Cited by

at *6 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Worthy, d at 276; (stating that a defendant’s opportunity to consult counsel about an issue supports the conclusion that the defendant made a voluntary decision).

“Whether consent is voluntary is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances.” (quotation omitted).

ourt held: “A respondent can raise alternative arguments on appeal in defense of the underlying decision when there are sufficient facts 6 in the record for the appellate court to consider the alternative theories, there is legal support for the arguments, and the alternative grounds would not expand the relief previously granted.” n.2 (Minn. 2013) (citing Grunig and determining that the state’s argument that the defendant consented to the search was properly before the court despite not being r

In Lindquist, the supreme court did not consider whether a well-trained officer would have known in February 2011 were incorrect, based on Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013).

simply by acquiescing to a claim of lawful authority.”

(applying preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in Fourth Amendment warrantless-search case); State ex rel.

See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (holding that, under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, a subject’s consent to a search must be “voluntarily given”); -72 (Minn. 2013) (considering whet her a defendant voluntarily consented to blood and urine tests under Minnesota’s implied-consent law after he was arrested for driving while impaired).

simply by acquiescing to a claim of lawful authority.”

“Taking blood and urine samples from someone constitutes a ‘search’ under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Brooks

d 563, 568 (Minn. 2013).

-31 (Minn. 2016) (holding in a related context that a urine test given under Minnesota’s implied-consen t law implicates a driver’s pri vacy rights under the Fourth Amendment).

d 563, 568-69 (Minn. 2013).

Citing State v. Brooks , the district court explained that “the law currently provides that test results from a consensual warrantless blood draw are admissible.” The district court found that the officer followed the statutory requirements of the implied-consent law before appellant consented to the test.

In considering whether a person’s consent is 10 voluntary, courts consid er the totality of the circumstance s, “including the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant is , and what was said and how it was said.” State v. Brooks , (quotation omitted).

(a pplying preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof in Fourth Amendment warrantless-search case); State ex rel.

Appellant moved to suppress the blood test results and dismiss the complaint; the court denied the motion in June 2015, determining that Minnesota’s 9-72 (Minn. 2013)

at 230 n.4; (analyzing validity of a suspected drunk driver’s consent to chemical testing under the Fourth Amendment).

Similarly, the supreme court concluded that the implied-consent advisory “made clear to [a driver] that he had a choice of whether to submit to testing.” Deputy Twaddle read the implied-consent advisory to Udovich, including the language stating that refusal is a crime, which suggests that a person may ref

d 563, 568 (Minn. 2013).

5 Appellant’s reliance on Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561 (2013) for his argument that law enforcement is required to obtain a warrant in drunk-driving investigations is misplaced.