Cited by

d 98, 102 (Minn. App. 2005), aff’d

26, 2009); (holding that a kidnapper’s leaving her victim in an unsafe place by a swamp constituted particular cruelty); see also Rourke, d at 923 (instructing the district court on remand to submit to the sentencing jury “one or more” special interrogatories to determine whether the state has pr

-94 (Minn. 2006) (concluding that a defendant benefits from a new caselaw rule if the defendant’s case is “pending on direct review”).

The district court “has broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.” , 249-50 (Minn. 1980); (affirming the district court’s revocation decision for a single drug-use violation), aff’d

d 98, 102 (Minn. App. 2005), aff’d

See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.b(2), (10) (2020); (recognizing that a criminal-sexual-conduct offense involving multiple forms of penetration is “particularly cruel” and a sufficient reason to justify a durational 13 departure); (noting the aggravating factor of committing a crime as part of a group of three or more individuals); (noting the aggravating factor of the defendant’s use of death threats).

(stating it is “the district court’s role” to hear testimony, “judge the credibility of the witnesses,” and weigh evidence, so we defer to the district court’s findings when based on the record), aff’d

aff’d on other grounds, 9 (affirming the district court’s decision to revoke probation, in part, because the defendant’s continued use and involvement with controlled substances posed a danger to the public interest, but the defendant’s drug use also was a contributing factor to defendant’s underlying conviction).

6 (holding that a departure will be affirmed when there is sufficient evidence to justify the departure even when the district court’s reasons are improper or inadequate).

See State v. Losh , , 893-94 (Minn. 2006) (stating that a case is pending until the availability of direct appeal has been exhausted).

2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 18 (b), at 591 (stating that the DSRA is effective the day following final enactment); - 94 (Minn. 2006) (stating that a case is pending until the availability of direct appeal is exhausted).

2016 Minn. Laws ch. 160, § 18 at 590 -91 (stating it is effective the day following final enactment); see also State v. Losh , -94 (Minn. 2006) (sta ting that a case is pending until the availability of direct appeal has been exhausted).

-94 1 This calculation is made based on Castellanos’s criminal history score , which is higher than six, plus an additional three months for his custody -status point.

-82 (Minn. 2008); -95 (Minn. 2006).

-94 (Minn. 2006); (noting that a case is final when “a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or fina lly denied”).

State v. 4 Losh, -94 (Minn. 2006).

1 A case is pending and not final “until such time as the availability of direct appeal has been exhausted, the time for a petition for certiorari has elapsed or a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court has been filed and finally denied.” State v. Losh , -94 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).

See, (affirming the revocation of appellant’s probation where “the district court found [her] continued use and involvement with controlled substances [to be] a danger to the public interest”), aff’d

court did not abuse its discretion by revoking defendant’s probation based on single incident of drug use where underlying offense “was the result of the abuse of drugs and alcohol and poor choices” and “allow[ing defendant] to again use or be involved with people who use chemicals in violation of the conditions of probation would not serve the public interest” (quotations omitted)), aff’d, –41 (Minn. App. 1987) (affirming revocation of probation where defendant was intoxicated at time of underl

of section 609.165 or 624.713, subdivision 1, clause (2), is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct.” 3 Fleming’s (holding that a defendant may wait until probation is revoked before challenging his or her sentence); (holding that Minn. Stat. § 244.11, subd.

To support his claim that we need not follow the state’s final decisions until a final decision by the United States Supreme Court is made

(deferring to district court's credibility determinations in probation-revocation proceeding), aff’d on other grounds