Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Wenigar v. Johnson, 712 N.W.2d 190.

23 citing documents.

Jon Huseth, et al., d/b/a Clay View Dairy, LLP, Appellants, Minn. Ct. App. 2024
See, e.g., Wenigar v. Johnson , (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Lecy v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Debra Lynn Johnson, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2021
(“To help us determine if a cause of action exists under the MHRA, it is appropriate to call on the interpretations of the federal anti- discrimination statutes when the provisions of the federa l statute and the MHRA are similar.”); (Minn. 201
Jeremy D. Mount, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2020
To satisfy the fourth element, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered distress “so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” d 190, 208 (Minn. App. 2006) (quoting Cafferty v. Garcia’s of Scottsdale, Inc., d 850, 853 (Minn. App. 1985)) (noting that courts “may look to the intensity and duration of the distress,” and observing that the distress must exceed “the type that people commonly encounter and endure in their lives”).
Meagan Abel, Appellant, vs. Abbott Northwestern Hospital, et al., Respondents, St. Mary's University Minnesota, Respondent. Minn. Ct. App. 2019
10 1424, 1426 (D. Minn. 1992) ; cf. Goins, d at 725 (assuming without deciding that MHRA authorizes claim of hostile work environme nt based on sexual orientation); (recognizing claim of hostile environment based on disability).
Julie Tossey, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
11, 2007); d 190, 209 (Minn. App. 2006) (rejecting the continuing-violation doctrine for an intentional- infliction-of-emotional-distress claim); Davies, d at 841 (rejecting the continuing-violation doctrine for a claim of improper distribution of association funds).
Vickie Apel, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2019
(“To help us determine if a cause of action exists under the MHRA, it is appropriate to call on the interpretations of the federal anti-discrimination statutes when the provisions of the federal statute and the MHRA are similar.”).
Yolanda Majors, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
(concluding that a district court properly awarded damages under the MHRA when it awarded da mages for emotional distress resulting from discrimination).
In re Minnwest Bank Litigation Concerning Real Property in Otsego, Minnesota, Minnwest Bank v. RTB, LLC 873 N.W.2d 135 Minn. Ct. App. 2015
In re Minnwest Bank Litigation Concerning Real Property in Otsego, Minnesota, Minnwest Bank v. RTB, LLC 873 N.W.2d 135 Minn. Ct. App. 2015
(holding that it was necessary for this court to reach method-of-valuation arguments because the district court abused its discretion by incorrectly awarding damages); (noting that whether a district court’s award of damages is proper is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard); Robert W. Carlstrom Co. v. German Evangelical Lutheran St.
Teresa McDonald v. Allina Health System d/b/a United Hospital Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Teresa McDonald v. Allina Health System d/b/a United Hospital Minn. Ct. App. 2015
(stating that “there is [a] two-year statute of limitations for commencing an [IIED] claim”).
In re the Order to Comply: Labor Law Violation of Daley Farm of Lewiston 816 N.W.2d 671 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
In re the Order to Comply: Labor Law Violation of Daley Farm of Lewiston 816 N.W.2d 671 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
Daley Farm also asserts that the commissioner’s determination is contrary to this court’s
Friend v. Gopher Co., Inc. 771 N.W.2d 33 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
Friend v. Gopher Co., Inc. 771 N.W.2d 33 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
(stating that “it is appropriate to call on the interpretations of the federal anti-discrimination statutes when the provisions of the federal statute and the MHRA are similar”).
Bahr v. Capella University 765 N.W.2d 428 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
Bahr v. Capella University 765 N.W.2d 428 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
Paul Pioneer Press, (“To help us determine if a cause of action exists under the MHRA, it is appropriate to call on the interpretations of the federal anti-discrimination statutes when the provisions of the federal statute and the MHRA are similar.”).
Baer v. J.D. Donovan, Inc. 763 N.W.2d 681 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
Baer v. J.D. Donovan, Inc. 763 N.W.2d 681 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
(calling on interpretations of the federal anti-discrimination statutes when interpreting similar MHRA provisions).
Monson v. Rochester Athlectic Club 759 N.W.2d 60 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
Monson v. Rochester Athlectic Club 759 N.W.2d 60 Minn. Ct. App. 2009
Gagliardi v. Ortho-Midwest, Inc. 733 N.W.2d 171 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
Gagliardi v. Ortho-Midwest, Inc. 733 N.W.2d 171 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
We determine whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive to support a claim by viewing “the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” (quotation omitted).