Cited by

Assuming, as Martinez claims, that he has a fundamental liberty interest in his release during his supervised-release term, he must show “governmental conduct so egregious that it shocks the conscience.” Mumm v. Mornson , (quotation omitted).

We find the argument unconvincing because, as the supreme cou rt has previously noted, “police pursuits by definition are emergency situations.”

“Official immunity enables public employees to perform their duties effectively, without fear of personal liability that might inhibit the exercise of their independent judgment.” (citation omitted).

and then granting official immunity to defendants, “physicians and surgeons,” who were “appointed by the court commissioner in accordance with [applicable statutory authority] to examine plaintiff and report to the court as to her mental condition,” actions that were “in the scope of their duties” and therefore “within the protection of the rule and immune from suit”); -93 (Minn. 2006) (applying official immunity to the discretionary decisions of a police officer in a high-speed pursuit); (recog

-91 (Minn. 2006); d 669, 673-74 (Minn. 2006); -07 (Minn. 2004); S.W.

Netland, d at 210 (-88, 490 (Minn. 2006)); see also Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (“[O]nly the most egregious official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’ ”) (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 126, 129 (other citations omitted)).

A complaint should put a “defendant on notice of the claims against him.”

Ministerial functions are “absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.” d 475, 490 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).

on the nature of the act.” (quoting Anderson, d at 656) (internal quotation marks omitted).

of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1714 (1998); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989) (“Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct [of alleged excessive force], that Amendment, not the more gen

(citing Elwood, d at 679 ).

at 1716-17 ; Slusarchuk v. Hoff, 346 F.3d 1178 , 1181-82 (8th Cir.2003)

“In reviewing an appeal from the denial of summary judgment, we must determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in applying the law.”

A cognizable claim under this standard must describe “egregious” governmental conduct, and we have said that “[o]nly the most extreme instances of governmental misconduct satisfy this exacting standard.” 490 (Minn.2006) (holding that an officer’s use of deadly force to stop a dangerous car chase did not shock the conscience because “[a]n officer’s poor judgment in using unreasonable force does not automatically convert the officer’s acts into conscience shocking conduct”).

Although a pleading need not specify the particular provisions “that form the basis of [a party’s] claims,” it “should put the defendant on notice of the claims against him.” (holding that allegations of specific “unconstitutional acts” by police officers engaged in vehicle pursuit were sufficient to state Fourth Amendment claims).

“In reviewing an appeal from the denial of summary judgment, we must determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in applying the law,” and “we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”

Our supreme court has adopted that same standard in a non-employment setting, explaining that “[a] cognizable claim of a Fourteenth Amend *786 ment substantive due process violation must describe governmental conduct so egregious that it shocks the conscience.” Mumm v. Mornson