gluba, 735 N.W.2d at 723 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Russell, we cited a law review article that analyzed Wegan v. Village of
Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273 (Minn. 1981), Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400
(Minn. 1982), and Nelson v. Peterson, 313 N.W.2d 580, 580–81 (Minn. 1981), to support
the conclusion that the Minnesota equal pr otection guarantee requires more searching
judicial scrutiny of the evidence on which the Legislature relied to support a law. Russell,
477 N.W.2d at 889 (citing Deborah K. McKnight, Minnesota Rational Relation Test: The
Lochner Monster in the 10,000 Lakes, 10 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 709 (1984)). We disagree
with the article’s interpretation of the cases. Those cases were not about imposing more
robust judicial scrutiny of—and second-guessi ng—the evidence before the Legislature.
Rather, those decisions turned on a conclusion that it is not rational for the Legislature to
treat two similarly situated individuals differe ntly when there is ab solutely no difference
between them regarding the purpose the Legislature was attempting to achieve.
In Wegan, we considered an equal protection ch allenge to a provision of the dram
shop statute that established a 1-year statute of limitations on claims brought by an injured
individual against a bar that served an impaired driver “intoxicating liquors.” 309 N.W.2d
at 278. In contrast, an individual injured by a driver impaired by drinking 3.2 beer had 6
years to bring a common law negligence action against the bar.16 Id. Applying basic equal

16 The dram shop statute did not apply to the sale of 3.2 beer for anachronistic
historical reasons related to prohibition. Wegan, 309 N.W.2d at 278–79.

39
protection principles, we reasoned that the appropriate class was individuals injured by an
intoxicated driver. Id. at 280 (“An injured person cares little whether the driver who causes
his injuries became intoxicated as a result of consuming 3.2 beer or stronger liquor.”).
Some injured individuals had only 1 year to su e the bar that served the driver and some
injured individuals had 6 years to bring the same claim. Yet, there was no reason that some
claims would grow stale more quickly than others. Stated another way, the purpose of the
statute of limitations—to avoid stale claims and encourage ear ly resolution of disputes—
applied equally to both sets of claimants and their claims. Id. at 280. The Legislature
simply had no conceivable rational basis for treating the two classes of injured claimants
differently. Id.; see also id. at 281 (citing Kossak v. Stalling, 277 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1979),
and Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977), in which
we struck down as equal protection violations statutes of limitations that applied only to
select groups of defendants).
In Nelson, we struck down, as an equal protection violation, a statute that prevented
state-employed lawyers who represented petitioners in workers’ compensation proceedings
from serving as workers’ compensation judges until 2 years had elapsed since leaving state
employment. 313 N.W.2d at 583. No other lawyers who represented parties in workers’
compensation cases faced a similar prohib ition, including state- employed lawyers who
represented the State in work ers’ compensation cases. Id. at 581. Although we
acknowledged that the Legislat ure could have believed that former petitioners’ counsel
would be perceived as biased in favor of employees, we concluded that the same argument
would apply equally to most other lawyers wo rking in the workers’ compensation arena,

40
especially state-employed defense lawyers. Id. at 582. As in Wegan, viewed in light of
the stated legislative purpose, the Legislat ure had no conceivable rational basis for the
distinction. Id. at 583.
Our rationale in Thompson was the same. There, we held unconstitutional a statute
that prohibited the victim of an intentional tort from recovering in an action against the
estate of a deceased tortfeasor, but allowed recovery by victims in jured as a result of
negligence or intentional conduct th at interferes with property rights. Thompson,
319 N.W.2d at 406. We reasoned that the Legislature’s rationale—that intentional claims
are harder to prove after th e alleged wrongdoer dies—was belied by the fact that other
claims requiring proof of intent survived. Id. a t 4 0 4 – 0 5 . W e s t a t e d t h a t e v e n i f t h e
Legislature was correct that intentional torts are more difficult to prove if the defendant is
dead, “its failure to place inte ntional torts on an equal footin g with other causes of action
for which proof is no less difficult was unreasonable.” Id. at 407 n.10.17

17 Recently, we applied a simi lar analysis and concluded th at a statute regarding jail
credit for juveniles violated the Equal Protection Clause. The statute denied jail credit to
an extended-jurisdiction juvenile offender for time spent postadjudi cation in a custodial
setting, but granted jail credit to a juvenile of fender certified as an adult for time spent in
postconviction probation in a custodial setting. State v. Garcia, 683 N.W.2d 294, 300–01
(Minn. 2004). We noted that the rationale for denial of jail credit to extended-jurisdiction
juvenile offenders—that it provides an incentive to successfully complete the probationary
program—applies identically to juveniles certified as adults who are sentenced to
probation. See also Back , 902 N.W.2d at 30 (holding th at a provision was not rational
because it allowed a claim under the Impris onment and Exonerated Remedies Act only
upon proof that a court vacated a conviction and the prosecutor dismissed the charges
because the statute premised relief under the statute on an legally impossible act). As with
Wegan and the other cases discussed above, our an alysis in these later cases did not turn
on judicial second-guessing of th e evidence before the Legislat ure. Rather, we found an
equal protection violation because there wa s absolutely no difference between the two

41
This principle articulated in Wegan and similar cases 18 is consistent with the rule
that equal protection rational basis review is not concerned that a distinction may have
uneven effects upon some members within an excluded or included group. See Holloway,
916 N.W.2d at 349 (a classification that has some reasonable basis “ ‘does not offend the
constitution simply because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice
it results in some inequality’ ” (quoting Guilliams v. Comm’r of Revenue, 299 N.W.2d 138,
143 (Minn. 1980))); Westling v. Cty. of Mille Lacs , 581 N.W.2d 815, 822 (Minn. 1998)
(stating that “imperfection is not a constitutional defect”). In Wegan and similar cases, we
focused on whether, in view of the purpose the Legislature is trying to achieve, there is any
rational distinction between the similarly situated persons covered by the classification and
those who are excluded. When there is no ra tional distinction at all, the classification
violates equal protection principles. In cases like Westling and Guilliams, the focus is on
the uneven effects the classification has upon individuals within each of the distinct groups
created by the classification. Those inequa lities are not of constitutional import under
rational basis review.19

classes of similarly situated persons in light of the purpose the Legislature was attempting
to achieve.

18 During the same period that Wegan, Nelson, and Thompson were decided, we struck
down a number of other classifications unde r equal protection rational basis review by
applying the same principles. See, e.g., Johnson v. Moberg, 334 N.W.2d 411 (Minn. 1983);
Grassman v. Minn. Bd. of Barber Exam’rs, 304 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. 1981); Dependents of
Ondler v. Peace Officers Benefit Fund , 289 N.W.2d 486 (Minn. 1980); Price v. Amdal ,
256 N.W.2d 461 (Minn. 1977).

19 We acknowledge that, in some cases deci ded in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
tension exists between our willingness to strike down laws on rational basis equal

42
In summary, we conclude that, as a general matter, the Minnesota equal protection
standard is not less deferential to legislative decisions than the federal standard. But where
a law demonstrably and adversely affects one race differently than other races, even if the
lawmakers’ purpose in enacting the law was not to affect any race differently, our precedent
under the Minnesota Constitution requires mo re of lawmakers (actual as opposed to
theoretical factual justification for a statut ory classification)—and de mands of this court
more searching scrutiny—than does the Fourteenth Amendment.
B.
With this background in mind, we turn to the spec ific equal protection challenge
before us. Once again, the ordinance prov ides that owner-occupied duplexes and
previously homesteaded single-family homes rented for 36 or fewer months are not subject
to the no-refusal-because-of-Section-8-requirements provision of the ordinance.

protection review and our genera l deference to legislative de cisions to adopt regulations
that “only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and refer[] complete elimination of the evil
to future regulations.” ILHC of Eagan LLC v. Cty. of Dakota, 693 N.W.2d 412, 423 (Minn.
2005) (citation omitted) (internal quotation ma rks omitted) (articulating a step-by-step
standard); see also Haskell’s, Inc. v. Sopsic , 306 N.W.2d 555, 5 59 (Minn. 1981) (citing
Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 470) (same). It is notable that, during this same period,
our decision in Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979) (holding
step-by-step principle did not apply even though the first step had no rational relationship
to achievement of a legitimate state interest), was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 470. We acknowledged the tension at the time.
We affirm today that under Minnesota equal protection pr inciples, we will not interfere
with a law solely on the ground that it does not completely ameliorate a perceived evil.

43
We start by identifying the relevant group of similarly situated persons. Because
the ordinance regulates the conduct of persons who rent residential units in the city, we
conclude that the relevant class is residential landlords.
Next, we precisely identify the distinction at issue. The Owners argue that the
distinction is between those residential la ndlords who are subject to the prohibition on
refusing to rent because of voucher program requirements and those residential landlords
who are not. We disagree.
The distinction that the Owne rs draw does not consider the entire ordinance. In fact,
no residential landlord is absolutely subject to the prohibition on refusing to rent because
of voucher program requirements. Every reside ntial landlord has the opportunity to seek
an exemption from the ordinance provision if compliance with housing choice voucher
requirements will impose an undu e hardship on the landlord. See MCO, tit. 7,
§ 139.40(e)(1).
Accordingly, the real distinction at issue in this case is between residential landlords
who may refuse to rent without proving an undue hardship (the exempt residential
landlords) and residential landlor ds who may refuse to rent on ly if they establish that
compliance with the requirements will impos e an undue hardship (the nonexempt
residential landlords). In other words, the different burden imposed on the Owners is not
that they must co mply with the provision, but rather that they must b ear the burden of
proving undue hardship while other residential landlords do not. And so the question we
must answer is whether exempting certain residential landlords from the burden of proving

44
an undue hardship is a rati onal means of achieving the C ity’s purpose for adopting the
exemption.
One of the reasons that th e City exempted previously homesteaded single-family
homes rented for 36 or fewer months and ow ner-occupied duplexes from the requirement
of proving an undue hardship wa s administrative efficiency. O wners of those types of
properties are likely to be able to demonstrate undue hardship and, accordingly, the limited
government resources needed to conduct a case-by-case analysis of such properties would
be better used for other purposes.
We have recognized administrative effici ency as a valid reason for a legislative
body to distinguish between classes. See In re Harhut, 385 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Minn. 1986)
(holding that an indetermin ate commitment to state hospita ls for mentally disabled
individuals was not unreasonable because it was “the more effective and efficient way to
deal with the state’s responsibility to treat mentally [disabled] persons”); Bituminous Cas.
Corp. v. Swanson, 341 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. 1983) (“Under the rational basis standard,
administrative ease is an adequa te justification.”). It is not irrational for the City to
conclude that owners of formerly homest eaded single-family homes and owner-occupied
duplexes are likely to be able to demonstrate undue hardship as defined in the ordinance.
It is certainly conceivable that those ow ners are less likely to have property
management processes, that the nature a nd net cost of comply ing with Section 8
requirements will be relatively significant fo r those owners, that the overall financial
resources of those owners will be relatively lo w, that those owners are unlikely to have
employees or own a large number of proper ties, and that there will be a relatively

45
substantial impact on the rental business of those owners, and on their dwelling, if they
must comply with Section 8 housing choice voucher program requirements. These burdens
are particularly heightened for owners of formerly homesteaded single-family homes who
are limited to 36 months to recoup their investment.
The Owners offer several reasons why the City’s administrative efficiency argument
should be rejected. First, the Owners argue that the premises underlying the City’s position
are based on anecdotal eviden ce and unproven assumptions and, consequently, the
administrative efficiency rationale for allowing those owners to be automatically exempted
from the ordinance does not satisfy the heightened scrutiny required under the Minnesota
Constitution’s equal protection guarantee. But the Owners do not contend that the
exemptions demonstrably and adversely affect residential landlords of one race differently
than residential landlords of another race or make any argument that landlords as a category
have unique characteristics or rights that justify a similar departure from traditional rational
basis scrutiny. Accordingly, a heightened standard of means-end scrutiny does not apply.
Second, the Owners argue that exempting owners of formerly homesteaded
single-family homes and owner-occupied dupl exes is inconsistent with the broader
purposes of the ordinance; namely, to increase the stock of affordable housing available to
voucher holders and to preven t discrimination against vouche r holders. The argument,
however, focuses on the wrong purposes. Wh ile those may be the purposes of the
ordinance provisions, the purpose of di stinguishing between landlords who are
automatically exempt from the provision and those who must prove undu e hardship to

46
become exempt is administrative efficiency. See Holloway , 916 N.W.2d at 348–49
(focusing on the purpose of the exemption from the general rule).
Third, the Owners argue that the exemption is both overinclusive and
underinclusive. They state that there ar e likely owners of formerly homesteaded
single-family homes and owne r-occupied duplexes who co uld not satisfy the undue
hardship exemption and that there are likely nonexempt residentia l landlords who could
qualify for the undue hardship exem ption. Even if that were true, we do not require that
legislation be perfect. See Westling, 581 N.W.2d at 822 (noting that a statute that treated
certain property differently from other propert y for taxation purposes did not violate the
equal protection guarantee, even though the classification scheme was imperfectly related
to the legislative objectives, because “imperfection is not a constitutional defect”); see also
Rey, 905 N.W.2d at 495 (stating in a rati onal basis due process case that “[t] he United
States and Minnesota Constitutions do not re quire the Legislature to devise precise
solutions to every problem”). “When the basic classificati on is rationally based, uneven
effects upon particular groups within a class ar e ordinarily of no constitutional concern.
The calculus of effects, the manne r in which a particular law re verberates in society, is a
legislative and not a judicial responsibility.” Guilliams, 299 N.W.2d at 143 (Minn. 1980)
(quoting Personal Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
In Guilliams, we analyzed the farm loss modification law. The Legislature enacted
the law to create a disincentive to a growing tax shelter scheme. Id. at 140. Because farm
income received unique treatment under the ta x code, increasing numbers of taxpayers
were buying farms for the sole purpose of us ing the farm losses to offset their nonfarm

47
income. Id. at 140–41. To address the problem, the Legislature passed a law that limited
the amount of farm losses that could o ffset nonfarm income to $15,000. Id. at 140. In
other words, owners of farms with $15,000 or less in nonfarm income were treated
differently than owners of farms with more than $15,000 in nonfarm income. Id. at 142.
Even though we acknowledged that some full-time farmers who did not own their
farm for tax shelter purposes might still have nonfarm income greater than $15,000 to
offset, we upheld the statute. “If the classification has so me reasonable basis, it does not
offend the constitution simply because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because
in practice it results in some inequality.” Id. at 143 (citation omitte d) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also State v. Barnes, 713 N.W.2d 325, 333 (Minn. 2006) (stating that
“substantial deference is given to the legislature where an underinclusiveness challenge is
made on rational basis review”).
Finally, it is not irrational line-drawing to treat owners of duplexes any differently
than owners of triplexes or fourplexes, notwithstanding that the latter owners may face the
same likelihood of qualifying for an undue hardship exemption as owners of duplexes or
formerly homesteaded single family homes. Under rational basis review, we have
consistently rejected such arguments, including in the cont ext of nearly the precise
line-drawing at issue here. See Hegenes v. State, 328 N.W.2d 719, 722 (Minn. 1983). In
Hegenes, we rejected an equal protection challenge to a property tax classification that
treated residential properties of three units or less differently from those with four or more
units. Id. at 720. We stated:

48
When a legal distinction is determin ed, as no one doubts that it may be,
between night and day, childhood and maturity, or any other extremes, a
point has to be fixed or a line has to be drawn, or gradually picked out by
successive decisions, to mark where such change takes place. Looked at by
itself without regard to the necess ity behind it the line or point seems
arbitrary. It might as well or nearly as well be a little more to one side or the
other. But when it is seen that a line or point there must be, and that there is
no mathematical or logical way of fixi ng it precisely, the decision of the
Legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide of any
reasonable mark.

Id. at 722 (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928) (Holmes,
J., dissenting)); see also Gluba , 735 N.W.2d at 724–25 (rej ecting an equal protection
challenge to a Workers’ Compensation Act pr ovision that treated a 49-year-old worker
differently than a 50-year-old worker).
We conclude that the distinction betwee n owners who must show undue hardship
and those who are automatically exempt from the ordinance is a rational method to achieve
the exemptions’ legislative pur pose. Therefore, we conc lude that the Minneapolis
ordinance does not violate the Minnesota Constitution’s equal protection guarantee.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.

C-1
C O N C U R R E N C E
ANDERSON, Justice (concurring).
I concur in the result reached by the court on the due process issue. I also concur
with the court’s holding that the deference afforded by the federal rational basis test applies
to equal protection claims brought under the Minnesot a Constitution. We have
inconsistently applied the rational basis te st, vacillating between va rious iterations of a
Minnesota specific standard and the federal standard. See State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517,
525 (Minn. 2011) (Stras, J., concurring) (“[O]ur equal protection jurisprudence is
inconsistent and confusing.”). Adopting the federal rational basis test, as we do today,
brings predictability and greater certainty to our law.
I write separately to briefly address the court’s discussion of State v. Russell, 477
N.W.2d 886 (Minn.1991). In dicta unnecessary to reach today’s result, the court mentions
a possible disparate impact exception to the federal equal protection standard that we adopt.
This is not a case that implicates the considerations of Russell, and the court need not carve
out any exceptions to the federal rational basis test to reach its decision. In addition, given
the high bar we set in State v. Frazier for the type of evidence required to establish a
disparate impact claim, it is unlikely the disparate impact evidence in Russell would survive
this scrutiny even under a Minnesota specific rational basis test. See State v. Frazier, 649
N.W.2d 828, 834–37 (Minn. 2002). Further, the particular issue in Russell is now moot as
the offending statute has been amended.
We should neither weigh the credibility of legislative testimony nor second-guess
the accuracy of legislative determinations of fact absent overwhelming contrary evidence.

C-2
See Moes v. City of Saint Paul , 402 N.W.2d 520, 525 (Minn. 1987). Doing otherwise
impermissibly encroaches on the legislative br anch and violates the separation of powers
doctrine. A statute will survive an equal protection challenge when the “classification
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). We should simply adopt and apply
the federal rational basis test here and avoid discussing excep tions for issues that are not
present in the case before us and unnecessary to our decision.

GILDEA, Chief Justice (concurring).
I join in the concurrence of Justice Anderson.