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“The statutory scheme emphasizes medical evaluation and procedural protection for potential commitments, provides certain rights to 8 patients at treatment facilities, and creates a state policy in favor of voluntary treatment.” –50 (Minn. 2016).

n.7 (Minn. 2016) (making similar observations).

1(b) (emphasis added); d 547, 552 (Minn. 2016) (stating that “the word ‘or’ should be given its ordinary meaning as a disjunctive”).

Having concluded that section 282.03 is ambiguous, we “may resort to the canons of construction or legislative history in order to determine the intent of the Legislature.” -51 (Minn. 2016).

The function of this court is “limited to identifying errors and correcting them.” n.7 (Minn. 2016) (noting that it is not a court’s place to contemplate policy considerations entrusted to the legislature).

We are an error correcting court, and it is not our place to contemplate policy considerations entrusted to the legislature; d 547, 554 n.7 (Minn. 2016); (noting a party’s “meritorious policy arguments” supporting his proposed reading of a statute, but rejecting that proposed reading of the statute because “this court may not disregard ambiguous statutory language”).

(stating that word “or” should be given its ordinary meaning as disjunctive and denotes legislature’s intent to separate one clause from the next).

See Minn. Stat. §§ 12.31, 6 The goal of statutory interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2014)).

-41 (Minn. 2014) (noting that when a proposition is phrased in the negative, use of “or” may allo w an interpretation that “or” is conjunctive), superseded by statute on other grounds, 2014 Minn. Laws ch. 242, § 3, at 804 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 609.375 (2020)); n.5 (Minn. 2016) (citing this aspect of Nelson).

See, -55 (Minn. 2016) (Lillehaug, J., concurring) (discussing application of the common-law-abrogation canon), In fact, in Kratzer , we specifically rejected the argument that the common law should inform our interpretation of the phrase "knowledge and consent" in an administrative rule because there was no “reason” to

(alteration in original).

When legislative intent is clear from 6 the statute’s plain and unambiguous language, [an appellate court] interpret[s] the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to other principles of statutory interpretation.” (quotations omitted).

“When legislative intent is clear from the statute’s plain and unambiguous language, [the court] interpret[s] the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to other principles of statutory interpretation.” (quotation omitted).