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The Minnesota Supreme Court “ha[s] interpreted section 590.04 to require the petitioner to allege facts that, if proven, would entitle him to relief.”

” –30 (Minn. 2010) (rejecting as meritless appellant’s argument “that he was wrongly convicted of aiding and abetting the [crime] because the State’s theory at trial was that” he was the principal in the crime).

“The presentation of evidence is a matter of trial strategy, and we will not review attacks on trial strategy.”

Rather, it is “a theory of criminal liability.” –30 (Minn. 2010).

to receive an evidentiary hearing is lower than that required to receive a new trial,” and a hearing must be held “if a petitioner alleges facts that, if proven, would entitle him to relief.”

d 719, 737 (Minn. 2010) (an evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s allegation that witness’s trial testimony was false was appropriate where petitioner supported his claim with an affidavit from another individual who swore that the trial witness confessed to the killing); Caldwell, d at 771 (“[T]he sworn affidavit

Rather, it is “a theory of criminal liability.” d 719, 729-30 (Minn. 2010).

See State v. Brown , (“What the parties agreed to involves an issue of fact to be resolved by the district court.”); see also Dobbins v. State , (stating that factual findings will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous).

*302 State v. Smith , , 322 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Dobbins v. State , , 731 (Minn. 2010) ).

Dobbins v. State , , 736 (Minn. 2010).

it from an investigator who interviewed the recanting witnesses was sufficiently trustworthy and an evidentiary hearing was required); Martin v. State , , 743 (Minn. 2013) (concluding that the petitioner was entitled to a hearing because the witnesses offered explanations for the recantations and submitted affidavits that formally recanted their sworn testimony); Dobbins v. State , , 734-35 (Minn. 2010) (concluding that a sworn affidavit from someone who spoke directly with the witness recanting

See Dobbins v. State , , 729 (Minn. 2010).

See, e.g., Caldwell, d at 771; –34 (Minn. 2010); 424 (Minn. 2004 ); Ferguson v. State, 6

court abused its discretion, exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, or based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law.” (quotation omitted).

And, in a close case, “any doubts about whether to conduct a postconviction hearing should be resolved in favor of the petitioner.”

And “lawyers representing appellants should be encouraged to limit their contentions on appeal at least to those which may be legitimately regarded as debatable.” (quotation omitted).

And “ lawyers representing appellants should be encouraged to limit their contentions on appeal at least to those which may be legitimately regarded as debatable .” (quotation omitted).

21, 2016) (d 719, 725 (Minn. 2010)).

See, d 719, 731 (Minn. 2010) (noting that burden of overturning grand jury indictment is heavier after a fair trial and a jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).

Nicks, d at 511; d 719, 733 (Minn. 2010).

“A grand jury determines whether ‘there is probable cause to believe the accused has committed a particular crime.’ ” ().'

In Ferguson, d at 445-46, -34 (Minn. 2010), we held that although evidence in the form of a third-party hearsay affidavit was sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing, it did not entitle the petitioner to a new trial.

“[A]ccomplice liability is a theory of criminal liability, not an element of a criminal offense or separate crime.” –30 (Minn. 2010); see also State v. Britt, 279 Minn. 260, 263, (agreeing with district court that “there is no separate crime of criminal liability for a crime committed by another person”).