Cited by

State v. Rourke , , 919 (Minn. 2009) (citing Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296 , 301, 303-04, 124 S.Ct.

See State v. Rourke , (noting that aggravating factors are reasons explaining why facts of the case provide a substantial and compelling reason to depart).

923 (Minn. 2009) (citing Minn. R. Crim.

wing 1 Under Blakely, “[a] district court must submit to a jury the question of whether the [s]tate has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of additional facts, which were neither admitted by the defendant, nor necessary to prove the elements of the offense, but which support reasons for [the sentencing] departure.” State v. Rourke

d 913, 923 (Minn. 2009).

(stating two requirements for an upward departure: “a factual finding that there exist one or more circumstances not reflected in the guilty verdict,” and “an explanation by the district court as to why those circumstances create a substantial and compelling reason” to depart).

("These explanations do not involve finding facts, nor is it a role that has traditionally belonged .to the jury, .

(stating that, when departing from the sentencing guidelines, the district court must explain why the circumstances or additional facts found by the jurors in a Blakely trial provide the court with a substantial and compelling reason to impose a sentence outside the range on the grid).

(citing State v. Rourke , ).

(explaining that, under Blakely, any facts that are “necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a .

must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” see also Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd.

Thus, two requirements must be met to support an upward sentencing departure: “(1) a factual finding that there exist one or more circumstances not reflected in the guilty verdict or guilty plea, and (2) an explanation by the district court as to why those circumstances create a substantial and compelling reason to impose a sentence outside the range on the grid.”

guilty verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” d 913, 919 (Minn. 2009) (citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301, 303–04, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004)).

A criminal law is unconstitutionally vague if it fails “to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits” or if it “authorize[s] and even encourage[s] arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” 1 But “[t]he use of somewhat general language in a statute also does not render it vague.”

See, -23 (Minn. 2009); (relying on collective experience to determine whether aggravating factor was justified).

Blakely requires a district court to “submit to a jury the question of whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of additional facts, which were neither admitted by the defendant, nor necessary to prove the elements of the offense, but which 16 support reasons for departure.”

Unless a defendant otherwise stipulates, the “district court must submit to a jury the question of whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of additional facts, which were neither admitted by the defendant, nor necessary to prove the elements of the offense, but which support reasons for departure.”

The sentencing guidelines provide a nonexclusive list of reasons for departure, and presence of children has long been recognized as an aggravating factor, (agreeing “that committing the offense in front of the children was a particularly outrageous act”).

“[A]ggravating factors [are] reasons explaining why the facts of the case provide the district court a substantial and compelling basis to impose a sentence outside the range on the grid.” (emphasis omitted).

-21 (Minn. 2009) (distinguishing between facts that 7 must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the state and reasons that explain why the district court found substantial and compelling circumstances); (

ndants knew the victim as neighbors and convinced the victim to open her door to them); –41 (Minn. App. 2004) (stating that “we have found no cases that limit the application of [the factor of abuse of a position of trust] to child victims” and “defendants who are adult authority figures”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded on other grounds

To impose a sentencing departure, a district court “must submit to a jury the question of whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of additional facts, which were neither admitted by the defendant, nor necessary to prove the elements of the offense, but which support reasons for departure.”