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Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107.

107 citing documents.

State of Minnesota v. Timothy John Bakken 883 N.W.2d 264 Minn. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Antonio Dion Washington-Davis 881 N.W.2d 531 Minn. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Antonio Dion Washington-Davis 881 N.W.2d 531 Minn. 2016
(recognizing that non-obscene pornography with adult performers is protected speech under the First Amendment).
State of Minnesota v. Mark Anthony Givins Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Mark Anthony Givins Minn. Ct. App. 2016
(“We have long held that the proof of knowledge may be made by circumstantial evidence.”).
State of Minnesota v. Nathan Charles Robert Schwartz Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Nathan Charles Robert Schwartz Minn. Ct. App. 2015
The phrase “reason to know” as used in section 617.247, subdivision 4(a), means that “the possessor is subjectively aware of a ‘substantial and unjustifiable risk.’”
State of Minnesota v. Brandon Wayne Riggs 865 N.W.2d 679 Minn. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Brandon Wayne Riggs 865 N.W.2d 679 Minn. 2015
The first question in our statutory interpretation analysis, therefore, is whether the statute’s language is ambiguous.
State of Minnesota v. Michael David Franklin 861 N.W.2d 67 Minn. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Michael David Franklin 861 N.W.2d 67 Minn. 2015
Patrick Hammer Fay, Relator v. Department of Employment and Economic Development 860 N.W.2d 385 Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Patrick Hammer Fay, Relator v. Department of Employment and Economic Development 860 N.W.2d 385 Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Dayna Kristine Bell Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Dayna Kristine Bell Minn. Ct. App. 2014
“The primary objective for a court’s interpretation of statutory language is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent.”
State v. Franklin 847 N.W.2d 63 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State v. Franklin 847 N.W.2d 63 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Statutory language is ambiguous only where it “is subject to more than one reasonable inter *65 pretation.”
State ex rel. Swanson v. 3M Co. 845 N.W.2d 808 Minn. 2014
State ex rel. Swanson v. 3M Co. 845 N.W.2d 808 Minn. 2014
(remanding denial of variance application for consideration under the proper legal standard); (remanding to district court after clarifying the legal standard because the district court was in the best position to review the record and apply the standard).
Interstate Traffic Signs, Inc. v. Commissioner 845 N.W.2d 550 Minn. 2014
Interstate Traffic Signs, Inc. v. Commissioner 845 N.W.2d 550 Minn. 2014
State v. Stahosky 836 N.W.2d 769 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
State v. Stahosky 836 N.W.2d 769 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
State v. Rick 835 N.W.2d 478 Minn. 2013
State v. Rick 835 N.W.2d 478 Minn. 2013
State v. Brown 835 N.W.2d 24 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
State v. Brown 835 N.W.2d 24 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co. 832 N.W.2d 790 Minn. 2013
Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co. 832 N.W.2d 790 Minn. 2013
(concluding that remand was necessary where the district court made an error of law in findings issued after a bench trial); -16 (Minn.2007) (holding that remand was necessary where it was unclear that the district court applied the proper legal standard in written findings issued after a bench trial).
State v. McCauley 820 N.W.2d 577 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
State v. McCauley 820 N.W.2d 577 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
Interpreting this requirement, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that “a possessor of child pornography has ‘reason to know’ that a pornographic work involves a minor where the possessor is subjectively aware of a ‘substantial and unjustifiable risk’ that the work involves a minor.”
In re the Financial Responsibility for the Out-of-Home Placement Costs for S.M. 812 N.W.2d 826 Minn. 2012
In re the Financial Responsibility for the Out-of-Home Placement Costs for S.M. 812 N.W.2d 826 Minn. 2012
Finally, when the “words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.” Engle, d at 593 .
State v. Vue 797 N.W.2d 5 Minn. 2011
State v. Vue 797 N.W.2d 5 Minn. 2011
State v. Zais 790 N.W.2d 853 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
State v. Zais 790 N.W.2d 853 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
Goodman v. Best Buy, Inc. 777 N.W.2d 755 Minn. 2010
Goodman v. Best Buy, Inc. 777 N.W.2d 755 Minn. 2010
State v. Ali 775 N.W.2d 914 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
State v. Ali 775 N.W.2d 914 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
(“We have long held that the proof of knowledge may be made by circumstantial evidence.”).
State v. Johnson 775 N.W.2d 377 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
State v. Johnson 775 N.W.2d 377 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
State v. Peck 773 N.W.2d 768 Minn. 2009
State v. Peck 773 N.W.2d 768 Minn. 2009
State v. Hodges 770 N.W.2d 515 Minn. 2009
State v. Hodges 770 N.W.2d 515 Minn. 2009
Kratzer v. Welsh Companies, LLC 771 N.W.2d 14 Minn. 2009
State v. Gradishar 765 N.W.2d 901 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
State v. Gradishar 765 N.W.2d 901 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
(stating that although this matter involved the express inclusion of a scienter element in a child-pornography statute, a reviewing court may treat a statute’s silence on an element as an ambiguity).

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