Cited by

See, (concluding prior threat to kill victims was evidence of premeditation); d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017) (noting that Minn. Stat. § 609.18 defines premeditation as “to consider, plan or prepare for, or determine to commit, the act referred to prior to its commission”).

21 of the same crime.” (quotations omitted).

See, (“[T]he number of times the defendant used the murder weapon and the number of wounds inflicted are relevant to an assessment of premeditation.”); d 400, 413 (Minn. 2016) (observing that 11 inflicting wounds to vital organs supports an inference of premeditation).

Constitution and article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution require defendants to be “informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.” This requirement “is satisfied if an indictment contains such descriptions of the offense charged as will enable a defendant to make his defense and to plead the judgment in bar of any further prosecution for the same crime.” (quotation omitted).

Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it “persuade[s] by illegitimate means.” (quotation omitted); see Schulz, d at 478 (explaining that evidence persuades by “illegitimate means” when it gives “one party an unfair advantage”).

on, “evidence showing that the defendant inflicted wounds to the victim’s vital organs may support an inference of premeditation,” “[a] single shot squarely in the back can support a finding of premeditation because it indicates that the shooter took careful aim at the victim,” “[m]ultiple gunshots are indicative of premeditation,” State v. Cooper, 19 and “[t]he failure to administer any aid to a victim who does not die instantaneously also supports an inference of premeditation,” Cox, 884

As part of the severance 20 analysis, a district court “must first decide whether the offenses are related,” and that analysis is the same “inquiry used to decide whether multiple offenses arose from a single behavior incident for purposes of [Minnesota Statutes section] 609.035.”

“The single-behavioral- incident analysis presents a mixed question of law and fact.” d 597, 607 (Minn. App. 2006).

if the offenses arose out of a single behavioral incident.”

See e.g. , Cox, d at 414–15 (citing evidence that the defendant failed to render aid to the victim, who did not die instantly); Hurd, d at 600 (explaining that the defendant “attempted to clean the blood from [the victim]’s car”); (noting that the defendant paused to lock a door after the murder); Leake, d at 321 (noting that, after the murder, the defendant “disposed of evidence by putting it in garbage bags and burning it in a fire”).

Joinder of charges “is not unfairly prejudicial if evidence of each offense would have been admissible at a trial of the other offenses had the offenses been tried separately.”

if the offenses arose out of a single behavioral incident.”

see also State v. Kendell , (“Immediate episode evidence is a separate category from evidence of other bad acts 7 crime evidence should not necessa rily preclude the state from m aking out its whole case against the accused based on evidence that may be otherwise relevant to the accused’s guilt of the crime charged.

But three years prior, in State v. Kendell, the supreme court held that “de novo review is the appropriate standard for reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion for severance of offenses.” d 597, 607 (Minn. 2006).

(addressing proper standard of review and holding “that de novo review is the appropriate standard for reviewing a district court ’s denial of a motion for severance of offens es under Minn. R. Crim.

State v. Kendell , , 605 (Minn. 2006).

See, (holding that a defendant’s statement that he was “going to hell” did not prove a propensity to engage in certain conduct); Ture v. State , (concluding that evidence of the defendant’s collection and storage of information on women was not bad- act evidence where the

P. 17.03 “requires severance of offenses, even related offenses, if severance is appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defendant’s guilt— that is, joinder would unfairly prejudice the defendant.” (quotation omitted).

(holding that “[a] single shot squarely in the back can support a finding of premeditation because it indicates that the shooter took careful aim at the victim”) ().

(noting that concealing identity after murder “reveals a cool, calm behavior consistent with premeditation”); (finding that defendant’s decision to arm himself and pursue his victim is planning evidence that supports the inference of premeditation

(stating that criminal defendant has right to notice of charges under “due process notice requirement”); (stating that criminal defendant has due process right “to be treated with fundamental fairness and afforded a meaningful opportunity to pre

6 -04, 608 (Minn.2006) (holding the district court correctly determined that shootings were part of a single behavioral incident under the avoidance-of-apprehension doctrine when the defendant shot at his girlfriend and children in their apartment and upon leaving the girlfriend’s apartment, shot and killed an unrel

(stating that it is not error to permit a jury to rehear a properly admitted taped interview of a victim).

1 Banks acknowledges that the offenses against M.Y.

“Joinder is not unfairly prejudicial if evidence of each offense would have been admissible at a trial of the other offenses had the offenses been tried separately.”

-07 (Minn. 2006) (noting that manner of killing, including firing multiple gunshots, can support an inference of premeditation and intent).