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The Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant against “a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal ” as well as “a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.” -37 (Minn. 2006).

In Hankerson v. State , – 39 (Minn. 2006), the supreme court observed that double jeopardy may preclude consideration of an aggravating sentencing factor on resentencing when the state neither sought an aggravated sentence nor presented sufficient evidence to support such a sentence in the underlying proceedings.

To the contrary, -39 (Minn. 2006), that double jeopardy may preclude a consideration of an aggravating sentencing factor on resentencing when the state presented insufficient evidence at the first trial to support the adoption of the aggravating factor.

-42 (Minn. 2006) (citing Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292-94 (1977) (holding that changing the roles of judge and jury was procedural and, therefore, not an ex post facto violation)).

Particularly, double-jeopardy rights “protect[] criminal defendants from three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.” Hankerson v. State , - 37 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).

See Hankerson v. State , , 237 (Minn. 2006) (holding that a sentencing trial following a Blakely infringement does not violate a defendant’ s double-jeopardy rights because it is not a second prosecution).

“To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be [1] retrospective—that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment—and [2] it must disadvantage the offender affected by it.” ().

V. This Double - Jeopardy Clause “protects criminal d efendants from three distinct abuses: [1] a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; [2] a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and [3] multiple punishments for the same offense.” -37 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).

Appellant cites Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 2150 (1978), -39 (Minn. 2006), for his claim that the district court’s consideration of the facts of the first -degree offense in sentencing on the second-degree offense “violated the principles of fairness and justice.” But Burks and Hankerson stand generally for the proposition that when an appellate court finds evidenc

n.4 (Minn. 2015); Hankerson v. State , Barker, d at 768.

d 232, 233, 236, 240-41 (Minn. 2006) (holding that the district court had the authority to empanel a sentencing jury to evaluate the aggravated-sentencing factors, where the district court initially denied a motion to vacate an aggravated sentence and the appellant’s underlying sentence had not expired, and that this pro

Appellant argues that remand for a as support for his argument.

See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 273, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2139-40 (1996); -37 (Minn. 2006).

2 “To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be [1] retrospective—that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment—and [2] it must disadvantage the offender affected by it.” (quoting Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See, e.g., Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64, 98 S. Ct. 2170, 2179 (1978); - 37 (Minn. 2006)

“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause protects criminal defendants not just from multiple punishments, but multiple prosecutions.” (Page, J., dissenting).

-37 (Minn.2006) (discussing that double jeopardy protections prohibit “a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction”); see also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498 , 104 S.Ct.

237-41 (Minn.2006), the supreme court determined that the offender’s double jeopardy rights were not violated when the district court denied her postconviction request to vacate her sentence and impose the presumptive guideline sentence, but impaneled a new jury to consider aggravating factors.

As a matter of judicial policy in Minnesota, “a court cannot ‘impose on a defendant who has secured a new trial a sentence more onerous than the one he initially received.’ ” (quoting State v. Holmes, 281 Minn. 294, 296 , , 652 *470 (1968)).

As a matter of judicial policy in Minnesota, “a court cannot ‘impose on a defendant who has secured a new trial a sentence more onerous than the one he initially received.’” (quoting State v. Holmes, 281 Minn. 294, 296 , ).

Finally, we have interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause 2 of the United States Constitution to protect criminal defendants both from prosecution for the same offense after either acquittal or conviction and from “multiple punishments for the same offense.” -37 (Minn.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).