Cited by

is that [such evidence] might be used for an improper purpose, such as suggesting that the defendant has a propensity to commit the crime or that the defendant is a proper candidate for pun ishment for his or her past acts.” (quotations omitted).

See, (stating that “[t]he law reflects, and the State concedes, that Fardan’s convictions should merge”); n.1.

But such evidence may be ad mitted for “other purposes, su ch as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparati on, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Id.; State v. Fardan

(indicating the 1 Evidence of other crimes or wrongful acts is not admissible except in accordance with Minn. R. Evid.

In evaluating a sentence, we “look to past sentences received by other offenders in determining whether the district court abused its discretion.”

State v. Riddley , -27 (Minn. 2009) (determining that the evidence in question did not constitute immediate episode evidence— even though the acts occurred within a span of 15 minutes and at the same location — because the other acts did not facilitate the charged offenses); d 303, 316 -17 (determining that the evidence in question did not constitute immediate episode evidence —even though the acts had a close temporal connection —because the “murder was not committed to facilitate the other off

“When consecutive sentences are permissive, [appellate courts] will not reverse the imposition of such a sentence absent a clear abuse of discretion.”

-22 (Minn. 2009) (concluding that defendant intended to kill when he fired single gunshot at victim’s abdomen from distance of three to five feet); (concluding that defendant intended to kill when he fired single gunshot at victim’s head at close range ); State v

Id.; see State v. Fardan , (stating that intent is an inference drawn by the jury from the totality of the circumstances).

In order for evidence to be properly admissible as immediate-episode evidence, the supreme court has “emphasize[d] the need for a close causal and temporal connection between the prio r bad act and the 5 charged crime.” Riddley, d at 426 ().

Citing State v. Fardan , -17 (Minn. 2009), and Riddley, d at 426 -27, Wilson argues that the threatening message was not sufficiently connected to the shooting.

In fact, we rejected a similar argument in Fraga , d at 273 n.4 (rejecting an argument that because our " 'general exclusionary rule is grounded in the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial,' " we are required to apply a constitutional test to the erroneous admission of prior bad acts evidence (quoting State v. Fardan , , 315 (Minn. 2009) )); see also Fardan , d at 320 n.9 (stating that we are not required to apply "the surely unattributable test to an erroneous admission of Spriegl e

State v. Fardan , -22 (Minn. 2009).

(stating that an erroneous admission is prejudicial when there is a “reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict” (quotation omitted)).

(noting that intent “is an inference drawn by the [fact -finder] from the totality of circumstances” (quotation omitted)).

An erroneous admission is prejudicial when there is “a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Fardan , (quotation omitted).

An erroneous admission is prejudicial when there is “a r easonable possibility that the wr ongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.”

See State v. Fardan , , 310 (Minn. 2009) (noting permissive consecutive sentences are reviewed for a clear abuse of discretion).

“The overarching c oncern behind ex cluding such evidence is that it might be us ed for an improper purpose, such as suggesting that the defendant has a propensity to commit the crime or that the defendant is a proper candidate for punishment for his or her past acts.” State v. Fardan , (quotations omitted).

evidence,” (emphasis added) .

(“To warrant a new trial, the erroneous admission of Spreigl evidence must create a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence signi ficantly affected the verdict.” (quotation omitted)).

C. Probative value vers us prejudicial effect Finally, in determining wh ether the potential for unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evid ence, courts must “balance the relevance of the [ Spreigl evidence], the risk of the evidence being used as propensity evidence, and the State’s need to strengthen weak or inade quate proof in the case.” State v. Fardan

“To warrant a new trial, the erroneous admission of Spreigl evidence must create a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State v. 6 Fardan, (quotation omitted).

.” (quotations omitted).

suggest[] that the defendant has a propensity to commit the crime or that the defendant is a proper candidate fo r punishment for his or her past acts.” (quotations omitted); see State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 490, (providing the common-law exclusionary rule regarding prior crimes).

But the record contains no evidence that Freeberg’s fetal alcohol syndrome is severe enough to 16 deprive him of control over his actions .6 See State v. Fardan , 22–23 (Minn. 2009) (determining defendant’s fetal alcoh ol syndrome did not constitute mitigating factor in sentencing).

suggest[] that the defendant has a propensity to commit the crime or that the defendant is a proper candidate for puni shment for his or her past acts.” (quotations omitted); see State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 490, d 167, 169 (1965) (stating the co mmon law exclusionary rule).

Fraga contends that the erroneous admission of his prior bad acts must be evaluated under the constitutional harmless-error test because-in State v. Fardan, we said our “general exclusionary rule is grounded in the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.” , 315 (Minn. 2009) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

And we “look to past sentences received by other offenders in determining whether the distinct court abused its discretion.”