Cited by

State v. Fleck , , 307 (Minn. 2012).

State v. Fleck , , 307 (Minn. 2012).

An offense is considered a general-intent crime “[w]hen a statute simply prohibits a person from intentionally engaging in the prohibited conduct.” () (other citation omitted).

State v. Fleck , , 307 (Minn. 2012).

State v. Fleck , , 308 (Minn. 2012) (citing 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.2(e) (2d ed. 2003) (explaining that general intent requires an "intention to make the bodily movement which constitutes the act which the crime requires")).

State v. Fleck , , 307 (Minn. 2012).

State v. Fleck , , 307 (Minn. 2012).

State v. Fleck , , 307 (Minn. 2012).

“When interpreting a statute, we must first determine whether the statute’s language, on its face, is clear or ambiguous.” (quotation omitted).

“[T]he mens rea element of assault -harm, ‘intentional,’ requires only the general intent to do the act that results in bodily harm.” State v. Dorn , ( (holding that assault-harm is general-intent crime)).

-10 (Minn. 2012) (concluding that assault- harm is a general -intent crime because it requires only that the defendant intended to do the physical act and not that the defendant intended to cause a particular result).

7 We also recognize that our prior holding in State v. Dalbec , , 512-13 (Minn. 2010), that assault-fear and assault-harm are "alternative means by which an assault may be committed" has been called into question by the supreme court's holding in *812 State v. Fleck , , 312 (Minn. 2012), that assault-harm is a general-intent crime and assault-fear is a specific-intent crime.

the state’s argument is that it reads too much into State v. Fleck, because the Fleck court established only that the intent-to-harm offense was a general intent crime, and it expressly clarified, “We need not, and do not, address Fleck’s argument that an attempt to inflict bodily harm is a specific-intent crime because the facts of Fleck’s case involve the actual infliction of bodily harm.” n.5 (Minn. 2012).

to support his argument that the instructions here, which allowed the jury to find assault by fear or harm, likewise allowed the jury to reach a verdict that was not unanimous.

State v. Fleck , , 307 (Minn. 2012).

State v. Fleck , -09 (Minn. 2012) ; State v. Hough , 5-96 (Minn. 1998).

“[A] specific -intent crime requires an intent to cause a particular result.” (quotation omitted).

State v. Fleck , , 308 (Minn. 2012).

-661 (Minn. 2007), see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1837 (1999) (concluding that the omission of the element of “materiality” from jury consideration is subject to harmless-error analysis, and that the omission was harmless because the element wa s not contested at trial and supported by

An ambiguity exists “only when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”

‘shut up’ would not put fear in the child is unreasonabl e.” Although Patchen denied hitting his son in any way, his admissions support an “assault-fear” offense, which “does not require a finding of actual harm to the victim.” ( discussing Minn. Stat. § 609.02, su bd.

Assault-fear occurs “through ‘an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death.’”

A defendant commits assault -fear if he engage s in “an act with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death.” (quotation omitted); see Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd.

“A person commits the offense of assault-fear through ‘an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death.’” (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd.

Although a defendant’s action must be intentional, “assault -harm is a general -intent crime.” State v. Fleck

-67 (Minn. 1981); see also State v. Fleck , (“[G]eneral intent only requir es an intention to make the bodily movement which constitutes the act which the crime requires.” (quotation omitted)).

The third prong is satisfied if there is a “reasonable likelihood that the error had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” n.8 (Minn. 2007)

To accomplish those goals, “jury instructions must define the crime charged and explain the elements of the offense to the jury.”

The third prong is satisfied if there is a “reasonable likelihood that the error had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” n.8 (Minn. 2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Fleck

But failure to object will not preclude appellate review if the instructions constitute plain error affecting substantial rights or an error of fundamental law.” State v. Vance , -55 (Minn. 2007) (citation omitted)

“A statute is ambiguous only when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” (emphasis added) (), Here, Boecker pleaded guilty to first-degree DWI, which is defined as: Subdivision 1.

And because of its specific-intent requirement, the statute does not target broad categories of speech.

Domestic assault – intent to cause fear – is a specific-intent crime, requiring that the defendant have an intent to cause a particular result: the state must “prove the defendant committed an act with an additional special mental element—specifically an act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death.” (quotation and emphasis omitted).

Appellant satisfies this prong of the analysis if he shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the error had a significant effect on the [district court’s] verdict.”

The third prong of the plain-error test is satisfied if there is a “reasonable likelihood that the error had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” 11 n.8 (Minn. 2007)

“When a statute simply prohibits a person from intentionally engaging in the prohibited conduct, the crime is considered a general-intent crime.”

d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012) (construing identical statutory language from Minn. Stat. § 609.02, 3 subd.

10(2), is a general-intent crime.” -10 (Minn. 2012).

-09 (Minn. 2012) (holding that assault-harm is a general- intent crime, to which voluntary intoxication is not a defense).