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We have also observed that the “relevant definition of a term depends on the context in which the term is used.” n.2 (Minn. 2014).

If the court concludes that a statute is unambiguous, it “must apply the statute’s plain meaning.” d 433, 436 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).

n.4 (Minn. 2014) (“[T]he canon against surplusage merely favors that interpretation which avoids surplusage[.]”).

If we conclude that a statute is unambiguous, “then we must apply the statute’s plain meaning.” (quotation omitted).

If we conclude that a statute is unambiguous, “then we must apply the statute’s plain meaning.” (quotation omitted).

-41 (Minn. 2014) (noting that when a proposition is phrased in the negative, use of “or” may allo w an interpretation that “or” is conjunctive), superseded by statute on other grounds, 2014 Minn. Laws ch. 242, § 3, at 804 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 609.375 (2020)); Binkley v. Allina Health Sys., 877

9 See also Back v. State , (interpreting “and” as conjunctive); (same), superseded by statute, Act of May 13, 2014, ch. 242, § 3, 2014 Minn. Laws 804, 804 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 609.375 (2020)); Lennartson v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep.

–41 (Minn. 2014); Lennartson v. Anoka -Hennepin Indep.

overlapping meaning are strung together.” Bryan A. Garner, Garner on Language and Writing 313 (2009); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 179 (2012).3 3 A “synonym string,” also known as a doublet or a tr iplet, describes a “lawyerly iteration” in which legal drafters “ ‘do repeat themselves and do include words that add 9 We considered a similar argument in State v. Nelson , –40 (Minn. 2014), abrogated by statute, Act of May 13, 2014, Minn. Laws 2014, ch. 242, § 3, 804, 804 (codified

Id.; d 433, 440 (Minn. 2014) (stating “and” is usually conjunctive).

See, ‒38 (Minn. 2014) (holding that “care” and “support” have distinct definitions to avoid rendering either term superfluous in the statut e at issue).

(recognizing that “the term 7 ‘and’ ordinarily has a conjunctive meaning”).

Lay dictionaries define the phrase similarly.6 Because the “relevant definition of a term depends on the context in which the term is used,” n.2 (Minn. 2014), how “broadly” or “narrowly” these definitions of “pursuant to” will be applied depends upon the breadth of the subject that follows the preposition “to.” For example, in Fabianich v. Hart, a case cited by the dissent to support its interpretation of “pursuant to” as a restrictive term, 7 s

State v. Nelson , , 437 n.2 (Minn. 2014).

see Rohmiller v. Hart , d 585, 590 (Minn. 2012) (“We cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted.”); Premier Bank v. Becker Dev., LLC, d 753, 759 (Minn. 2010) (“[I]f the language of a statute is clear and free from ambiguity, our r

State v. Nelson , , 444 (Minn. 2014).

State v. Nelson , , 436 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).

State v. Nelson , , 436 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).

State v. Nelson , , 436 (Minn. 2014).

Campbell , d at 4 ; State v. Nelson , , 436 (Minn. 2014) ("[I]f a statute is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, then we must apply the statute's plain meaning."

Co. , , 543 (Minn. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nelson , , 445 (Minn. 2014) (Dietzen, J. dissenting) ).

State v. Nelson , , 437 n.2 (Minn. 2014).

The "relevant definition of a term depends on the context in which the term is used," State v. Nelson , , 437 n.2 (Minn. 2014), and "technical words and phrases ...

We must give “words and phr ases [in a statute] their pl ain and ordinary meaning.”

State v. Nelson , , 437, n.2 (Minn. 2014) ; see also Deal v. United States , 508 U.S. 129 , 132, 113 S.Ct.

When interpreting a statute, this court “give[s] words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning.” (quotation omitted).