Cited by

“When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and its legal determinations de novo.”

5 “When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and its legal determinations de novo.” State v. deLottinville

“[S]tanding to bring a Fourth Amendment claim hinges on whether [the defendant] has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” (citation omitted).

“When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and its legal determinations de novo.”

(stating that Fourth Amendment rights are “personal and may not be vicariously asserted” (quotation omitted)).

(quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978), for the principle that “standing to bring a Fourth Amendment claim hinges on whether [the defendant] has ‘a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place’ ”).

implied that it was okay for Officer Walker to enter the residence.” “When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s factual findings u nder a clearly erroneous standard and its legal determinations de novo.” State v. deLottinville

(noting that an individual cannot vicariously assert Fourth Amendment rights); see also Miller, 425 U.S. at 437, 440 (concluding that the depositor had no Fourth Amendment rights to copies of his checks because they were better characterized as the bank’s business records).

See, e.g., State v. deLottinville

See, (reviewing factual findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo).

State v. deLottinville , , 119 (Minn. 2017), cert.

State v. deLottinville , , 119 (Minn. 2017), cert.

18 “When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and its legal determinations de novo.”

Evidence discovered by an illegal search must be suppressed under the fruit-of-the- poisonous-tree doctrine “unless the state can show that the subsequently obtained evidence has been purged of the primary taint.” (internal quota tions and citations omitted), aff’d

State v. deLottinville , cert.

State v. deLottinville , , 119 (Minn. 2017), cert.

“When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to su ppress evidence, [appellate courts] review the district court’s factual findings under a cl early erroneous standard and its legal determinations de novo.”

Recently, we held that neither the Fourth Amendment nor Article I, Section 10 required the police to obtain a search warrant before entering a third-party’s home to execute a lawfully issued arrest warrant for a guest.

Rakas, 439 U.S. at 14 8-49, 99 S. Ct. at 43 3; -21 (Minn. 2017) (concluding that a guest, who is subject to an arrest warrant, cannot as sert the homeowner’s right to privacy); (legitimate expectation of privacy exists in a shared apartment); B.R.K., d at 576 (holding that a short-term social gues