Cited by

(constitutional); Beaulieu v. Minn .

Schleicher v. State , , 445 (Minn. 2006) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A court may address the two prongs in any order and “may dispose of the claim on one prong without analyzing the other.”

We address the two prongs “in any order and may dispose of the claim on one pr ong without analyzing the other.”

The state does not bother to address the first prong of Strickland but argues that Behrens is not entitled to relief because he “cannot meet the prejudice prong.” (stating that “[a] court may address the two prongs of the test in any order and may dispose of the claim on one prong without analyzing the other”).

The reasonableness of an attorney’s representation is judged by an objective standard: “ an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

But “[i]t is well settled that a party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal from denial of postconviction relief.” (quotation 15 omitted).

(holding that parties may not raise issues for the first time on appeal from the denial of a postconviction petition); Washington, d at 216 (holding that a defendant may not assert an exception to the Knaffla bar for the first time on appeal).

4 3 We have yet to decide whether the two exceptions to the Knaffla bar remain viable after the codification of the statutory counterparts.

It is well settled that claims raised for the first time on appeal ‘are forfeited for purposes of the appeal.’ ” ()).

13 strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.” (quotation omitted).

(explaining that “appellate counsel’s failure to raise meritless claims does not constitute deficient performance”); (“When an appellant and his counsel have divergent opinions as to what issues should be raised on appeal, his counsel has no duty to inc

ective assistance of counsel “[T]o demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that the representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness (performance prong) and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different (prejudice prong).” (quotation omitted).

“There are two exceptions to the Knaffla rule: (1) if a novel legal issue is presented, or (2) if the interests of justice require review.” (quotation omitted).

and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (quotation omitted).

and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (quotation omitted).

On review, “[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.” (quotation omitted).

A court may address the two prongs of the Strickland test in any order and “may dispose of the claim on one prong without analyzing the other.”

While the Knaffla rule has two exceptions that allow review if a novel legal issue is presented or if review is necessary in the interests of justice, Abdillahi’s claim does not fall under either of these exceptions.

On review, “[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.” 5 (quotation omitted).

(“It is well settled that a party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal from denial of postconviction relief.” (quotations omitted)); (“An assignment of error in a brief based on mere assertion and not supported by argument or au