Cited by

–28 (Minn. 2007).4 In sum, although Larrison continues to be the appropriate test for false testimony, including cases of witness recantation or admission by the State that a witness falsely testified, it is not applicable here because the appellant presents a new expert opinion that merely offers a dif

Because we generally look “with disfavor on motions for a new trial founded on alleged recantations,” the first prong of the Larrison test is not met “by a simple statement contradicting earlier testimony” or a determination that “a witness is generally unreliable.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

6 allegations that “false testimony was given at trial.” (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).

Gilbert, d at 771 (stating that “a difference of 3 The state also asserted in its briefs that the Larrison test does not apply to expert opinions.

(applying test for newly discovered evidence rather than Larrison test).

(stating that a postconviction petitioner “has the burden of 7 showing that he is entitled to relief”).

The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to relie f. Pippitt v. State

See Opsahl, d at 422; (“[W] e have also indicated that Larrison applies more generally, such as ‘ when a court reviews an allegation that fals e testimony was given at trial.’ ” ( )).

The Larrison test governs our analysis in cases in which there are allegations that “false testimony was given at trial.” (emphasis added).

“We will not grant a new trial on the basis of evidence that is merely impeaching.”

“We will not grant a new trial on the basis of evidence that is merely impeaching.” d 221, 228 (Minn. 2007).

“We will not grant a new trial on the basis of evidence that is merely impeaching.”

“We will not grant a new trial on the basis of evidence that is merely impeaching.”

-28 (Minn. 2007) 7 (stating that evidence that attacks the credibility of trial testimony is impeaching in nature and does not provide a basis for a new trial).

“We will not grant a new trial on the basis of evidence that is merely impeaching.”

-87 (Minn. 1982) (adopting the test set forth in Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir.1928)); (explaining that the Larrison test applies to witness recantations and, “more generally, ...

(holding that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial because newly discovered evidence could have been used only for impeachment of a witness who testified that the defendant participated in the killing); (concluding that new evidence that “does no

Ferguson II, d at 559-62 ; see, , 226-27 & n. 5 (Minn.2007) (citing Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir.1928)).

(citing Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir.1928), overruled by United States v. Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir.2004)).

) the evidence was not known to him or his counsel at the time of trial; (2) the failure to learn of the new evidence was not because of a lack of diligence; (3) “the evidence is material (or as we have sometimes said, is not impeaching, cumulative or doubtful)”; and (4) the evidence will probably produce an acquittal at a retrial or a more favorable result for the [petitioner], ().

Larrison v. United *708 States, 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir.1928); 4 (noting that the Larrison applies to instances when a court reviews an allegation that false testimony was given at trial).

In Cooper, we said that claims relating to closing argument generally “are known or should have been known at the time of a direct appeal.” d at 191 ( ).