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Because there is a state constitutional right to counsel in postconviction proceedings, (Minn. 2006), appellant asserts that the district court should have forwarded her pro se motion to the Office of the Appellate Public Defender, as required by Minn. Stat. § 590.02, subd.

We have held that a postconviction petitioner who has not previously had a direct appeal must still be “in compliance with the procedural requirements of the Post-conviction Remedy Act.”

(“[A] defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel under Article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution extends to one review of a criminal conviction, whether by direct appeal or a first review by postconviction proceeding.”).

See id.; (stating that the interests-of-justice exception is “quite narrow” and that “the grounds for postconviction relief are substantially limited once a direct appeal has been taken”).

Noble’s claims are not novel because he has raised them before, and Noble cannot show that addressing his claim would promote fairness or justice because establishing that point requires the claim to have “substantive merit.” (quotation omitted).

Lastly Pfarr argues that “his extraordinary circumstances be considered” in the “interests of fairness and justice.” “Claims decided in the interests of justice require that the claims have substantive merit, and that the defendant did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue on direct appeal.” (citation and quotations omitted).

In addition to Fedziuk , the dissent of Justice Page cites a number of cases that purportedly support the application of the statutory-revival rule in this case, State v. One Oldsmobile Two-Door Sedan, Model 1946, 227 Minn. 280, 288, and State v. Luscher, 157 Minn. 192, 195 , 195 N.W.

(“We hold that a defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel under Article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution extends to one review of a criminal conviction, whether by direct appeal or a first review by postconviction proceeding.”).

On appeal from the denial of his third posteonviction petition, Staunton characterized his appeal as “a first review by posteonviction proceeding,”

(“[A] defendant’s access to the ...

(holding that when interpreting the Minnesota constitution “[a]s a general rule we favor uniformity with the federal constitution”).

(citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 , 105 S.Ct.

“Claims decided in the interests of justice require that the claims have substantive merit and that the defendant did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue on direct appeal.” (citation omitted) (quoting Powers, d at 561 ; ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We explained that, in the context of the rule announced in State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246 , the “interests of justice” exception required the claim to “have substantive merit and the defendant must not have deliberately and inexcusably failed to raise the issue on direct appeal.” Gassler, d at 586 (-94 (Minn.2006)).

As to his claim that the statute violates the Minnesota Constitution

implies that the Minnesota Constitution provides a convicted defendant with a right of first review of constitutional issues.