Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Pederson, 840 N.W.2d 433.

24 citing documents.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2026
( “Because intent involves a state of mind, it is generally established circumstantially.”).
State of Minnesota v. Justice King Whitelaw Minn. Ct. App. 2026
State of Minnesota v. Justice King Whitelaw Minn. Ct. App. 2026
“Because intent involves a state of mind, it is generally established circumstantially.” (stating that a defendant’s state of mind is “generally proved circumstantially—by drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances” (quotation omitted)).
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2025
“Because intent involves a state of mind, it is generally established circumstantially.” see also Austin, d at 792 (stating “subjective sexual intent typically must be inferred from the nature of the conduct itself”).
State of Minnesota v. Raymond Allen Torgerson Minn. Ct. App. 2024
State of Minnesota v. Raymond Allen Torgerson Minn. Ct. App. 2024
(“[R]egardless of whether an offense is described as a specific- or general-intent crime, a defendant must voluntarily do an act or voluntarily fail to perform an act.” (quotation omitted)); (“The defendant must have engaged in a volitional act and not merely acted accidentally.”).
, A22-0103 Minn. Ct. App. 2023
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2022
Alfonso Carillo Buenaventura, petitioner, Appellant, Minn. Ct. App. 2018
State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State v. Lopez 897 N.W.2d 295 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State v. Lopez 897 N.W.2d 295 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
We therefore consider whether the statutory definition of “building” includes a motel room, which is a subunit of a larger building, “The scope of the conduct forbidden by a statute presents an issue of statutory construction, which this court considers de novo.”
State v. Litzau 893 N.W.2d 405 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
State v. Litzau 893 N.W.2d 405 Minn. Ct. App. 2017
“The scope of the conduct forbidden by a statute presents an issue of statutory construction, which this court considers de novo.”
State of Minnesota v. Areial Jean Stoecker Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Areial Jean Stoecker Minn. Ct. App. 2016
Although a general-intent crime does not require proof that the defendant intended to cause a particular result, the state must prove that “the defendant engaged intentionally in specific, prohibited conduct.” (quotation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Daniel Lee Bender Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Daniel Lee Bender Minn. Ct. App. 2016
16, 2016) (applying Fleck and concluding that evidence was sufficient to support conviction of first-degree assault (great bodily harm) where state proved defendant’s general intent to use “some degree of physical force” against victim); –36 (Minn. App. 2013) (applying Fleck and concluding that evidence was sufficient to support conviction of fourth-degree assault (assault-harm on peace officer) where state proved defendant’s general intent to kick officer); (stating that “[d]omestic assault
State of Minnesota v. Clint Ryan Serrano Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Clint Ryan Serrano Minn. Ct. App. 2015
The defendant must have engaged in a volitional act and not merely acted accidentally.” d 433, 436 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotations and citation omitted).
State of Minnesota v. Travis Clay Andersen Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Travis Clay Andersen Minn. Ct. App. 2014
(analyzing sufficiency of conviction of fourth- degree assault under circumstantial-evidence standard).
State of Minnesota v. Stephen Thomas Conlin Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Stephen Thomas Conlin Minn. Ct. App. 2014
Sufficiency of the Evidence “The scope of the conduct forbidden by a statute presents an issue of statutory construction, which [appellate courts] consider[] de novo.”