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“[T]he function of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve one from unlawful 4 restraint.” State v. Schnagl , (quotation omitted).

First, “the authority of a court to review a sentence is separate and distinct from judicial authority to review the decisions of the Commissioner in administering the sentence imposed.”

In interpreting Rule 27.03, subdivision 9, we have said that “[f]or a sentence to be unauthorized, it must be contrary to law or applicable statutes.”

Moreover, “whenever possible, no word, phrase or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void or insignificant” by our interpretation of a 4 Although we have not previously interpreted this specific provision, we considered a factually similar case.

4 DECISION “[H]abeas corpus is a [statutory] remedy available to a confined person to obtain relief regarding the custody imposed, or the length of confinement in a given case.” (citing Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2014)).

-04 (Minn. 2015), a case in which the supreme court held that an inmate may obtain judicial review of the commissioner’s administrative decisions regarding implementation of a judicially imposed sentence by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

(citing Tischer v. Hous.

9; see, -02 (Minn. 2015) (stating that Rule 27.03, subdivision 9, “provides for review of the legality of the district court’s sentence” and that “[w]e have approved of the use of [that rule] to correct the conditional-release term of a previously imposed sentence” (emphasis omitted)).

The supreme court granted Ward’s petition for further review, but it stayed the proceedings until it decided another case brought under rule 27.03, subdivision 9

Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9, provides in relevant part that the district court “may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law.”

Judicial review of a DOC administrative sentencing decision is appropriately sought through a writ of habeas corpus, as Pollard petitions for here.

(stating that a motion to correct sentence is proper only when the sentence was illegal); (recognizing the district court’s authority to treat a motion to correct sentence as a postconviction petition).

(concluding that a motion filed in a criminal proceeding was not the proper procedure to obtain review of the DOC’s actions, as the DOC was not a party).

The case law has changed since 2013, with the supreme court’s and this court’s decision in Ward, and Duncan has not had an opportunity to respond to the commissioner’s assertion of the defense.

ervised-release term of 77 months and 21 days.2 After hearing argument from both parties, the court granted Ihnot’s motion to correct his sentence, ordering that “[Ihnot] is entitled to have the 77 months and 21 days he was on supervised release deducted from his conditional release period.” The state appealed, and we stayed the appeal pending the supreme court’s

“Subject matter jurisdiction is a court’s ‘statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.’” (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1010 (1998)).

(holding that Rule 27.03 “is not the proper procedure to obtain judicial review of’ an administrative decision “implementing the sentence imposed”).