Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Losh, 721 N.W.2d 886.

76 citing documents.

State of Minnesota v. Steven Andre Moore Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Steven Andre Moore Minn. Ct. App. 2016
“In determining whether to durationally depart from the guideline sentence, the district court considers whether the defendant’s conduct was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime described in the applicable statute.” (quotation omitted); (stating that “‘[s]ubstantial and compelling circumstances’ are those circumstances that make the facts of a particular case different from a typical case”).
State of Minnesota v. Richard John McNeil Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Richard John McNeil Minn. Ct. App. 2015
(affirming revocation of probation based solely upon incident of drug use, where the district court found that the underlying crime “was the result of the abuse of drugs and alcohol and poor choices,” and that appellant’s continued use of controlled substances was “a danger to the public interest”), aff’d on other grounds, d 886 (Minn. 2006); (affirming revocation of probation based on DWI convictions after appellant received probation for assault occurring while he was very intoxicated); -91 (M
State of Minnesota v. Dakari Michael Coles 862 N.W.2d 477 Minn. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Dakari Michael Coles 862 N.W.2d 477 Minn. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Gary Lee Burnett Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Gary Lee Burnett Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Chambers v. State 831 N.W.2d 311 Minn. 2013
Sanchez v. State 816 N.W.2d 550 Minn. 2012
Sanchez v. State 816 N.W.2d 550 Minn. 2012
But we do “have the power to determine what is judicial and what is legislative; and if it is a judicial function that the legislative act purports to exercise,” we “must not hesitate to preserve what is essentially a judicial function.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Minn. Const, art. III, § 1.
In re the Welfare of the Child of T.L.M. 804 N.W.2d 374 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
In re the Welfare of the Child of T.L.M. 804 N.W.2d 374 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
See, -92 (Minn.2006) (holding that rule of criminal procedure concerning time for appeal governs despite contrary provision in statute).
State v. Gaiovnik 794 N.W.2d 643 Minn. 2011
State v. Gaiovnik 794 N.W.2d 643 Minn. 2011
-92 (Minn.2006) (noting that “statutes that set time limits for an appeal” are procedural and holding that the statute at issue in that case, which provided that a defendant had to appeal her sentence within 90 days, was unconstitutional because it “encroaches on a judicial function in violation of the separation
Vang v. State 788 N.W.2d 111 Minn. 2010
Vang v. State 788 N.W.2d 111 Minn. 2010
890 n. 3 (Minn.2006); see also In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., (explaining that it is only an exceptional case that leads us to invoke our inherent powers).
State v. Vance 765 N.W.2d 390 Minn. 2009
State v. Vance 765 N.W.2d 390 Minn. 2009
State v. Hughes 758 N.W.2d 577 Minn. 2008
State v. Hughes 758 N.W.2d 577 Minn. 2008
State v. Rodriguez 754 N.W.2d 672 Minn. 2008
State v. Rodriguez 754 N.W.2d 672 Minn. 2008
State v. Hughes 742 N.W.2d 460 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
State v. Hughes 742 N.W.2d 460 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
s pivotal to a proper application of the retroactivity rule, but, because of the procedural posture of that case, the supreme court said, “[W]e need not reach the questions of whether ‘finality of the sentence’ (as opposed to ‘finality of the conviction’) is ever the touchstone for determining retroactive effect and whether or not some methods of review of a sentence qualify as ‘direct review.’ ” Hughes is correct that “payment of court-ordered restitution” is part of a criminal “sentence.” Minn
State v. Lemmer 736 N.W.2d 650 Minn. 2007