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Moreover, “[a] party is entitled to a specific jury instruction if evidence exists at trial to support the instruction.” 10 (Minn. 2009).

The standard of review “for claims of prosecutorial error depends on whether an objection was raised at the time of the alleged error.”

“If testimony was erroneously admitted, [appellate courts] review for harmless error.”

(“Presence, companionship, and conduct before and after an offense are circumstances from which a person’s criminal intent may be inferred.” ()).

“[A] court need not give a requested instruction if the substance of the instruction is already contained in the existing jury instructions.”

cmt.; (stating that, under rule 704 “helpfulness test,” supreme court has “not allowed ultimate conclusion testimony which embraces legal conclusions or terms of art or which simply tells the jury what conclusion to reach” (quotations omitted)).

“If testimony was erroneously admitted, [appellate courts] review for harmless error.”

See United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 906 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding an investigatory stop where person generally matched the physical description of the suspect except for the color and style of shirt); d 539, 552 (Minn. 2009) (holding that officer reasonably stopped a dark blue Honda Civic hatchback based on a description of a black Honda Accord).

See, n.2 (Minn. 2014) (“[I]n several cases, we have questioned the continued viability of [the] two-tiered approach to harmless-error review of prosecutorial misconduct.”); (recognizing two-tiered Caron test).

“Issues not raised or argued in appellant’s [principal] brief cannot be revived in a reply brief.” (), review denied (Minn. Sept.

“Issues not raised or argued in appellant’s [principal] brief cannot be revived in a reply brief.” (), review denied (Minn. Sept.

“An investigatory stop of a vehicle is justified if police have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).

“An investigatory stop of a vehicle is justified if police have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” (quotation omitted); (stating that a traffic stop must be supported by “a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot”) (quotation omitted)).

(upholding a benefit-of-a-gang conviction where the defendant and his accomplice shouted “Villa Lobos for life!” “That’s what you get!” and “Next time would be worse!” after a shooting), review denied (Minn. May 15, 2001); (upholding a benefit-of-a-gang conviction where the defendant and other gang members made gang signs while yelling and swearing at the victims shortly before attacking).

“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” (quoting Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 290 Minn. 518, 519-20, ).

See Vang, d at 582 (“[W]e do not conclude that failure to do so automatically constitutes plain error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights.”); , 558 n. 6 (Minn.2009) (“But the failure to include such language does not require automatic reversal, particularly when the record clearly indicates that it was reasonably foreseeable to appellant that if he aided and abetted [gang] members in shooting at the [rival gang members], some of the [rival gang members] wou