Cited by

Riggs , d at 682 n.3 ; see State v. Nelson , , 445 (Minn. 2014) (Dietzen, J., dissenting) ("We use the 'canons of interpretation' set forth in section 645.08 to determine the threshold issue of whether the statutory language is unambiguous."); Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe , , 435 (Minn. 2009) ("We have utilized the 'canons of interpretation' set

State v. Nelson , , 436 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted); accord Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (1) (2016).

State v. Nelson , , 436 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).

If a statute is unambiguous, “then we must apply the statute ’s plain meaning.” (quotation omitted).

State v. Nelson , , 445 (Minn. 2014) (Dietzen, J. dissenting) (citing In re Stisser Grantor Trust , , 504 (Minn. 2012) ).

The problem with this analysis is that first-degree burglary is defined differently than second-degree burglary, and our precedent holds that " 'when different words are used in the same context, we assume that the words have different meanings' " State v. Nelson , , 439 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Dereje v. State , , 720 (Minn. 2013) ) (citing Transp.

(describing the word “and” as a conjunctive); see also Musacchio v. United States, — U.S. ——, ——, 136 S.Ct.

437 n.2 (Minn. 2014) (stating “the basic principle that the relevant definition of a term depends on the context in which the term is used”).

First, rather than treating the rule of lenity as a last resort, (discussing the rule of lenity and holding that it applies only when a grievous ambiguity exists after exhausting the other canons of construction), the court relied on it first to adopt Thonesavanh’s construction of the statute.

(stating that the rule of lenity only applies when there is “a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute”).

437-38 & n.2 (Minn. 2014).

(dispositive statutory- interpretation issue was raised by defendant and determined by district court in defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause); -49 (Minn. 2001) (the supreme court relied on its previous construction of a charging statut

(stating that the rule of lenity “applies to the interpretation of criminal statutes when ‘a grievous 7 ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute’ remains after we have considered other canons of statutory construction” (quoting Dean v. United States

But we only look to the rule of lenity if “a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute remains after we have considered other canons of statutory construction.” (quotation omitted).

The requirements that one must be told to “leave” and “not to return” are joined in the statute by an “and,” which 5 “ordinarily has a conjunctive meaning.”

But the rule of lenity should be used to resolve ambiguity in criminal statutes “when ‘a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute’ remains after [this court has] considered other canons of statutory construction.” (quoting Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 577 (2009)).

In pari materia is a canon of statutory interpretation that “allows two statutes with common purposes and subject matter to be construed together to determine the meaning of ambiguous statutory language.” d 433, 441-42 (Minn. 2014) (quotations omitted).

We are to apply the rule of lenity to render a criminal statute unenforceable only “when ‘a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute’ remains after we have considered other canons of statutory construction.” (emphasis added) (quoting Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 577, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2009)).

-41 (Minn.2014) (noting that when a proposition is phrased in the negative, the use of the word “or” may give rise to an interpretation that the "or” is conjunctive).

The dissent cites State v. Nelson, in which we applied the canon against surplusage, -39 (Minn.2014).