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A victim’s particular vulnerability “impairs the victim’s ability to seek help, fight back, or escape harm.” rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

See Vance, d at 395; Stanke, d at 828; (reversing and remanding because “the record does not permit us to conclude that the district court would have imposed the same sentence based on only the valid aggravating factor”).

district court properly considered vulnerability due to sleep when it imposed the upward durational departure, and because—as the state concedes—the district court improperly considered vulnerability due to age, the postconviction court needed to determine “whether the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent reliance upon the improper aggravating factors.” (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

A district court must provide a substantial and compelling reason when it departs from the sentencing guidelines, but it has broad discretion to depart from a presumptive sentence when aggravating factors are present.

“When determining whether to depart, the district court must consider whether the defendant’s conduct was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in such crimes.” rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

“When determining whether to depart, the district court must consider whether the defendant’s conduct was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in such crimes.” rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

Stanke, d at 829; rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

As to the zone-of-privacy violation, appellant argues that this factor does not apply because appellant and the victim lived in the same house and the assault did not occur in the victim’s bedroom, relying on State v. Mohamed , (holding that when the defendant and the victim share a residence, the factor applies only if the offense is in the victim’s bedroom), rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

a three-year- old toddler.” Baldwin argues that the district court impr operly considered C.S.’s age as a basis for departure because the elements of the offense already “account for the vulnerability of a child under four.” Baldwin acknowledges that age may be a proper consideration as an aggravating factor even when it is an element of the offense, rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

(“Because [appellant] and [victim] shared a home, the zone-of- privacy aggravating factor is limited to a bedroom within their home.”) , rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

See State v. Mohamed , (acknowledging the “special vulnerability” of those under 18 in considering the age of the victim as an aggravating 7 A “prior sex offense conviction” is one where “the offender was convicted of committing a sex offense before the offender has bee

State v. Mohamed , 9 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

State v. Mohamed , review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

State v. Mohamed , , review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010) .

See State v. Mohamed , (holding that father did not subject his so n to serious physical abuse in his son’s “zone of privacy” because there was no evidence that father committed the offense in the son’s bedroom of their shared residence), review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010); (Min

In making this determination, we consider “the weight given to the invalid factor[s] and whether any remaining factors found by the court independently justify the departure.” State v. Mohamed , review denied (Minn. May 1 8, 2010) (quotation omitted).

review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

When a district court relies on both proper and improper bases for aggravating factors, an appellate court “must determine whether the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent reliance upon the improper aggravating factor[s].” State v. Mohamed , (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

See State v. Mohamed , (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

-100 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

In State v. Mohamed , we explained that, “given the broad spectrum of physical development captured in [the statute’s] 18 –year time span, the legislature’s reco gnition does not preclude consideration of the victim’s infancy as an aggravating factor.” , 98 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

“The presence of a single aggravating factor is sufficient to uphold an upward departure.” review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

See Dillon, d at 596 (“We have found no cases in which an appellate court has held that adequate grounds to depart exist but that the district court abused its discretion by extending the sentence up to twice its presumptive term.”); –97, 100 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010) (indicating that, in some circumstances, an upward durational departure amounting to less than double the presumptive sentence could be properly based on a single aggravating factor).

28, 2011); (“The presence of a single aggravating factor is sufficient to uphold an upward departure.”), review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

177–80 (Minn. App. 2013) (19-month-old victim of felony murder), review denied (Minn. July 16, 2013); –99 (Minn. App. 2010) (4- month-old victim of malicious punishment in case charged under Minn. Stat. § 609.377, subds.

1; State v. 5 Mohamed, (holding that district court improperly relied on aggravating factor that defendant was in a position of trust in imposing upward departure on sentence for malicious punishment of a child), review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

Guidelines 2.D.2.b(1) (2011); –99 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

en defendant participated in aggravated robbery of elderly victim and then left injured, helpless victim alone in victim’s apartment); (“[B]e-cause of the absolute vulnerability of the victim and the particular cruelty of petitioner in committing the offense, the trial court would have been able to double the sentence duration.”); -99 (Minn.App.2010) (attributing particular vulnerability to victim’s infancy), review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010); (“Beard’s offense was aggravated by the absolute vu

hile it would be inappropriate for us to remand the ease to allow the district court to explain its reasons on particular cruelty after the fact, see Geller, d at 517 , we conclude that the “group of three or more” factor properly supports the departure and the district court would have “imposed the same sentence absent reliance upon the improper aggravating factor[ ].” (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).

“The presence of a single aggravating factor is sufficient to uphold an upward departure.” review denied (Minn. May 18, 2010).