Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Manns, 810 N.W.2d 303.

227 citing documents.

State of Minnesota v. James Lamar Davis Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Scott Richard Seelye Minn. Ct. App. 2016
(characterizing subdivision 1 as “assault-fear” and subdivision 2 as “assault-harm” and attempted assault).
State of Minnesota v. John Charles Kotten Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Mark Anthony Givins Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Daniel Lee Bender Minn. Ct. App. 2016
10(1) (prohibiting an act done with the intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death) is a specific-intent crime.”
State of Minnesota v. Alie Christine Theodore Dorn 875 N.W.2d 357 Minn. Ct. App. 2016
he “did not intentionally push [the complainant] into the fire, but she did intentionally push [him] two times, which resulted in him falling into the embers and causing significant burns.” The district court found that “[a]lthough the Defendant contends that she did not intend to push [him] into the fire, that is not the standard that the State must meet in this case,”
State of Minnesota v. Sabrina Beth O'Brien Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Malicious punishment of a child is a general-intent crime because it requires only that “the defendant intended to do the physical act” and not “that the defendant meant to violate the law or cause a particular result.” –10 (Minn. 2012) (concluding that assault-harm is general-intent crime because “[a]lthough the definition of assault-harm requires the State to prove that the defendant intended to do the physical act, nothing in the definition requires proof that the defendant meant to violate t
State of Minnesota v. Luis Daniel Ruiz-Oliva Minn. Ct. App. 2016
9, 10 (2010); (stating that assault-harm is a general intent crime, meaning that “[a]lthough the definition of assault-harm requires the State to prove that the defendant intended to do the physical act, nothing in the definition requires proof that the defendant meant to violate the law or cause a particular r
Amanda Jean Lunzer v. State of Minnesota 874 N.W.2d 819 Minn. Ct. App. 2016
The state asserts that we have “jurisdiction to consider the stay of adjudication as a sentencing appeal under the rules of criminal procedure,”
State of Minnesota v. Tiffaney Diane Hill Minn. Ct. App. 2016
(explaining that “regardless of whether an offense is described as a specific- or general-intent crime, a defendant must voluntarily do an act or voluntarily fail to perform an act”) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Kremer, 262 Minn. 190, 192, 114
State of Minnesota v. Jesus Armando Puente Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Kevin Charles Owens Minn. Ct. App. 2016
-59 (Minn. 2007) (stating that “jury instructions must include all elements of the offense” and that failure to instruct the jury on an element of an offense is error that is plain)
State of Minnesota v. Cedric Chappell, Jr. Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Pierre Scott Glass Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Noting that Glass did not object to the instruction, the state argues that we should not entertain Glass’s “unpreserved policy argument.” “Failure to object to jury instructions before they are given generally constitutes a forfeiture of the right to an appeal based on those instructions.” d 303, 311–12 (Minn. 2012).
State of Minnesota v. Alexander Kenton Edmondson Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Appellant relies on State v. Fleck to support his argument that assault-fear, in contrast to assault-harm, is a specific-intent crime “requir[ing] the State to prove the defendant committed an act with an additional special mental element—specifically: ‘an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death.’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd.
State of Minnesota v. Nathan Edward Palmer Minn. Ct. App. 2015
that the defendant meant to violate the law or cause a particular result.” -10 (Minn. 2012).
State of Minnesota v. Timothy John Bakken Minn. Ct. App. 2015
“[F]ailure to properly instruct the jury on all elements of the offense charged is plain error.”
State of Minnesota v. Derik Chester Rekdal Minn. Ct. App. 2015
A statute is ambiguous “when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”
State of Minnesota v. Thomas Raymond Struzyk 869 N.W.2d 280 Minn. 2015
(describing the distinction between assault-harm and assault-fear).
State of Minnesota v. Vennie Jerome Williams Minn. Ct. App. 2015
“A statute is ambiguous only when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”
In re the Matter of: Dakota County, Lorinda Elaine Floding, Below v. Darrell Ray Gillespie 866 N.W.2d 905 Minn. 2015
A statute is ambiguous “when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”
State of Minnesota v. Brian J. Machacek Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Christopher Thomas Wenthe 865 N.W.2d 293 Minn. 2015
A general-intent crime requires only that the defendant “intentionally engag[ed] in the prohibited conduct,” whereas a specific-intent crime “requires an 'intent to cause a particular result.’ ” (quoting 9 Henry W. McCarr & Jack S. Nord-by, Minnesota Practice-Criminal Law and Procedure § 44:3, at 515 (4th ed.2012)).
State of Minnesota v. Trevon Fuller Minn. Ct. App. 2015
“[F]ailure to properly instruct the jury on all elements of the offense charged is plain error.”
State of Minnesota v. Cole Lyle Kjellberg Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Clint Ryan Serrano Minn. Ct. App. 2015
An instruction is given in error when it “materially misstates the law.”
State of Minnesota v. Brian Kenneth Moore 863 N.W.2d 111 Minn. Ct. App. 2015
d 303, 311 (Minn. 2012), for the proposition that “jury instructions must define the crime charged and explain the elements of the offense to the jury.” Id.
State of Minnesota v. Carl Lee Nodes 863 N.W.2d 77 Minn. 2015
A statute is ambiguous “when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”
State of Minnesota v. Yuri Alexander Taylor Minn. Ct. App. 2015
-10 (Minn. 2012) (construing Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd.
State of Minnesota v. Sammy Lee Mays Minn. Ct. App. 2015
(“The phrase ‘with intent to’ is commonly used by the [l]egislature to express a specific-intent requirement.”).
State of Minnesota v. Jeffery Dale Trevino Minn. Ct. App. 2015
- 10 (Minn. 2012) (holding that assault-harm is a general-intent crime).
State of Minnesota v. Spidel Wayne Browder Minn. Ct. App. 2015
“When a statute simply prohibits a person from intentionally engaging in the prohibited conduct, the crime is considered a general-intent crime.”
State of Minnesota v. Fonati McArthur Diggs Minn. Ct. App. 2015
The third prong is satisfied “if there is a reasonable likelihood that the error had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.”
State of Minnesota v. Abdirahman Ali Moallin Minn. Ct. App. 2014
“[A]n error affects substantial rights if there is a reasonable likelihood that the error had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.”
State of Minnesota v. Malcolm Roy Evans Minn. Ct. App. 2014
“[E]rror is plain if it is clear or obvious” or “if the error contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” (quotations omitted)
State of Minnesota v. Rosalind Rae Loggin Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Timothy John Huber Minn. Ct. App. 2014
“It is well settled that jury instructions must define the crime charged and explain the elements of the offense to the jury.” (emphasis added)
Harvey Ray Dupey v. State of Minnesota 855 N.W.2d 544 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Harvey Ray Dupey v. State of Minnesota 855 N.W.2d 544 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Although Dupey may be correct that no judgment of conviction can be entered until a stay of adjudication is revoked, a stay of adjudication is in itself a “sentence.” d 303, 303 (Minn. 2005) (mem.)
State of Minnesota v. Bernard Miles Minn. Ct. App. 2014
- 10 (Minn. 2012) (discussing intent requirements for assault); (discussing intent requirements in terroristic threats statute), review denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Robert John Meyers 853 N.W.2d 819 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
(holding that assault-harm is a general-intent crime, meaning that proof that the defendant intended to cause a particular result is unnecessary to convict).
State of Minnesota v. Rebecca Brynetta Passon Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. John Christopher Winford Minn. Ct. App. 2014
We review the district court’s jury instructions to determine whether they “fairly and adequately explain the law.”
State of Minnesota v. Devon Scott Martin Minn. Ct. App. 2014
The assault charged is a specific intent offense, so the state must prove that Martin intended to cause C.W.
Robert Earl Pittman, Jr. v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Alex Cennedi Closmore Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Ahavel Abimbola Scherz Minn. Ct. App. 2014
d 303, 308–10 (Minn. 2012) (construing substantively identical language in Minn. Stat. 1 Scherz mischaracterizes K.J.’s stated reason for running away.
State of Minnesota v. Emmanuel Maurice Galloway Minn. Ct. App. 2014
“Under this standard, we may review an unobjected-to error only if there is (1) error; (2) that is plain; and (3) that affects substantial rights.” -56 (Minn. 2007)
State of Minnesota v. Gregory Brian-Will Thompson Minn. Ct. App. 2014
“[J]ury instructions must define the crime charged and explain the elements of the offense to the jury.”
State of Minnesota v. Charles Edward Love Minn. Ct. App. 2014
(quotation omitted) (“An erroneous jury instruction does not require a new trial if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).