Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite ILHC OF EAGAN, LLC v. County of Dakota, 693 N.W.2d 412.

139 citing documents.

Krueger v. Zeman Construction Co. 758 N.W.2d 881 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
“The touchstone for statutory interpretation is the plain meaning of a statute’s language.” ILHC of Eagan
Wallboard, Inc. v. St. Cloud Mall, LLC 758 N.W.2d 356 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
Wallboard, Inc. v. St. Cloud Mall, LLC 758 N.W.2d 356 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
ILHC of Eagan, LLC v. County of Dakota, *359 (“[I]t is a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that we read each statutory provision in reference to the whole statute.”).
Greene v. Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services 755 N.W.2d 713 Minn. 2008
Beardsley v. Garcia 753 N.W.2d 735 Minn. 2008
In Re the Welfare of the Children of N.F. 749 N.W.2d 802 Minn. 2008
In Re the Welfare of the Children of N.F. 749 N.W.2d 802 Minn. 2008
See ILHC of Eagan, (when a statute’s meaning is plain from its language, judicial construction is not necessary).
HealthEast v. County of Ramsey 749 N.W.2d 15 Minn. 2008
HealthEast v. County of Ramsey 749 N.W.2d 15 Minn. 2008
Independent School District No. 281 v. Minnesota Department of Education 743 N.W.2d 315 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
Independent Sch. Dist. v. DEPT. OF EDUC. 743 N.W.2d 315 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
Independent Sch. Dist. v. DEPT. OF EDUC. 743 N.W.2d 315 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
§ 645.16 (2006) (providing that, where language is unclear, courts may look to several factors to discern its meaning); ILHC of Eagan, ("When a statute's meaning is plain from its language as applied to the facts of the particular case, a judicial construction is not necessary."); see also Kersten, d at 874-75 ("When the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, it manifests the legislative intent and we must give th
Independent School District No. 281 v. Minnesota Department of Education 743 N.W.2d 315 Minn. Ct. App. 2008
§ 645.16 (2006) (providing that, where language is unclear, courts may look to several factors to discern its meaning); ILHC of Eagan, (“When a statute’s meaning is plain from its language as applied to the facts of the particular case, a judicial construction is not necessary.”); see also Kersten, d at 874-75 (“When the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, it manifests the legislative intent and we must give th
Afton Historical Society Press v. County of Washington 742 N.W.2d 434 Minn. 2007
Afton Historical Society Press v. County of Washington 742 N.W.2d 434 Minn. 2007
Inter generational Living and Health Care of Eagan
Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Coop v. County of Renville 737 N.W.2d 545 Minn. 2007
Mavco, Inc. v. Eggink 739 N.W.2d 148 Minn. 2007
Mavco, Inc. v. Eggink 739 N.W.2d 148 Minn. 2007
Finally, we are required “to read a particular [clause] in context with other [clauses] of the same statute in order to determine the meaning of the particular [clause].” ILHC of Eagan, see also Van Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc., 254 Minn. 62, 74 , (“[T]he legislature must be presumed to have understood the effect of its words and intended the entire statute to be effective and certain.”).
Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Coop v. County of Renville 737 N.W.2d 545 Minn. 2007
Irongate Enterprises Inc. v. County of St. Louis 736 N.W.2d 326 Minn. 2007
Irongate Enterprises Inc. v. County of St. Louis 736 N.W.2d 326 Minn. 2007
Gluba Ex Rel. Gluba v. Bitzan & Ohren Masonry 735 N.W.2d 713 Minn. 2007
Gluba Ex Rel. Gluba v. Bitzan & Ohren Masonry 735 N.W.2d 713 Minn. 2007
Kellogg v. Woods 720 N.W.2d 845 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
Kellogg v. Woods 720 N.W.2d 845 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
McClure v. Davis Engineering, L.L.C. 716 N.W.2d 354 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
McClure v. Davis Engineering, L.L.C. 716 N.W.2d 354 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
Hans Hagen Homes, Inc. v. City of Minnetrista 713 N.W.2d 916 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
Hans Hagen Homes, Inc. v. City of Minnetrista 713 N.W.2d 916 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
Determining the integrated plain meaning requires us to “read a particular provision in context with other provisions of the same statute in order to determine the meaning of the particular provision.” ILHC of Eagan, see also *921 Glen Paul Court Neighborhood Ass’n v. Paster, (recognizing that sections of statute must be read together because arrangement of sections may provide plain meaning); Kollodge v. F. & L. Appliances, Inc., 248 Minn. 357, 360 , (sta
Riley v. Jankowski 713 N.W.2d 379 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
Riley v. Jankowski 713 N.W.2d 379 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
ILHC of Eagan, (quotations and citations omitted).
State v. Johnson 713 N.W.2d 64 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
State v. Johnson 713 N.W.2d 64 Minn. Ct. App. 2006
Kmart Corp. v. County of Clay 711 N.W.2d 485 Minn. 2006
Kmart Corp. v. County of Clay 711 N.W.2d 485 Minn. 2006
Council of Independent Tobacco Manufacturers of America v. State 713 N.W.2d 300 Minn. 2006
Council of Independent Tobacco Manufacturers of America v. State 713 N.W.2d 300 Minn. 2006
ILHC of Eagan, -22 (Minn.2005), (when the challenged statute does not involve a suspect classification or a fundamental right, the appropriate standard of review is rational basis).
Citizens Concerned for Kids v. Yellow Medicine East Independent School District No. 2190 703 N.W.2d 582 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
Citizens Concerned for Kids v. Yellow Medicine East Independent School District No. 2190 703 N.W.2d 582 Minn. Ct. App. 2005
We construe words and phrases in accordance with common usage, *586 Sprint Spectrum LP v. Comm’r of Revenue, and in the context of the entire statutory provision, ILHC of Eagan