Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite In Re Petition for Disciplinary Action Against Effertz, 773 N.W.2d 303.

134 citing documents.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
To determine whether the probative value of the Spreigl evidence is not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, “we balance the relevance of the other offenses, the risk of the evidence being used as propensity evidence, and the State’s need to strengthen weak or inadequate proof in the case.”
State of Minnesota v. Joseph Greene Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State of Minnesota v. Rhonda Jean Fitzgerald-Hunter Minn. Ct. App. 2017
The question becomes, is there a “reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict?”
State of Minnesota v. Damien Kent Hallmon Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Marco Anthony Gresham Minn. Ct. App. 2016
“The overarching concern behind excluding such evidence is that it might be used for an improper purpose, such as suggesting that the defendant has a propensity to commit the crime or that the defendant is a proper candidate 9 for punishment for his or her past acts.” (quotations omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Nathan Charles Robert Schwartz Minn. Ct. App. 2016
It is improper to use this evidence to suggest “that the defendant has a propensity to commit the crime or that the defendant is a proper candidate for punishment for his or her past acts.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Ian Blair Lindemyer Minn. Ct. App. 2016
“The ‘overarching concern’ behind excluding such evidence is that it might be used for an improper purpose, such as suggesting that the defendant has a propensity to commit the crime or that the defendant is a proper candidate for punishment of his or her past acts.” (quotations omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Nathaniel Donald Beulah Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Bradley Dean Johnson Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Lacy Rose Carlsen Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Shawn Deangelo Jones Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Grant Leighton Johnson Minn. Ct. App. 2016
See, (affirming use of Spreigl evidence as relevant of intent); (holding district court properly admitted evidence of Spreigl incidents to show intent); -79 (Minn. 1990) (holding no abuse of discretion where distric
State of Minnesota v. Jeremia Joseph Loper Minn. Ct. App. 2016
d 303, 321 (Minn. 2009) (stating that intent is “an inference drawn by the [fact-finder] from the totality of the circumstances”); see, e.g., Vick, d at 691 (stating that the contact described “clearly permits the inference” that defendant acted with sexual in
State of Minnesota v. Dashaunta Dmar Gomez Minn. Ct. App. 2016
d 303, 321 (Minn. 2009) (“We concluded that evidence that the defendant was armed with a pistol when he accosted the victim and shot him at close range would ‘alone’ be sufficient for the jury's finding of intentional murder.”) (citation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Reynaldo Benitez Minn. Ct. App. 2015
404(b); (stating that use of Spreigl evidence is improper to “suggest[] that the defendant has a propensity to commit the crime or that the defendant is a proper candidate for punishment for his or her past acts” (quotation omitted)).
State of Minnesota v. Pierre Scott Glass Minn. Ct. App. 2015
–22 (Minn. 2009); 768 (Minn. 1983); –71 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. Aug.
State of Minnesota v. Nathan Charles Robert Schwartz Minn. Ct. App. 2015
It is improper to use Spreigl evidence to suggest “that the defendant has a propensity to commit the crime or that the defendant is a proper candidate for punishment for his or her past acts.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Eddie Niles Hubbard Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Intent is “an inference drawn by the jury from the totality of circumstances.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Tyrone Bill Harper Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. James Michael Soderbeck Minn. Ct. App. 2015
But the error is not grounds for reversal unless there is “a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.”3 (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Levi Chen-Wah Leong Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Roxanne Kay DeFlorin Minn. Ct. App. 2015
“The overarching concern behind excluding such evidence is that it might be used for an improper purpose, such as suggesting that the defendant has a propensity to commit the crime or that the defendant is a proper candidate for punishment 4 for his or her past acts.” (quotations omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Yuri Alexander Taylor Minn. Ct. App. 2015
Intent is “an inference drawn by the jury from the totality of circumstances.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Fonati McArthur Diggs Minn. Ct. App. 2015
–17 (Minn. 2009); Riddley, d at 426–27.
State of Minnesota v. Joseph Gassoway Minn. Ct. App. 2014
(holding Spreigl evidence admissible in part because of state’s weak case).
State of Minnesota v. Mahdi Hassan Ali 855 N.W.2d 235 Minn. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Ahavel Abimbola Scherz Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Intent is “an inference drawn by the jury from the totality of circumstances.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Keith Richard Rossberg 851 N.W.2d 609 Minn. 2014
evidence,” (emphasis added), and the district court referred only to whether Rossberg “was in possession of the weapon” and said nothing about discharging the gun.
State v. Welle 847 N.W.2d 52 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
If the evidence was erroneously admitted, this court must determine whether there is “a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” (quotation omitted).
State v. Vang 847 N.W.2d 248 Minn. 2014
State v. Scruggs 822 N.W.2d 631 Minn. 2012
State v. Beecroft 813 N.W.2d 814 Minn. 2012
A. Adequacy of Miranda Warning Turning first to Beecroft’s assertion that the Miranda warning was inadequate, we have cautioned that there is “a heightened concern” that a juvenile suspect “actually comprehends that [her] statements can be used in adult court.”
State v. Austin 788 N.W.2d 788 Minn. Ct. App. 2010
(stating that intent is “an inference drawn by the [fact-finder] from the totality of the circumstances”); see, e.g., Vick, d at 691 (stating that contact described “clearly permits the inference” that defendant acted with sexual intent).
State v. Riddley 776 N.W.2d 419 Minn. 2009