Cited by

d 725, 732-33 (Minn. 2010) (concluding that because the petitioner’s ineffective-assistance- of-appellate-counsel claim is partially based on appellate counsel’s failure to raise another claim on direct appeal, the merits of both claims must be addressed).

These decisions by counsel, however, are matters of trial strategy, which this court is generally reluctant to review for ineffective assistance because of the public policy concern of “allowing counsel to have the flexibility to represent a client to the fullest extent possible.” 11

736 (Minn. 2010); d 703, 717 (Minn. 2003) (rejecting an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based, in part, on ineffective cross-examination).

(considering argument that trial counsel should have impeached witnesses with certain evidence).

A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has “ ‘exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.’ ” ().

More recently, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that “[t]here is ‘a critical difference between a rule governing subject-matter jurisdiction and an inflexible claim-processing rule.’” (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456, 124 S. Ct. 906, 916 (2004)); (“[T]here is a fundamental difference between finding that a deadline is mandatory and concluding that it operates to take away the district court’s

4 capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

eme Court in Wood emphasized the difference between forfeiture and waiver: “We note here the distinction between defenses that are ‘waived’ and those that d at 603 (citing Day for proposition that statute of limitations is not jurisdictional bar); (distinguishing Day); (citing Day for proposition that statute of limitations is not jurisdictional).

To have a valid ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, appellant must show “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

We do not reverse the postconviction court “unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

We will not reverse an order “unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

The denial of a postconviction petition “will not be reversed unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

We have said that “a matter will not be reversed unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

But this argument does not satisfy the second exception to Knaffla: “The interests of justice exception to the Knaffla bar does not apply when a party simply believes an argument actually raised on direct appeal could have been more complete.”

(reviewing the denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion).