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“We review the denial of postconvic tion relief for abuse of discretion.”

A district court abuses its discretion when it has “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious 3 manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

We will not reverse a district court’s denial of a petition for relief unless the court “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

A district court abuses its discretion when it has “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

“Under this standard of review, a matter will not be reversed unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an 12 erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

And “unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings,” we will not reverse the denial of a

“Under this standard of review, a matter will not be reversed unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its r uling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

A district court abuses its discretion when it has “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

A district court abuses its discretion when it has “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearl y erroneous factual findings.”

Appellate courts will not reverse an order “unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

(quoting Reed v. State , ).

Reed v. State , , 729 (Minn. 2010).

“Under this standard of review, a matter will not be reversed unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a party must demonstrate “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional erro rs, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (quotations omitted).

Reed v. State , , 729 (Minn. 2010).

D E C I S I O N We review the denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion, and reversal is warranted only if “the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clea rly erroneous factual findings.”

(quoting Reed v. State , ).

Grauberger must therefore show “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (quotation omitted).

“We will reverse a postconviction court only if it ‘exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual 4 findings.’” ().

Reed v. State , , 729 (Minn. 2010).

Reed v. State , , 729-30, 737-38 (Minn. 2010).

Accordingly, Schiller must show “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness , and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)).

" Brown v. State , , 786 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Reed v. State , , 729 (Minn. 2010) ).

We will reverse a postconviction court if the court “ ‘exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.’ ” Brown v. State , (quoting Reed v. State , ).

Section 171.19 explicitly states that it applies, “except where the license is revoked or disqualified under section 169A.52.” 3 Recently, the supreme court has clarified that there is “a critical difference between a rule governing subject -matter jurisdiction and an inflexible claim -processing rule.” (quotation omitted); (“[T]here is a fundamental difference between finding that a deadline is mandatory and concluding that it operates to take away the district court’s authority to act.”); John

Reed v. State , , 729 (Minn. 2010).

Reed v. State , , 729 (Minn. 2010).

“We will not reverse the denial of postconviction relief unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

This standard calls for “representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” 3 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

(“[A]n ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim is not subject to the Knaffla bar when it cannot be said that the defendant knew or had a basis to know about the claim at the time of direct appeal .”).

We acknowledge that the supreme court in Tupa did not hold that the statute -of- limitations defense may never be waived, and that our supreme court has since concluded that a “statute-of-limitations defense is a claim-processing rule, which is subject to waiver.” 5 Reed v. State , (holding that a statute -of-limitations defense is not a jurisdictional rule that deprives a district court of its power to adjudicate a case).