Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Wolf v. BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORPORATION, 787 N.W.2d 575.

100 citing documents.

  • Antoine Goodman v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
  • Megan Marie Kochendorfer v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
  • Ky Antoinette Word v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
  • Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs 870 N.W.2d 103 Minn. Ct. App. 2015
    n.11 (Minn. 2010); Swanson, d at 274; In re Phillips’ Trust, 252 Minn. 301, 306
  • Victoria Lynn Robinson v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
    d 575, 582 (Minn. 2010).
  • In the Matter of Reichmann Land and Cattle, LLP. 867 N.W.2d 502 Minn. 2015
    ann argues that this interpretation leads to an absurd result because “there will always be a gap between the time that grasses begin to grow in the spring and farm fields are tilled and traditional crops are planted and begin to grow.” However, “when the words of a statute are clear, we may not disregard the letter of the law under the pretext of pursuing the law’s spirit.” (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.16).
  • Michael Wayne v. State of Minnesota 866 N.W.2d 917 Minn. 2015
    Subdivision 4(b)(5) is “reserved for 5 exceptional cases.” ().
  • In the Matter of the Expulsion of A.D. from United South Central Public Schools No. 2134 Minn. Ct. App. 2015
  • Mark Edward Wetsch v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
    To satisfy that exception, “a claim must have substantive merit and the defendant must not have deliberately and inexcusably failed to raise the issue on direct appeal.”
  • In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Duane A. Kennedy, a Minnesota 864 N.W.2d 342 Minn. 2015
    “In order to prove a claim by clear and convincing evidence, a party’s evidence should be unequivocal, intrinsically probable and credible, and free from frailties.”
  • Jacob Stephen Brown v. State of Minnesota 863 N.W.2d 781 Minn. 2015
    To prove a claim by clear and convincing evidence requires a party’s evidence to be “unequivocal, intrinsically probable and credible, and free from frailties.”
  • Alina Marie Konczak v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
  • John Stephen Woodward v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
    [and] ha[s] identified a non-exclusive list of factors to be considered.” d 575, 586 (Minn. 2010).
  • Tha Phongvixay v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
  • Harold David Yaritz v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
    “A petition is frivolous if it is perfectly apparent, without argument, that the petition is without merit.”
  • Benard Nyangate Mauti v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
    The interests-of-justice exception applies only in truly “exceptional situations.” -87 (Minn. 2010).
  • Phillip Anthony Roberts v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2015
  • German N. Salgado Velasquez v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2014
  • Phillip Anthony Roberts v. State of Minnesota 856 N.W.2d 287 Minn. Ct. App. 2014
    “[Appellate courts] have only applied the interests of justice in exceptional situations.”
  • Abdirisak Dahir Jama v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2014
    The interests-of-justice exception applies only in “exceptional situations.”
  • In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: S. W. N. and J. L. P., Parents Minn. Ct. App. 2014
  • State of Minnesota v. Abdullahi Jimale Jama Minn. Ct. App. 2014
  • Gary Ekdahl, Relator v. Independent School District 213, Self-Insured/Riverport Insurance Services 851 N.W.2d 874 Minn. 2014
    See, n.11 (Minn. 2010) (“[W]hen the legislature uses a phrase we assume .
  • David Joseph Masters v. Commissioner of Public Safety Minn. Ct. App. 2014
  • Miles v. State 840 N.W.2d 195 Minn. 2013
    (explaining that when addressing the newly discovered evidence exception, “we are only concerned with whether section 590.01, subdivision 4(b), permits consideration of the petition, and not with the petition’s merits”); see also Minn.Stat.
  • State v. Broten 836 N.W.2d 573 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
    see also Aberle v. Faribault Fire Dep’t Relief Ass’n, 230 Minn. 353, 360 , (“The word ‘or’ is a disjunctive and ordinarily refers to different things as *577 alternatives.”).
  • State v. Brown 835 N.W.2d 24 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
  • In re the Civil Commitment of Moen 837 N.W.2d 40 Minn. Ct. App. 2013
    586 n. 11 (Minn.2010); Swanson, d at 274-75 ; In re Phillips’ Trust, 252 Minn. 301, 306
  • Clifton v. State 830 N.W.2d 434 Minn. 2013
    (“In order to prove a claim by clear and convincing evidence, a party’s evidence should be unequivocal, intrinsically probable and credible, and free from frailties.”).
  • Francis v. State 829 N.W.2d 415 Minn. 2013
  • Berkovitz v. State 826 N.W.2d 203 Minn. 2013
  • Mosloski v. Spencer 825 N.W.2d 753 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
    586 n. 11 (Minn.2010); Swanson, d at 274 ; In re Phillips' Trust, 252 Minn. 301, 306
  • Vazquez v. State 822 N.W.2d 313 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
    As the supreme court has stated in identifying the factors to be used in applying the “interests of justice” exception, “the reversal of a conviction may seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
  • Wallace v. State 820 N.W.2d 843 Minn. 2012
    Although we have extensively defined what a petitioner must show to obtain relief in the “interests of justice,” we have only briefly described what it means for a postconviction petition to be “frivolous.” -87 (Minn.2010).
  • State v. Davis 820 N.W.2d 525 Minn. 2012
    -90 (Minn.2011); -80 (Minn.2010); -95 (Minn.2010); (discussing that an inmate refused to testify at a trial because “living in prison as a snitch was worse than the possibility of a longer sentence for refusing to testify”).
  • Riley v. State 819 N.W.2d 162 Minn. 2012
    “[T]o prove a claim by clear and convincing evidence, a party’s evidence should be unequivocal, intrinsically probable and credible, and free from frailties.”
  • Sanchez v. State 816 N.W.2d 550 Minn. 2012
    4, is clear and free from all ambiguity.” , 584 (Minn.2010).
  • Carlton v. State 816 N.W.2d 590 Minn. 2012
    A petition is considered frivolous “if it is perfectly apparent, without argument, that the petition is without merit.” (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 692 (8th ed.1999) (defining “frivolous” as “[l]acking a legal basis or legal merit; not serious; not reasonably purposeful”)).
  • Hansen v. Robert Half International, Inc. 813 N.W.2d 906 Minn. 2012
  • State v. Beecroft 813 N.W.2d 814 Minn. 2012
  • Colbert v. State 811 N.W.2d 103 Minn. 2012
    Because we hold that review of Colbert’s petition is barred by subdivision 4(c), we do not decide the merits of Colbert's argument that his petition is "not frivolous and in the interests of justice.” We note, however, that we only apply the “interests of justice” provision in exceptional situations, and Colbert’s petition does not present exceptional circumstances.
  • State v. Fitman 811 N.W.2d 120 Minn. Ct. App. 2012
    586 n. 11 (Minn.2010); see also Minn.Stat.
  • Roby v. State 808 N.W.2d 20 Minn. 2011
    The clear and convincing evidence standard is met “when the truth of the fact to be proven is ‘highly probable.’ ” ().
  • Inquiry into the Conduct of Galler 805 N.W.2d 240 Minn. 2011
    “Clear and convincing evidence requires that the truth of the facts asserted be ‘highly probable.’ ” ()
  • U.S. Bank N. A. v. Cold Spring Granite Co. 802 N.W.2d 363 Minn. 2011
    § 645.08(1) (2010), “words and phrases are construed according to the rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” We have said that “when the legislature uses a phrase we assume the legislature is aware of the common law understanding of the phrase and that the legislature intended to use the phrase according to its commonly understood meaning.”
  • State v. Hawes 801 N.W.2d 659 Minn. 2011
  • Miles v. State 800 N.W.2d 778 Minn. 2011
    In two related cases, we considered whether newly discovered evidence in the form of a report and a letter that undermined the testimony of a state firearms witness would establish the innocence of the petitioners by a “clear and convincing standard.” In both cases, we
  • State v. Milliman 802 N.W.2d 776 Minn. Ct. App. 2011
    586 n. 11 (Minn.2010); In re Phillips’ Trust, 252 Minn. 301, 306
  • Rickert v. State 795 N.W.2d 236 Minn. 2011
  • Scott v. State 788 N.W.2d 497 Minn. 2010
    At trial, the State presented the testimony of *499 an FBI agent who, relying on Composite Bullet Lead Analysis (CBLA), 1 testified that a pellet recovered from the victim’s body “could have” come from a box of ammunition tied to Scott and that the pellet from the victim’s body and pellets from the box of ammuniti