Cited by
Opinions in Minnesota that cite ILHC OF EAGAN, LLC v. County of Dakota, 693 N.W.2d 412.
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State of Minnesota v. Jaimiah Lamar Irby
848 N.W.2d 515
Minn. 2014
of Dakota, provides some clarification.
- Schuette v. City of Hutchinson 843 N.W.2d 233 Minn. 2014
- Schuette v. City of Hutchinson 843 N.W.2d 233 Minn. 2014
- Motokazie! Inc. v. Rice County 824 N.W.2d 341 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
- Motokazie! Inc. v. Rice County 824 N.W.2d 341 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
- State v. Nelson 823 N.W.2d 908 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
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State v. Nelson
823 N.W.2d 908
Minn. Ct. App. 2012
See ILHC of Eagan, LLC v. Cnty, of Dakota
- First National Bank v. Profit Pork, LLC 820 N.W.2d 592 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
- First National Bank v. Profit Pork, LLC 820 N.W.2d 592 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
- 78th Street OwnerCo, LLC v. County of Hennepin 813 N.W.2d 409 Minn. 2012
- 78th Street OwnerCo, LLC v. County of Hennepin 813 N.W.2d 409 Minn. 2012
- Schatz v. Interfaith Care Center 811 N.W.2d 643 Minn. 2012
- Schatz v. Interfaith Care Center 811 N.W.2d 643 Minn. 2012
- In re Individual 35W Bridge Litigation 806 N.W.2d 820 Minn. 2011
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In re Individual 35W Bridge Litigation
806 N.W.2d 820
Minn. 2011
of Dakota, (internal quotation marks omitted)).
- KSTP-TV v. Ramsey County 806 N.W.2d 785 Minn. 2011
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KSTP-TV v. Ramsey County
806 N.W.2d 785
Minn. 2011
of Dakota, (noting that statutory construction is unnecessary “[w]hen a statute’s meaning is plain from its language as applied to the facts of the particular case”).
- Eclipse Architectural Group, Inc. v. Lam 799 N.W.2d 632 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
- Eclipse Architectural Group, Inc. v. Lam 799 N.W.2d 632 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
- Midland Credit Management v. Chatman 796 N.W.2d 534 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
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Midland Credit Management v. Chatman
796 N.W.2d 534
Minn. Ct. App. 2011
§ 645.08 (2010); ILHC of Eagan
- Crossroads Church of Prior Lake v. County of Dakota 800 N.W.2d 608 Minn. 2011
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Followed
Crossroads Church of Prior Lake v. County of Dakota
800 N.W.2d 608
Minn. 2011
of Dakota, (quoting Chateau Cmty.
- Amcon Block & Precast, Inc. v. Suess 794 N.W.2d 386 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
- Williams v. National Football League 794 N.W.2d 391 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
- Amcon Block & Precast, Inc. v. Suess 794 N.W.2d 386 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
- Williams v. National Football League 794 N.W.2d 391 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
- In re the Welfare of the Child of R.S. 793 N.W.2d 752 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
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In re the Welfare of the Child of R.S.
793 N.W.2d 752
Minn. Ct. App. 2011
of Dakota, (stating that “the legislature must be presumed to have understood the effect of its words) (quotation omitted).
- Hebert v. CITY OF FIFTY LAKES 784 N.W.2d 848 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
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Hebert v. CITY OF FIFTY LAKES
784 N.W.2d 848
Minn. Ct. App. 2010
“Under the basic canons of statutory construction, we are to construe words and phrases according to rules of grammar and according to their most natural and obvious usage ...” ILHC of Eagan
- In Re the Welfare of J.B. 782 N.W.2d 535 Minn. 2010
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In Re the Welfare of J.B.
782 N.W.2d 535
Minn. 2010
Because we read particular statutory provisions “in context with other provisions of the same statute in order to determine the meaning of the particular provision,” ILHC of Eagan, the express references in subdivision 3(c) to both “public defender” and “other counsel at public expense” demonstrate legislative acknowledgment that for some parties in juvenile protection proceedings, a public defender would be appointed and, for other parties, “other counsel” would be appointed.
- In Re Enlargement of the Valley Branch Watershed District 781 N.W.2d 417 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
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In Re Enlargement of the Valley Branch Watershed District
781 N.W.2d 417
Minn. Ct. App. 2010
ILHC of Eagan, (“The touchstone for statutory interpretation is the plain meaning of a statute’s language.”); see also Minn.Stat.
- Krueger v. Zeman Construction Co. 781 N.W.2d 858 Minn. 2010
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Krueger v. Zeman Construction Co.
781 N.W.2d 858
Minn. 2010
We “construe words and phrases according to rules of grammar and according to their most natural and obvious usage unless it would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature.” ILHC of Eagan, (citing Minn.Stat.
- Imperial Developers, Inc. v. Calhoun Development, LLC 775 N.W.2d 895 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
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Imperial Developers, Inc. v. Calhoun Development, LLC
775 N.W.2d 895
Minn. Ct. App. 2009
“Under the basic canons of statutory construction, we are to construe words and phrases according to rules of grammar and according to their most natural and obvious usage.” ILHC of Eagan
- State v. McCurry 770 N.W.2d 553 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
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State v. McCurry
770 N.W.2d 553
Minn. Ct. App. 2009
See ILHC of Eagan, (requiring phrases in statute to be read in context with other phrases).
- Pigs R US, LLC v. Compton Township 770 N.W.2d 212 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
- Pigs R US, LLC v. Compton Township 770 N.W.2d 212 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
- State v. Spence 768 N.W.2d 104 Minn. 2009
- State v. Spence 768 N.W.2d 104 Minn. 2009
- BRIDGEWATER TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC. v. City of Monticello 765 N.W.2d 905 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
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BRIDGEWATER TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC. v. City of Monticello
765 N.W.2d 905
Minn. Ct. App. 2009
“Under the basic canons of statutory construction, we are to construe words and phrases according to rules of grammar and according to their most natural and obvious usage unless it would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature.” ILHC of Eagan
- Bahr v. Capella University 765 N.W.2d 428 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
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Bahr v. Capella University
765 N.W.2d 428
Minn. Ct. App. 2009
Respondent contends that unless a plaintiff pleads actual discrimination by an employer, a reprisal claim is “wholly unfounded.” “When a statute’s meaning is plain from its language as applied to the facts of the particular case, a judicial construction is not necessary.” ILHC of Eagan
- Krueger v. Zeman Construction Co. 758 N.W.2d 881 Minn. Ct. App. 2008